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International Organizations, Rebel Diplomacy, and Civil Conflict Duration

How External Intervention Prolongs the War in Yemen (2014-Present)

Yin Tsit Chan

Abstract: Why does foreign intervention, in the name of civil conflict termination, overwhelmingly produce opposite outcomes? This paper looks into the Yemeni Civil War (2014-present)—one of the most grievous ongoing intrastate wars despite intense participation of external actors—to contribute to the theoretical framework on the adverse effects external intervention poses on civil conflict duration. The author argues that shifting alliances and domestic institutional plurality as a result of multilateral organizations' intervention and the absence or failure of rebel diplomacy under external influence could prolong civil wars. The case of Yemen provides an example for this rationale, with negative consequences attributed to the controversial intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the obstructed rebel diplomacy between the Houthis and external actors.

Keywords: *civil war, conflict duration, external intervention, rebel diplomacy*

Introduction

While foreign intervention and support, in theory, seek to bring quicker peace and re-stabilization to regions in civil conflict, this is usually not the case in practice.^① The war in Yemen presents a distinct example. Since the initial intervention of a foreign coalition consisting of Saudi Arabia, the United States, and a number of other Western and Middle Eastern states in 2015, Yemen has already experienced another six years of civil war. The war has caused more than 250,000 casualties and serious famine, and led to one of the most urgent humanitarian crises to date.^② Similar situations arose during Israel and Syria's intervention in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-

① Patrick M. Regan, "Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, no.1 (2002): 56.

② Daniel Egel et al., *Building an Enduring Peace in Yemen* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2021), 1.

2002) by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and many more.^①

Existing theories can be applied to explain such phenomenon to a certain extent, yet more aspects of the correlation between external intervention and civil conflict duration have been largely overlooked. Thus, this paper looks to explore the role of foreign actors in the Yemeni Civil War and their influence on the longevity of the war, in order to contribute new perspectives to the existing theoretical model on how external intervention affects civil war duration.

By conducting an exploratory case analysis of the war in Yemen and incorporating existing explanations, this paper argues that shifting alliances and institutional plurality with the engagement of multilateral actors, as well as challenges for rebel diplomacy when external states intervene, may supplement the existing arguments on how foreign intervention prolongs—rather than terminates—intrastate wars.

Existing Theories on External Intervention and Civil Conflict Duration

Previous studies debate the effect external intervention has on civil conflict duration. While Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008) finds third-party interventions supporting one side only effective in shortening the length of civil wars by increasing the “likelihood of negotiated settlement,” more scholars expect negative results on civil conflict duration when foreign actors are engaged, though they tend to reach such conclusions based on different conditions.^②

Collier et al. (2004) reveal that the duration of civil wars depends on the side with which the intervener aligns, and external military intervention only shortens civil conflicts when foreign actors solely support the rebels rather than the government, though the authors have not extensively discussed why this is the case.^③ Regan (2002) shares this conclusion by testing foreign interventions with support to both sides of the conflict, which shows that such interventions have a tendency to lead to stalemates, but not to an end of the war.^④ Sullivan and Karreth (2015) further elaborate on the argument by adding that pro-rebel interventions are most effective when the rebels’ major disadvantage lies in their conventional military capacity.^⑤

Some other scholars find the identity of the interveners important, with a distinction between state actors and multilateral organizations. For instance, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) suggest that interventions by

① David E. Cunningham, “Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no.2 (2010): 127.

② Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no.3 (2008): 360.

③ Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no.3 (2004): 261, 267.

④ Regan, “Third-Party Interventions,” 71.

⑤ Patricia L. Sullivan and Johannes Karreth, “The conditional impact of military intervention on internal armed conflict outcomes,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no.3 (2015): 269.

multilateral parties, especially UN interventions, could positively affect conflict duration by facilitating negotiations for conflict settlement or armistice.^① Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also reiterate this argument, having obtained quantitative results verifying the tendency of intervention by international organizations to improve the prospects of civil war resolution.^② On the other hand, the involvement of foreign state actors tends to complicate and prolong civil wars as they make civil wars “multi-party,” which creates conditions for longer conflicts, including “shifting alliances and incentives,” complexified settlement bargaining, and progressively asymmetrical intelligence.^③

However, these rationales cannot explain the duration of many civil wars in full, including the case of Yemen. For instance, multilateral organizations have intervened in the Yemeni war, but they have not had any substantive impact on preventing the continuation of the war. In addition, though scholars like Collier et al. (2004) have recognized the limited effect of external interventions on civil conflict duration (when fighting against rebel groups), further research is required to explain and theorize such phenomena.^④

Therefore, by exploring the case of Yemen in depth, this paper seeks to supplement the existing theoretical model of external intervention and civil conflict duration by identifying new determining factors, and fill some of the foregoing research gaps left by previous studies. For example, the Yemeni case can be used to support the correlation between intervention efforts against rebel groups and prolonged civil wars, and how international organizations may exacerbate civil war dynamics and lead to more enduring conflicts, diverging from what some existing research suggests.

Theoretical Argument

Built upon previous studies and an exploratory case analysis of the Yemeni Civil War, this paper proposes two additional factors associated with external intervention that could prolong civil conflicts: 1) institutional plurality and shifting alliances caused by international intervention, including those by multilateral organizations; and 2) the absence or failure of rebel diplomacy attributed to foreign interventions siding with the *de jure* government.

This paper considers these two factors relevant and significant for several reasons. First, existing theories underscore the positive effects brought by multinational organizations on civil war duration and condemn external state actors for creating “multi-parties.” However, international organizations may also possess negative “potentials” when they overwhelmingly represent state interests and risk alliance shifts and

① Karl R. DeRouen Jr and David Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no.3 (2004): 317.

② Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 94, no.4 (2000): 779.

③ David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no.4 (2006): 875, 878.

④ Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” 267.

institutional plurality. Second, diplomacy—as opposed to direct confrontations or sanctions—can play a crucial role in altering civil war dynamics as it facilitates communication between rebels and the international community, and can thereby reduce misperceptions and increase the likelihood of peace negotiations.^① However, when major foreign actors side with the government against rebel groups, formal diplomatic ties between the rebels and the outside world may be hindered, reflecting the existing observations that pro-government external interventions are generally ineffective in quickly ending wars.

The remainder of this paper explores these two dimensions in further detail with the case of Yemen. The case selection is appropriate, as the Yemeni Civil War—one of the few ongoing intrastate conflicts—provides a distinct example of civil conflicts accommodating extensive and enduring external interventions. Moreover, given the contemporary nature of the war in Yemen, information about foreign interventions in this case is well-documented and readily accessible, as compared to other long-lasting and foreign-aided civil wars in the past.

Case Analysis: The Yemeni Civil War

Following an overview of the war in Yemen, this analysis elaborates on the aforementioned theoretical argument and exemplifies the impact of multilateral intervention and rebel diplomacy on civil conflict duration with the Yemeni case. In particular, this section addresses the role of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Yemeni war and the obstruction of rebel diplomacy channels between the Houthis and external actors as a result of delegitimization efforts and Iranian influence.

The War in a Nutshell

When the tribal elites of Yemen decided to take a role in the Arab Spring to alter their nation's bleak economy and fragile state of security in 2011, little did they know that they would end up with a new regime far from what they intended.^② The Yemeni uprisings in 2011 overthrew the longstanding authoritarian government under Ali Abdullah Saleh and replaced him with Sunni politician Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi under the effect of the GCC Initiative.^③ Yet within three years, the Hadi government had a hard time catering to the fundamental demands of its people and resolving the most urgent issues that Yemen was facing. The Sunni identity of this leadership was no help for the situation, given the large discontented Zaidi Shia population in the north.^④ The Sunnites and the Zaidi Shiites are the two major denominations of

① Patrick M. Regan and Aysegul Aydin, "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no.5 (2006): 754.

② Khaled Fattah, "Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of Sheikhs," *Middle East Policy* 18, no.3 (2011): 81-82.

③ Thomas Juneau, "Yemen and the Arab Spring: Elite Struggles, State Collapse and Regional Security," *Orbis* 57, no.3 (2013): 415.

④ Bruce Riedel, "Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them," *Brookings Institution*, December 18, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/18/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-are-we-at-war-with-them/> (accessed December 23, 2021).

Muslims in Yemen, with the former constituting around 65% of the state's population and the latter contributing to a majority of the rest, and have maintained deep-rooted divisions.^① Therefore, when the Sunni administration once again failed the state by cutting fuel subsidies, which would further aggravate poverty, the Houthis—a Zaidi Shia armed force—organized extensive protests and marched southward, eventually seizing the Yemeni capital Sana'a from the *de jure* government of Hadi in late 2014 and early 2015.

Since then, Yemen has been in a state of insurgency that thus far has no sign of alleviation. In March 2015, alarmed by the potential for serious disturbances and rising Shia influence in its neighborhood, the predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia led a coalition of Sunni Muslim states (e.g., the UAE) into Yemen to support the Hadi government against the Houthi rebels—who were perceived to be backed by Shia Iran—through military supplies, missile attacks, and more.^② The civil conflict thus began to involve international stakeholders: on one side stood the *de jure* Hadi administration supported by the Arab coalition, while on the other was Iran aiding the self-declared Houthi regime. However, the Saudi Arabian coalition alone could hardly keep abreast with the rebel alliance and thus turned to western countries, including the US, UK, and France, for further support in the form of intelligence and other logistical support.^③ Multiple international organizations, including the UN Security Council, the European Union, the GCC, and numerous humanitarian NGOs, also entered the scene. As a result, foreign actors were even more heavily involved in the Yemeni Civil War.

International Organizations, Shifting Alliances, and State Fragmentation

While existing arguments place a major emphasis on the impact of foreign state actors on shifting alliances, exacerbated state fragmentation, and conflict duration, the effect of interventions by international organizations also requires significant attention. Unlike what previous scholars have said about the predominantly benevolent role of multinational players in contributing to peacemaking efforts and conflict termination, this paper observes that in multiple civil wars (the Yemeni war being a distinct example), international actors also carry the risk of shifting alliances and furthering state fragmentation. Further, though peacemaking negotiations are more likely when international organizations intervene, these do not necessarily result in shorter wars, and could even lead to opposite outcomes.

By looking into the case of Yemen, this paper suggests that international organizations may complicate the dynamics of civil conflicts in two primary aspects: shifting alliances caused by international

① Anthony H. Cordesman, "America, Saudi Arabia, and the Strategic Importance of Yemen," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, March 26, 2015, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/america-saudi-arabia-and-strategic-importance-yemen> (accessed February 26, 2022).

② Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, "The War in Yemen," *Survival* 58, no.6 (2016): 170-71.

③ *Ibid.*, 165.

organizations' function in representing the stakes of powerful member states, and institutional plurality within the conflict as a result of failed peacemaking efforts.

Realists and neo-Gramscians would agree on international organizations' function in pursuing the interests of member states—especially the powerful ones—rather than holding a high level of institutional autonomy and reflecting unbiased rationales in their decisions.^① In the context of a civil war, international organizations' decisions on whether to intervene, when to intervene, and who to support reflect the preferences of member states with strong voting power. For instance, actions carried out by the UN Security Council for “maintaining international peace and security”—including intervening in intrastate conflicts—are decided by procedural votes of the 15 member states, including the five permanent members with veto powers to reject operations unfavorable to their own interests.^② In this sense, it is true that peacemaking interventions by international organizations largely represent the interests of powerful member states, and international organizations can have the same impact as external state actors on multiplying divisions within states in civil conflicts and leading to longer wars. Moreover, international organizations, like state actors, may have inconsistent objectives under different circumstances when member states' interests diverge, which could result in switching alliances during wartime, further complicating the dynamics of the conflict and extending the war.

The GCC, a regional political and economic alliance which is practically dominated by Saudi Arabia, testifies this argument in the case of the Yemeni war.^③ As Saudi Arabia holds major decisional power within the institution, the GCC has long demonstrated an apparent preference for Sunni regimes in the Arab Peninsula. Since the Arab Spring, the GCC's choice of alliance has consistently reflected Saudi preferences. When Saudi Arabia was primarily concerned about regional stability during the early stages of the uprisings in Yemen, the GCC provided full support for the Saleh government against rebel elites who were attempting to overthrow it.^④ Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia's considerations changed when it realized that the Saleh administration did not possess the sufficient capacity and resolve to restore peace. The GCC quickly followed Saudi Arabia's lead and switched support to the transitional government.^⑤ The alliance shift seemed to have temporarily restored stability within the new Hadi administration, yet led to greater mistrust between the GCC and Yemen, laying the foundation for the long duration of the subsequent civil war.

① Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” *Millennium* 12, no.2 (1983): 172.

② United Nations Security Council, *Voting System*, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/voting-system> (accessed December 23, 2021).

③ Gertjan Hoetjes, “The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Failure of Peacebuilding in Yemen,” *The International Spectator* 56, no.4 (2021): 155.

④ Michael D. Rettig, “International Institutions, Institutional Duality, and State Fragmentation: The Case of Yemen,” *Social Science Research Network*, December 15, 2012, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2201920#references-widget (accessed January 3, 2022).

⑤ *Ibid.*

Additionally, institutional plurality as a result of multinational organizations' intervention also hinders state consolidation and civil conflict termination. Borrowing insights from Rettig's (2012) theory of institutional duality, institutional plurality refers to division within the same institutional system—in other words, state fragmentation.^① Interventions by international organizations have the potential to facilitate such conditions in a civil war, as the negotiations they draft and enact more often reflect the interests of their powerful members than those of the state in conflict. Consequently, such negotiations may advance some interest groups' prospects at the expense of other institutions within the same state and system, thereby encouraging divisions among the state.

In the case of the Yemeni Civil War, the GCC multilateral alliance directed the initiative that brought Hadi to power and ended the 2011 conflicts, which, on the surface, may be considered a successful intervention. Yet this consideration is deemed problematic by many due to the current fragmentation of Yemen and the duration of the ongoing war. The GCC, in accordance with the Saudi interests of restoring regional peace and ensuring Sunni leadership, brokered the initiative with Yemeni “politically relevant elites (PRE)” without the presence of students, tribal elites, and others who together constituted the majority of activists in the uprisings.^② During the conflict's temporary hiatus, most of the essential socioeconomic problems (that had led to the uprisings in the first place) were neglected and the GCC even attempted to marginalize some of these groups after 2011.^③ Scholars thus refer to the Arab Spring in Yemen as a “hijacked revolution” that failed to resolve any of the state's key grievances and instead triggered additional divisions between activist groups that had originally pursued similar objectives, such as between tribal elites and PREs.^④ The GCC initiative—despite resulting in a temporarily effective peace settlement—created more long-term state fragmentation. The unresolved grievances brought about another round of intrastate conflict in Yemen after three years and state fragmentation only further complicated the stakes and prolonged the war.

Obstructed Rebel Diplomacy

In addition to alliance shifting and state fragmentation, foreign actors can also alter civil conflict duration by affecting the course of rebel diplomacy. Rebel diplomacy is a form of public diplomacy that connects rebel groups with foreign actors through formal communication channels. Common methods of rebel diplomacy include dispatching representatives as “diplomats” to established offices abroad, posting on mainstream social media platforms (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), and arranging interviews with foreign

① Rettig, “International Institutions.”

② Atiaf Z. Alwazir, “Yemen's enduring resistance: youth between politics and informal mobilization,” *Mediterranean Politics* 21, no.1 (2016): 171.

③ Hoetjes, “The Gulf Cooperation Council,” 159.

④ Letta Tayler, “Yemen's Hijacked Revolution: New Protests Pushed Aside by Old Rivalries in Sana'a,” *Human Rights Watch*, September 26, 2011, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/26/yemens-hijacked-revolution> (accessed January 5, 2022).

media.^① Previous research on rebel diplomacy has determined these methods generally productive in achieving the rebels' goals, whether they be seeking foreign support or publicizing their grievances and appeals, and often lead to considerable improvement to exchanges between rebel groups and foreign state and non-state actors.^{②③} Regan and Aydin (2006) further supplement the argument by analyzing whether diplomacy indeed has a significant effect in reducing the expected duration of civil conflicts.^④ They offer a possible rationale for such a tendency, suggesting that successful diplomatic communication may facilitate combatants' perceptions and calculations regarding the capacity and resolve they and the government possess, which often make peace settlements more likely.

Therefore, rebel diplomacy can be a significant variable in determining the duration of a civil war. Not only does it facilitate mutual understanding and increase the likelihood of peace negotiations, but it also prevents third parties (those that serve as a middle ground for indirect communication between rebels and external actors) from pursuing their own interests, which would further complicate war dynamics and prolong the conflict.

However, scholars also note that such diplomatic efforts by rebel groups are significantly blocked when foreign actors exclude them from the international stage, as seen in the case of Ansar Dine in the Mali War (2012-present).^⑤ Categorized by the US as a terrorist group, the Ansar Dine struggled to obtain international recognition and was kept from pursuing digital diplomacy on mainstream social media.^⑥ It is reasonable to expect similar outcomes when foreign actors align with the government, as such alliances would distance the rebel groups from the outside world and result in biased perceptions, which could further lead to the complete isolation of the rebel groups from any diplomatic channels.

In the case of Yemen, direct rebel diplomacy was essentially disabled. Cautious of "legitimizing" the Houthis, embassies of foreign interveners relocated from Sana'a to other Arab states after it was taken by the rebels, with the exception of Iran, leaving little space for diplomatic communications.^⑦ The Trump administration designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in January 2021, leaving no space for international recognition of the group and normalized communication between the Houthis and external players.^⑧ On account of the diplomatic blockade, foreign actors must now rely on third-party

① Reyko Huang, "Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War," *International Security* 40, no.4 (2016): 94, 100;

Michèle Bos and Jan Melissen, "Rebel diplomacy and digital communication: public diplomacy in the Sahel," *International Affairs* 95, no.6 (2019): 1335-37.

② Bos and Melissen, "Rebel diplomacy," 1342-46.

③ Benjamin T. Jones and Eleonora Mattiacci, "A manifesto, in 140 characters or fewer: social media as a tool of rebel diplomacy," *British Journal of Political Science* 49, no.2 (2017): 739.

④ Regan and Aydin, "Diplomacy and Other Forms," 753.

⑤ Bos and Melissen, "Rebel diplomacy," 1339-42.

⑥ *Ibid.*, 1341-42.

⑦ Farea Al-Muslimi, "Why isolating the Houthis was a strategic mistake," *Chatham House*, November 5, 2021, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/why-isolating-houthis-was-strategic-mistake> (accessed January 5, 2022).

⑧ Imad K. Harb, "Pompeo's Departing Sabotage in Yemen," *Arab Center Washington DC*, January 19, 2021, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/pompeos-departing-sabotage-in-yemen/> (accessed January 5, 2022).

states—in this case, Iran and Oman—for formal communication with the Houthis regarding their demands. However, such communication channels have been deemed largely unreliable in delivering accurate messages.^① Furthermore, Trump’s categorization of the Houthis as a terrorist group has only irritated the self-declared regime, making them even more reluctant to cooperate and reach a settlement with foreign actors and the previous government. In response to this “foreign sabotage,” the Houthis further raised the stakes for settlement and normalized diplomacy by demanding complete withdrawal of external forces from Yemen, leading the diplomatic situation into a stalemate.^②

Most ironically of all, despite the Arab coalition initially intervening in the war with the hope of restoring stability and containing Iranian (Shia) expansion, their abandonment of direct diplomatic opportunities with the Houthis has only consolidated—if not strengthened—Iranian influence in the region. Nor has peace returned.

Conclusion

By studying the war in Yemen with insights drawn from previous theories, this paper has identified two additional arguments supporting the correlation between external intervention and conflict duration. First, interventions by multilateral organizations that primarily represent member states’ interests can prolong civil conflicts by causing alliance shifts and state fragmentation, even when negotiations seem to be in place. Second, failed or limited direct rebel diplomacy due to unreliable communication channels and self-serving foreign intervention can extend civil war duration. To consolidate these arguments, the author recommends further research to explore a wider range of civil conflicts and conduct quantitative verification.

This study also provides insights for international policymakers into the Yemeni conflict by addressing additional aspects of the war that may be responsible for its duration but may have been overlooked. For instance, relevant parties may want to establish diplomatic ties with the self-declared Houthi office and quickly move to the negotiation stage. In terms of potential future settlements, peacemakers should learn from the GCC’s failure and give more consideration to the appeals of the already divided interest groups within the state in order to achieve and maintain peace.

① Al-Muslimi, “Why isolating the Houthis was a strategic mistake.”

② Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “The Houthis and the limits of diplomacy in Yemen,” *Middle East Institute*, May 6, 2021, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/houthis-and-limits-diplomacy-yemen> (accessed January 5, 2022).

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Punishment or Denial: What Deters in a Cold War Setting?

A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis

Yin Tsit Chan

Abstract: While deterrence is common among state actors in restraining conflict escalation, deterrence attempts during the 1947-1989 Cold War were particularly complicated and more often produced unexpected outcomes due to the unique characteristics of cold war dynamics. These include the lack of clear and direct communication channels, great power competition, and the presence of nuclear threats. Accommodating rising suspicions about a cold war redux between China and the United States, this paper explores the practice of deterrence by the two states in two Cold War events—the Korean War (1950-1953) and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954-1955)—to supplement existing arguments about the effectiveness of different deterrence mechanisms and shed light on the current bilateral tensions. Borrowing insights from previous scholarship on the use of deterrence by denial versus punishment, the author conducts in-depth analysis of deterrence attempts in each event and incorporates cold war characteristics into the discussion. The paper theorizes that deterrence by denial is prone to produce more positive outcomes in a cold war setting, with the exception of using nuclear threats as a deterrent for punishment.

Keywords: *deterrence theory, US-China relations, cold war*

Introduction

When powers clash, the outcomes have generally diverged into two streams—crises and conflicts—over the course of history. What marks the difference is whether or not a dispute militarizes or even escalates into a full-scale war.^① In many cases, deterrence strategy is applied to prevent a crisis from escalating into an open conflict, in which a polity would *deter* its opponent not to initiate an attack or any other “unwanted actions” that would worsen the situation.^② The goal is to convince the adversary that the benefit of not attacking outweighs the potential cost, thereby resolving a potential crossfire. That said, deterrence does

① Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, (1988): 29-30.

② Michael J. Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018), 2.

not always work. For instance, the mutual deterrence failure between China and the United States in 1950 is considered by many scholars as a major cause of the outbreak of the Korean War.^①

With regard to recent growing tensions between China and the United States over the Taiwan issue, the North Korean nuclear threat, and more, it is evident that a new crisis is emerging and practices of deterrence, such as increased military deployment, have been suspected of occurring. Some even argue that a “new Cold War” is emerging and that deterrence has been and will continue to be a crucial part of the foreign policies of China and the US.^② Thus, it is a suitable time to revisit the concept of deterrence, especially deterrence in a cold war setting, and understand the implications for Sino-US relations in the contemporary era. To elaborate, a cold war redux may signify the return of an international setting where great power competition prevails and states are divided into independent blocs, accompanied by the obstruction of direct communication and an escalation of nuclear competition.

This study examines the practice of deterrence policies during the Korean War and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis as both events revealed the dynamics of the 20th century Cold War in Asia and both involved China and the US as the two primary actors, either as the deterrer or the deterred. These two particular events may also offer further insight for current policymakers focused on the Taiwan and North Korea issues, which continue to be major sources of contention between China and the US today. By exploring the two events, this study hopes to answer the questions of what deters (the deterrent) and how to deter (the deterrence approach) in a cold war setting.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II summarizes foundational information and significant arguments of existing scholarship related to the research questions of this paper and addresses the anticipated contributions of this study. Section III introduces the methodology for this research. Section IV reviews deterrence attempts during the Korean War and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis respectively and identifies the deterrents and deterrence strategies involved. Section V conducts a comparative analysis between the deterrence attempts in these two events and further elaborates on which deterrence approach was more effective. Section VI concludes the findings of this study, arguing that deterrence by denial with conventional means is generally more effective in a cold war setting, with the exception of using a nuclear threat when practicing deterrence by punishment.

Literature Review

The Deterrence Theory Revisited

① Thomas J. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao’s Korean War Telegrams,” *International Security* 17, no.1 (1992): 128.

② Yang Yao, “The New Cold War: America’s New Approach to Sino-American Relations,” *China International Strategy Review* 3, (2021): 20.

By classic definition, deterrence in international relations refers to the practice of discouraging or restraining an adverse polity—usually a nation-state—from deploying military force to achieve its foreign policy objectives.^① Huth (1988) further categorizes deterrence policies into direct and extended deterrence, depending on the “protégé” of the deterrence.^② According to Huth (1988), direct deterrence counters threats targeted only at the defendant, while extended deterrence involves the defense of a third party—often an ally or partner—against the potential attacker. Extended deterrence is often applied to superpowers, and to many scholars, including Schelling (1966), presents a greater challenge as it has to be “made credible” rather than being “inherently credible” as in the case of a direct deterrence.^③

Regarding deterrence in practice, scholars generally distinguish between two fundamental mechanisms—denial and punishment. While deterrence by denial is preemptive, aiming at making an attack unfeasible or unlikely to succeed upfront, deterrence by punishment is consequential and focuses on threatening *ex-post* retaliation if the attack actually occurs.^④ To illustrate, upgrading the defender’s own military defense and convincing the adversary that it is capable of countering any attempted attack would be a typical example of deterrence by denial, as a “capability to defend” is inherently a “capability to deny.”^⑤ Another would be initiating a preventive war against the attacker, such that its capability of launching the attack is denied at its origin.^⑥ On the other hand, actions such as threatening to wage a retaliatory war—a nuclear one at its extreme—would be considered an attempt of deterrence by punishment. The punishment strategy does not have an immediate effect, and the level and duration of the punishment could progressively mount depending on the defender’s willingness.^⑦

Overall, previous literature has reached a consensus on the necessary conditions for effective deterrence. As McInnis (2005) states, the key to deterrence lies in two primary factors: capability and credibility.^⑧ Nevertheless, whereas a state’s capability of committing to a deterrence attempt is rather straightforward, the credibility of deterrence is a more complex issue. Kilgour and Zagare (1991) explain deterrence credibility in the form of “believability” and “rationality” in the eyes of the adversary.^⑨ For instance, Eisenhower’s *Massive Retaliation* policy was largely seen as “unbelievable” and not credible from the

① Mazarr et al., *What Deters and Why*, 2, 7.

② Paul Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no.2 (1988): 424.

③ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966): 35-36.

④ Luis Simón, “Between Punishment and Denial: Uncertainty, Flexibility, and US Military Strategy toward China,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 41, no.3 (2020): 364.

⑤ Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983): 11.

⑥ James J. Wirtz, “How does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no.4 (2018): 70.

⑦ *Ibid.*, 68.

⑧ Kathleen J. McInnis, “Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East,” *Washington Quarterly* 28, no.3 (2005): 179.

⑨ D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no.2 (1991): 306-07.

Soviet perspective given growing Soviet power.^① Hence, deterrence credibility is tricky as it involves a great deal of subjectivity and requires absolute clarity of the deterrent and unequivocal interpretation of the deterrence from both sides. In this case, any miscommunication, misinformation, or misinterpretation between the two parties could easily trigger a deterrence failure and cause the situation to take a drastic turn, as seen in the US-China mutual deterrence failure during the Korean War.^②

Effectiveness of Deterrence: Denial vs. Punishment

Scholars have long contested the effectiveness of the two deterrence approaches, though generally from a broader scope of interstate aggression. Classic opinions prefer denial over punishment. Synder (1959) reasons that denial—such as demonstrating a certain extent of military capability “directly in the path” of the adversary—sends a much clearer message as compared to punishment, in which actions are prewarned and involve more uncertainties regarding whether retaliation would actually be carried out afterward.^③ Huth (1988) adds that denial is more effective as it is more likely to eliminate threats “from the outset” without concern about the possibility of further unwanted moves by the aggressor in addition to the initial attack.^④

Nonetheless, some recent studies lean toward deterrence by punishment. For example, Simón (2020) argues that punishment allows the defender state to take control of the situation.^⑤ While calculations for denial are challenging, as the defender is unsure about the necessary extent of its own capability to successfully deny the aggressor’s attack, punishment assures the opponent that costs and undesirable consequences will occur if it decides to attack. Wirtz (2018) further suggests that the non-immediate nature of the punishment strategy could actually be advantageous, as the defender could continuously add to the object of punishment and reinforce the adversary of the increasing cost of attacking over time.^⑥

Existing Literature on Deterrence Attempts during the Korean War and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis

Although deterrence efforts were prominent in both the Korean War and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, and both provided a distinct snapshot of the Cold War in Asia, their outcomes greatly differed. The 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis avoided severe escalation despite relatively minor bombardments, yet the situation on the Korean Peninsula evolved into full-scale warfare, signaling divergence in the outcomes of different deterrence attempts.

① Kilgour and Zagare, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” 306.

② Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” 128.

③ Glenn H. Synder, *Deterrence by Denial and Punishment* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1959): 35.

④ Huth, “Extended Deterrence,” 432.

⑤ Simón, “Between Punishment and Denial,” 364.

⑥ Wirtz, “How does Nuclear Deterrence Differ,” 68-69.

Prior to this research, the practice of deterrence in these two events had already attracted wide attention from academia. Christensen (1992) and many other scholars consider the outbreak of the Korean War as a mutual deterrence failure between China and the United States.^① On the one hand, the US failed to prevent China from entering the war in the first place and to dissuade China from launching further counterattacks later in the war. On the other hand, China failed to deter the US from crossing the 38th parallel and advancing to the Yalu River. In either case, the line between denial and punishment is blurred, though previous studies have generally attributed the dual deterrence failures to a lack of clarity, credibility, and reassurance.^②

Deterrence attempts in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis produced more diverse outcomes. The shelling of Jinmen during the 1954-55 crisis was viewed as an attempt by the Chinese to deter the US from strengthening mutual defense with Taiwan—such that it would “permanently separate Taiwan from the mainland”—and making a statement to the world about its stance on the Taiwan issue.^③ The attempt was effective regarding Beijing’s aim to capture international attention, yet deterrence through limited military deployment failed to the extent that it not only resulted in stronger ties between the US and Taiwan, but it also elicited counter-deterrence by the US with a nuclear threat that was successful in preventing another full-scale war between the two states over the Strait. Again, existing literature has not drawn a distinct line between the denial and punishment strategies when discussing these attempts, but scholars’ arguments concerning the failure of China’s deterrence and the success of the US’ deterrence in this crisis can be understood as an issue of “believability,” of whether each state is equipped with the capability of committing to their deterrence.^④

By studying the existing scholarship related to this research topic, the author has identified two major research gaps to be addressed. First, previous debates over the effectiveness of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, as well as discussions of the necessary conditions for effective deterrence, have not specifically delved into the Cold War. This study seeks to incorporate the distinct characteristics of the Cold War—including the undesirability of direct and massive military encounters (and the resulting prevalence of extended deterrence), the dynamics of great power competition, and the concern of nuclear deterrence—when considering the effectiveness of the deterrence attempts in Korea and Taiwan, so as to identify effective deterrents unique to a cold war setting. Second, the deterrence attempts in the Korean War and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis need clearer categorization according to their deterrence mechanisms. By distinguishing between practices of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, and moreover between practices of conventional and nuclear deterrence, a more thorough understanding can be

① Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” 128-29.

② Ibid., 133, 149.

③ Di He, “The Evolution of the People’s Republic of China’s Policy toward the Offshore Islands,” in *The Great Powers in East Asia*, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Arika Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 223-31.

④ Kilgour and Zagare, “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” 306.

established to theorize which type of deterrence is more effective in a cold war setting. Moreover, further implications about potential deterrence practices between China and the United States in the future can also be derived.

Methodology

To locate the effective deterrents and deterrence approach in a cold war setting, this study will first distinguish the exact deterrents and deterrence mechanisms used in the Korean War and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis by the US and China, then conduct a qualitative comparative analysis of these components of deterrence during the two events. Additional scholarly papers and archives will be adopted as sources of information.

Case Study

Deterrents and Deterrence Strategies during the Korean War

According to Christensen (1992), the ultimate outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was the result of dual deterrence failures between the US and China.^① The failure of two pivotal deterrence attempts made by the two states—China’s failure to deter the US from crossing the 38th parallel and the US’ failure to deter China from entering the war and launching a counteroffensive—shaped the massive scale of the war. While scholars, including Christensen (1992), would also consider the US’ offensive move toward the Yalu as a deterrence failure by the Chinese, this research excludes this event from the category as it did not involve a clear deterrent.^②

Aware of the US’ attempts to cross the 38th parallel and demand North Korea’s unconditional surrender, and increasingly concerned about its national security, China issued successive warnings from September to October 1950 to deter the US from crossing the line.^③ These warnings included public statements by Marshal Nie Rongzhen and Premier Zhou Enlai in September, military patrols in the Manchu area, and—the clearest signal of all—Zhou’s message via the Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar in early October stating China would enter the war were the US to cross the parallel.^④ All three warnings threatened *ex-post* consequences of potential movement by the US, and none involved immediate or direct actions to deny the US’ capability in actually crossing the parallel. Therefore, China’s deterrence against the US in this case should be regarded as an attempt of deterrence by punishment, with China’s alleged intervention as the deterrent.

① Christensen, “Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace,” 128-29.

② Ibid., 129, 140-41.

③ Richard N. Lebow, “Deterrence Failure Revisited,” *International Security* 12, no.1 (1987): 199-200.

④ Abram N. Shulsky, *Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2000), 56-57.

Not fully convinced about the credibility of China's warnings and its capability to carry out the threatened punitive actions, and determined to achieve a quick and complete victory, US troops advanced across the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950, marking the failure of China's deterrence attempts. Consequently, following the US' failure in reassuring Chinese leaders of its non-malicious intentions toward China, the PRC entered the Korean War. Nonetheless, it was the subsequent event that caused the situation to escalate into a full-blown war. Christensen (1992) argues that at this stage, China's initial performance in the war was an additional act of deterrence by punishment, demonstrating its capacity to retaliate and attempting to prevent the US from further advancing toward the Yalu.^① However, this seems irrational and ambiguous given China's decision to disengage in early November 1950. As Christensen (1992) himself also considers China's disengagement as a tactic to pave the way for its subsequent counteroffensive, it is fairly evident that China was no longer aiming for deterrence at that point.^②

Meanwhile, the United States' failed deterrence attempts are reflected by its failure to prevent China from entering the war in the first place and launching a massive counteroffensive in November. Despite lacking explicit deterrent statements, it was clear that the US misinterpreted China's vulnerability, and deemed its military presence in Taiwan to be sufficient to deter China from entering the war and confronting it at the Yalu.^③ Given General McArthur's perception of China's internal strife and his decision to advance to the Yalu despite Zhou's warnings, the Americans likely considered the deterrent to be the launch of punitive air attacks on the Chinese mainland via neighboring US military bases. Again, no *ex-ante* actions actually took place to forestall China's participation in the war or launching a counterattack against US troops at the Yalu, and thus this case should be regarded as an attempt of deterrence by punishment, with potential punitive air attacks on the Chinese mainland as the deterrent. Since China was "insufficiently fearful of American punitive air attacks" and sufficiently concerned about the US' presence on the peninsula, this deterrence attempt by the US failed and did not preclude China's intervention in the war nor its massive counteroffensive at the Yalu.^④

Deterrents and Deterrence Strategies during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis

After their costly engagement in the Korean War, the United States and China became particularly cautious of further potential clashes regarding other issues. China's major concern regarding the US during that time was what it called a "Three Front" strategy, in which China perceived the US to be applying

① Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace," 128-29.

② Ibid., 140-41.

③ Shulsky, *Deterrence Theory*, 59.

④ Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace," 133.

military pressure on the PRC from three fronts: Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan.^① By July 1954, the former two fronts had practically been resolved, leaving the US' ties with Taiwan (ROC) the major issue.

In August 1954, the ROC deployed around 58,000 troops to Jinmen (Quemoy) and 15,000 to Matsu to build a defensive line against the Chinese mainland.^② This was particularly alarming to the PRC as these two islands are geographically adjacent to Zhejiang Province, a weak spot for the mainland if the ROC were to launch a counterattack after its defeat in the Chinese Civil War.^③ In addition, the ROC's occupation of these islands would pose a direct threat to China's offshore communications and fishing activities.^④ Meanwhile, China was aware of an ongoing discussion about a mutual defense treaty between the US and Taiwan and the US' intention to include the ROC in the newly established Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).^⑤ With the foregoing considerations, the PRC, without sufficient knowledge of the growing split in the US-ROC camp at that moment, decided to shell Jinmen (where US troops were not present) in September 1954 to reaffirm its stance on the Taiwan issue and initiate a dual deterrence of the ROC and the United States. The aim was to pressure ROC troops to evacuate the islands, prevent the signing of the mutual defense treaty between the US and Taiwan, and eventually liberate Taiwan.^⑥

This effort is considered as a practice of deterrence by denial, since upfront preemptive attacks to obstruct the opponent's military capability—in this case, the Nationalist troops on the island—were carried out, with the attacks serving as the deterrent. As a result, China was able to hurt the ROC troops on Jinmen and force their withdrawal from Dachen (another island close to the mainland), thus securing its shore. In this sense, the deterrence attempt can be considered as partially successful. However, although China was able to make its open statement and attract wide external attention to the coalition between the US and Taiwan, it failed to deter the US from advancing its defense treaty with the ROC. That said, the content of the defense treaty revealed the US' reluctance to fully commit to defending Taiwan, and no promises were made regarding the offshore islands, revealing to the Chinese an underlying disunity among the opposition camp that was in fact exacerbated by the Jinmen bombardment.^⑦ Hence, the outcomes of this deterrence attempt were overall positive for China.

At the same time, China's occupation of Dachen made the US increasingly concerned about China's true intentions regarding the offshore islands and the potential military threat that China could pose. In order to secure Jinmen and Matsu as well as avoid further exacerbating its own disadvantage in the Strait,

① Shulsky, *Deterrence Theory*, 62.

② Junghoon Lee, "The international context of the Cold War in East Asia: processes of security and economic co-operation between alliances," *SN Social Sciences* 1, no.5 (2021): 7.

③ He, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy," 223.

④ *Ibid.*, 223.

⑤ *Ibid.*, 224-25.

⑥ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 194-95.

⑦ He, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy," 230-31.

the US opted for nuclear deterrence in March 1955, warning China that the use of nuclear weapons over the offshore islands was a possibility, which quickly escalated the crisis.^① Subsequent bilateral negotiations and Premier Zhou's statement in April elucidating China's position against armed conflict prevented the crisis from evolving into a full-scale war. It was widely considered as a deterrence success for the US^② and was a typical example of deterrence by punishment, using the threat of consequential nuclear warfare as the deterrent.

Comparative Analysis & Discussion

From the foregoing overview, this research has reached several findings. First, the multiple failed attempts of deterrence during the two events can be attributed to several distinct characteristics of deterrence in a cold war setting. First, clear communication—which is essential for effective deterrence—is difficult to achieve during a cold war, as the separate blocs generally hinder direct communication. This characteristic is demonstrated by China's failed attempt to deter the US from crossing the 38th parallel during the Korean War. Zhou's message via the Indian Ambassador in October 1950 about China's commitment to defending its security and intention to enter the war if the US crossed the parallel was taken as a bluff rather than a serious attempt to deter, due to the lack of direct and credible channels between the two states to avoid miscommunication. Second, the involvement of superpowers in a cold war means 1) there will be a high level of mutual distrust of the opponent's displayed capacity; 2) powers generally do not favor direct encounters; and 3) nuclear threats and competition will be present. The first factor was observed in the US' perception of China's deterrence during the Korean War, and its own deterrence attempt against the PRC, while the latter two were demonstrated by the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Since neither China nor the US wanted direct confrontation over the Strait after the Korean War, the PRC chose to deter by attacking an island not occupied by US troops, whereas the US issued a nuclear deterrence to allegedly protect an ally far from their homeland.

Accordingly, the foregoing discussion illustrates that deterrence by denial was generally more effective in these cold war events, with the exception of using nuclear threat as deterrence by punishment. However, it should be noted that scholars tend to put nuclear deterrence in an independent category apart from normal means of deterrence by punishment, since the involvement of nuclear weapons could lead to unreversible damage, fatalities, and “uncontestable cost” with which conventional weapons could barely be on par with.^③ Hence, the subsequent discussion will be divided into deterrence by conventional means versus nuclear threats.

① He, “The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy,” 228.

② Gordon H. Chang and Di He, “The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence,” *The American Historical Review* 98, no.5 (1993): 1519.

③ Wirtz, “How does Nuclear Deterrence Differ,” 59-60.

When looking at the failed deterrence attempts during the Korean War and the relatively more effective deterrence by the PRC on the Taiwan issue, the aforementioned distinct characteristics of cold war scenarios could adequately explain the variations in the outcomes and advantages of using deterrence by denial. Given the distrust of the opponent's capacity during the Korean War, applying deterrence by punishment would have endured a higher risk, as miscalculation of the opponent's capacity—in this case the US' misperception of China's capacity—could result in a disastrous misinterpretation of the opponent's capability to bear the potential costs, and thereby underestimate or overestimate the credibility of the opponent's deterrence. Deterrence by denial, on the contrary, involves fewer uncertainties and can send more direct messages for both sides to deliberately consider the opportunity cost of aggravating the situation.

In addition, the undesirability of direct encounters, which resulted in extended deterrence attempts in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, reinforces the advantage of using deterrence by denial. When any of the major players in a crisis is physically absent from the center of the crisis, the uncertainties associated with *ex-post* warning further increase. By launching direct preemptive attacks, the deterrer can take a more proactive role in the crisis, leaving its opponent to consider both the visible and invisible consequences of sustaining or escalating the crisis. The opponent would then be more cautious with its own calculations and more suspicious of the attacker's capabilities beyond the initial attack, and would thus be more easily deterred.

Finally, the assertions would be deemed insignificant if any nuclear deterrent were involved. No strategy or instrument to date could outweigh—or even balance—the level of destruction that can be wrought by nuclear weapons, thus indicating that nuclear deterrence would remain the predominant and most effective deterrence approach in any setting.

Conclusion

By conducting a comparative analysis between deterrence attempts and outcomes during the Korean War and the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, this study has drawn two primary conclusions: 1) Among conventional mechanisms of deterrence, the practice of deterrence by denial produces more positive outcomes and more effectively prevents war in a cold war setting; 2) punishment is more effective only when nuclear threats are involved.

In consideration of these findings, the author further suggests rational decision making by both current Chinese and US administrations regarding rising tensions over the current Taiwan Strait and the North Korean nuclear issues. As both issues are of major interest to the US and China, it is crucial that both states accurately interpret the claims and actions made by the other. Meanwhile, in order to prevent unwanted actions from the other, both states should make their stances absolutely explicit and ensure that the other state fully comprehends every message. In either case, direct and candid communication as well as mutual understanding of the stakes involved would be necessary to prevent miscommunication and conflict

escalation. For instance, China has constantly warned the US that the Taiwan issue is an “insurmountable red line” in an attempt of deterrence by punishment. In this case, China may want to consider clarifying the deterrent in its warnings, elucidating the intended consequences if the US crosses the “red line” to enhance the credibility of its deterrence practice. At the same time, the US should carefully estimate China’s and its own stakes in this issue when deciding its response to China’s warnings. Ergo, clarity and direct communication remain pivotal, and both states ought to learn from the lessons of the Cold War in order to avoid the undesired outcomes of failed deterrence and escalated tensions.

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Shocking But Not Surprising

British and Soviet Intelligence Surrounding Operation Barbarossa

Rachel Farmer

Abstract: Operation Barbarossa has received significant attention as one of the most famous surprise attacks in the history of war, and also as one of the most disastrous intelligence failures to date. Why did Stalin so obstinately refuse to believe that the Germans would invade Russia in June of 1941 despite receiving a multitude of warnings? This paper seeks to examine the intelligence systems of Great Britain and the Soviet Union with a focus on each system’s approach to intelligence surrounding Operation Barbarossa to understand why the British and Soviet intelligence communities came to different conclusions regarding the validity of such intelligence. Despite both systems struggling to heed warnings of Operation Barbarossa due to a variety of factors—disinformation efforts, the current state of the war, and the circumstances of German-Soviet relations—it was ultimately the UK that was able to accept the validity of such warnings and act accordingly. While both systems were formidable and had received ample warnings of the coming attack from a variety of sources, the British intelligence system was more equipped to act upon gathered information due to differences in leadership and intelligence system hierarchies.

Keywords: *intelligence, Operation Barbarossa, Britain, Soviet Union*

Introduction

Operation Barbarossa has received significant attention in World War II studies as one of the most famous surprise attacks in the history of war, and also as one of the most disastrous intelligence failures to date. On June 22, 1941, Adolf Hitler broke Germany’s non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and launched a blitzkrieg attack, intending to quickly crush the Soviet Union’s Red Army and occupy the major cities of Kiev, Leningrad, and Moscow.^① The operation was part of Hitler’s vision to racially reorganize Eastern Europe through his brutal *Generalplan Ost*, which would eliminate the Slavs and obtain more

^① David M. Glantz, “Operation Barbarossa (1941),” in *The Encyclopedia of War*, ed. Gordon Martell (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2011).

territory for German expansion.^① Although the operation ultimately ended in defeat in December of the same year, its initial speed and ferocity caught the Soviets off guard and resulted in substantial losses of human life and property. Operation Barbarossa is recognized as a turning point in the Second World War as it pulled the Soviet Union into the conflict, aligning it with the Allied Powers and ultimately bringing about the defeat of Nazi Germany. This paper seeks to examine the intelligence systems of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, looking briefly at structure, operations, and leadership, and focuses on each system's approach to intelligence surrounding Operation Barbarossa, with the goal of understanding why the British and Soviet intelligence communities were able to come to different conclusions regarding the validity of such intelligence.

British Intelligence

It is difficult to discuss the British intelligence system as a singular entity, as "British intelligence" could refer to information collected by any number of organizations. As a detailed examination of the structure, evolution, and degrees of cooperation between British intelligence organizations are beyond the scope of this paper, it will instead briefly mention the primary entities responsible for intelligence collection and processing. UK Professor Eunan O'Halpin gives a succinct overview of British intelligence operations structure from the turn of the century through the Second World War:

The principal intelligence agencies in the period were MI6 or the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), under Foreign Office control and responsible for the collection of intelligence outside British territory, and M15, the domestic security and counter-espionage body. These two agencies emerged from the division in 1910 of the Secret Service Bureau, which had been founded in the previous year. In addition to them, in wartime each of the armed services built up intelligence gathering and processing organizations. The latter were created in a hurry, and it took time to establish a working relationship with the older intelligence agencies. Inevitably there were rivalries, competition and confusion between the different bodies, and nothing resembling a unified intelligence service was ever established.^②

Although the British intelligence community predated the Great War, it was wholly unprepared when war broke out again in 1939. Much of the country's intelligence structure had been neglected during interwar peacetime, and operated on the "Ten Year Rule," which ruled out the threat of war within a decade. Impeded by this assumption and organizational issues, British intelligence lacked consistent, high-quality

① David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin, "Hitler's Decision to Invade the USSR, 1941," in *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), 82.

② K.G. Robertson, ed., *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*. (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987), 187.

information, and was ill-equipped to make long-range assessments about developments in Germany.^① Also, as is evident in the number of relevant organizations at the time, the British intelligence structure was rather decentralized, which often accounted for challenges regarding communication, overlap/underlap, and inconsistencies in operational policy. Notwithstanding, its decentralized nature likely afforded British intelligence some benefits as well. The various agencies were able to focus on their respective areas of strength and adapt as intelligence needs changed.^② Overall, Britain's intelligence community grew rapidly during the Second World War.

Despite British intelligence's weakness and underdevelopment at the outbreak of war, it was still formidable in several regards. Perhaps most impressive about British intelligence was its variety of methods for collecting information, including espionage, aerial photography, captured documents, underground networks in occupied territories, and extractions from Axis prisoners of war.^{③④} Naturally, British intelligence cannot be discussed without giving considerable attention to Ultra, the project responsible for obtaining wartime signals intelligence by cracking encrypted enemy radio and teleprinter communications. Having recovered 180 cypher keys in May 1940,^⑤ Ultra had become the most important source of intelligence by the summer of 1941 and was deemed the only source capable of influencing strategy.^⑥ Henceforth, all military tactics were in some manner informed by intelligence gleaned by Ultra. One example of the utility of Ultra can be seen in its contribution to strategy toward German U-boats. From June 1941, the British read the U-boat intelligence traffic regularly and without delay, "an advance which almost wholly explains why they prevented the U-boats from dominating the Atlantic during the autumn of 1941 and the winter of 1941-1942."^⑦

Soviet Intelligence

The Soviet Union's intelligence system also operated well before World War II. Its lineage began with the Cheka, the original state security organization established by the Bolsheviks in 1917, and by the onset of World War II had been reorganized into the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs). After the German invasion, the NKVD was primarily responsible for the mass evacuation and execution of political prisoners. While mainly intended for internal security, used on the front to prevent retreat and

① Ibid., 90-91.

② Robertson, ed., *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*.

③ F. H. Hinsley, "British Intelligence in the Second World War: An Overview," *Cryptologia* 14, no.1 (1990): 1-10.

④ Kent Fedorowich, "Axis Prisoners of War as Sources for British Military Intelligence, 1939-42," *Intelligence and National Security* 14, no.2 (1999): 156-78.

⑤ Hinsley, "British Intelligence in the Second World War: An Overview," 3.

⑥ Robertson, ed., *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, 135.

⑦ Hinsley, "British Intelligence in the Second World War: An Overview," 8.

desertion of Soviet Army divisions, it did on occasion carry out missions of sabotage in enemy-held territories. Tasks directed by various subdivisions of the NKVD included conducting intelligence activities abroad, battling espionage and sabotage acts in USSR territory, liquidating counter-revolutionaries, overseeing ideology, and protecting government officials.^{①②}

Like its British counterpart, the Soviet intelligence system also had several channels for collecting information at its disposal. Russia's main asset was perhaps its network of spies throughout the Comintern. However, while this network was able to provide the USSR with strategic intelligence, it was usually concerning allies rather than enemies, as can be seen by the efforts devoted to infiltrating Britain's MI5 and MI6. Additionally, the centralized nature of the NKVD likely improved the coordination of information. It was organized along command and functional lines, and included fifteen subordinate special departments, each with specific functions. Due to this and established reporting channels, officers were no longer beholden to army commanders, and could therefore concentrate specifically on security work.^③

Intelligence Surrounding Operation Barbarossa

Perhaps unsurprising to those well-versed in intelligence studies, Britain and the Soviet Union similarly experienced significant failures in their approaches to intelligence regarding Germany's changing intentions toward the Soviet Union, especially in the early stages. Despite the growing number of rumors predicting that Germany would invade the Soviet Union in the spring or summer of 1941, the British intelligence community in general gave little credit to them and maintained the opinion that Germany would ultimately not risk open conflict with the Russians. This was in part due to the consistent understanding that Germany's main priority was to defeat Great Britain, and hence would continue to focus the majority of its efforts on preparing for Operation Sea Lion. To the majority of the British intelligence community, the idea that Germany may tie itself down on an eastern front, and therefore redistribute its efforts to some extent away from the United Kingdom, was frankly inconceivable. It was not until March 27 that this perception changed, when a Chiefs of Staff summary noted that Germany was again increasing its troops in Poland. This reflected intelligence received from the GAF Enigma the previous day that three armored divisions and other important elements had been ordered to move from the Balkans to the Kraków area. On

① Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), ix.

② Robert Stephan, "Smersh: Soviet Military Counter-Intelligence during the Second World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 22, no.4 (1987): 586-87.

③ John Ferris, "Intelligence," in *The Cambridge History of the Second World War*, Vol. 1, ed. John Ferris and Evan Mawdsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

the 27th, the Enigma revealed that part of this transfer was being cancelled. This provided the first confirmation that Germany's preparations were directed against Russia.^①

The amount of intelligence that the Soviet Union received regarding Hitler's intentions was also extensive. Spymaster Barton Whaley has previously cited over eighty-four warnings that should have alerted Moscow, from both within the Soviet intelligence system and outside, yet none were able to convince Stalin to properly prepare for the coming blitzkrieg.^② Many warnings came from within the NKVD. One such report, sent to Stalin by Pavel Fitin, Chief of NKGB Foreign Intelligence, asserted that German preparations had been made and that the Soviet Union could expect the attack at any time. Stalin sent the report back to Fitin's supervisor with the note: "Comrade Merkulov, you can send your 'source'... to his f—king mother. This is not a 'source' but a *dezinformator*."^③ Similarly, as early as November 1940, Richard Sorge—a top operative stationed in Japan—reported that Germany was creating and mobilizing divisions against the Soviet border and that the offensive would begin on June 20-22. Stalin dismissed Sorge's warnings outright as well, calling him "a little shit who has set himself up with some small factories and brothels in Japan."^④

Aside from the ample warning Stalin received from within the Soviet system, he also received many from foreign sources. On April 11, Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador to the USSR and one of the few who believed that Hitler would "overcome his fear of a war on two fronts," alerted Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky of the impending attack. Once Ultra had "illuminated the whole eastern scene," Churchill insisted that his own warning be sent to Stalin, believing that the cryptic message would arrest his attention. While the message did get Stalin's attention, he considered it "merely a device to embroil the Soviet Union in war."^⑤ A month before Churchill's letter, President Roosevelt had directed Sumner Welles, the US Deputy Secretary of State, to call in the Soviet ambassador Konstantin Umansky and give him information about the German massing of troops in Poland. Stalin also wrote this off as a plot by Washington and London to provoke a war.^⑥

While both Britain and the Soviet Union expressed severe misgivings regarding the seriousness or validity of the many predictions that Germany would invade Russia, they differed in that the British intelligence system was able to eventually alter its perception. What then was the deciding factor that allowed Britain to eventually heed incoming intelligence and adapt accordingly, yet prevented the Soviet

① Francis Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, Vol. 1. (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1979), 451.

② Gompert, Binnendijk, and Lin, "Hitler's Decision to Invade the USSR, 1941," 85.

③ David E. Murphy, *What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), xv.

④ *Ibid.*, 87.

⑤ Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Churchill's Warning to Stalin: A Reappraisal," *The Historical Journal* 29, no.4 (1986): 983.

⑥ John Lukacs, *June 1941: Hitler and Stalin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 73.

Union from doing the same? How was Operation Barbarossa still able to take Stalin by surprise when it should have been anything but surprising?

Existing Arguments

Stalin's "folly" and the extreme intelligence failure that was Operation Barbarossa has been at the forefront of intelligence studies ever since its occurrence. While there is abundant scholarly debate surrounding the Soviet Union's mishandling of relevant intelligence, less emphasis has been applied to Britain's degree of intelligence success regarding the military operation. Most literature focuses on British intelligence as a whole throughout the war period, and its success or lack thereof in influencing strategy for many campaigns. Less prevalent is literature focused specifically on whether British intelligence was superior to that of the Soviet Union in regard to applying its Barbarossa intelligence to strategy. This is understandable, as Britain was far less impacted by the campaign, having not been directly involved. Simply put, German-Soviet relations were important, but not the primary focus of British intelligence. At most, accurately predicting Barbarossa would have potentially given Britain the opportunity curry favor with Stalin and convince him to join the Allied effort. In fact, the overall consensus among existing literature seems to be that British intelligence and its inherent capabilities at the onset of the war were largely underwhelming and that it was generally unprepared to operate effectively.

That being said, the most often cited reason for British intelligence successes is the utilization of Ultra. It is certainly given the most attention among all methods of information collection by the British government during the Second World War. However, defaulting to Ultra's utility as a reason for military success encounters some issues when considering that intelligence is not everything, and that wars are not won by intelligence alone. Furthermore, Ultra only proved itself to be of great value and able to change popular opinion starting in the summer of 1941, and the provision of information from varying sources was a necessary precondition for Ultra to function effectively, as it usually served to validate information.

As mentioned, more discussion exists on the contributing factors to the Soviet Union's approach to intelligence surrounding Operation Barbarossa. Like the British (and most others), the Soviet intelligence community had a difficult time believing the Germans would invade Russia given the current state of the war. With Germany tied down on its western front with the UK, all signs indicated that Operation Sea Lion was at that time Hitler's top priority, and that he would ensure the defeat of Britain before turning his sights eastward. While he understood that Russia would eventually be subject to German hostilities, Stalin still assumed that Hitler would maintain friendly ties between Germany and the Soviet Union while the former

dealt with Britain.^① But Hitler was indeed willing—eager, even—to launch his offensive against Russia as soon as possible, even before concluding his campaign on the Western Front. Stalin misjudged Hitler to behave rationally, which he did not.

Stalin's assumption that Hitler would remain friendly, at least for a while, was due to two main factors: the non-aggression pact between them and Germany's reliance on Soviet military aid. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed on August 23, 1939, and contained a five-year mutual nonaggression agreement, as well as a secret protocol dividing the territory between them.^② Considering Hitler's hatred of Jewish Bolshevism and persistent goal to expand the German nation eastward,^③ Stalin understood that this pact was temporary; a German attack was less about *if* and more about *when*. The Soviet Union's entry to the pact, which surprised many, was part of a strategy to buy time. The Red Army was incredibly weak and disorganized at the time due to military purges that Stalin had initiated in 1937, resulting in a lack of experienced senior commanders capable of command initiative.^④ Hoping to buy enough time to properly reform the military, Stalin was reluctant to take any action that could provoke Germany to launch its offensive earlier. This may explain why Stalin did not dispatch Soviet troops to the border in preparation, as that would have likely raised suspicion and provoked retaliation. However, this explanation is overall unsatisfactory as it does not really consider the fact that the benefits of proactively reinforcing the border would have surely outweighed the cons, especially if it was understood a German attack was ultimately inevitable.

Equally relevant in Stalin's assumption that Germany would not invade as early as predicted was the factor of Germany's reliance on Soviet aid to advance its war efforts. Stalin was of the understanding that Germany could not hope to defeat Britain without the food and raw materials provided by the Soviet Union.^⑤ Invading Russia would obviously mean the end of any such trade relationship, and so Stalin recognized that Germany's dependency on Russian resources worked in his favor. Hitler of course understood this as well, but was just as prepared to acquire necessary provisions through forceful occupation. Stalin perhaps should have understood, and likely did understand, that his primary bargaining chip was slipping away once the trade relationship between the two countries began to rapidly deteriorate

① Murphy, *What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa*, 145.

② Gompert, Binnendijk, and Lin, "Hitler's Decision to Invade the USSR, 1941," 83.

③ Jürgen Förster, "Barbarossa Revisited: Strategy and Ideology in the East," *Jewish Social Studies* 50, no.1/2 (1988): 23.

④ David M. Glantz, "Operation Barbarossa (1941)," in *The Encyclopedia of War*, ed. Gordon Martell (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2011), 1.

⑤ Francis Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, Vol. 1. (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1979), 434.

in February 1940.^① This surely indicated that Hitler was less inclined to maintain their friendship and was probably preparing to attack.

Analysis

This paper does not seek to disqualify the existing arguments discussed above, as they certainly played an important role in influencing how Britain and Russia perceived incoming intelligence about German intentions. It instead aims to emphasize the human factor and argue that, when considering the differing degrees of success between the two intelligence systems regarding Operation Barbarossa, the importance of leadership—and said leadership’s perceptions—cannot be overstated. As Wesley Wark reminds us, “the critical flow of intelligence to decision-makers is often interrupted by the human element in government organizations – personality clashes, bureaucratic conflicts, and sheer bumbling... Intelligence failure cannot be explained solely as a result of the quirks and flaws in the system.”^② The human element of the decision-makers themselves must also be considered.

While naturally at the top of the command chain as Prime Minister, Winston Churchill did not insist on micromanaging intelligence efforts and instead allowed experienced and capable professionals to lead the charge. Churchill initially did not have much respect for the machinery of intelligence analysis, and insisted on examining the material for himself. However, once he saw it and understood that it was well beyond even his capacities, he allowed those who were capable to review everything and report to him the relevant findings.^③ This somewhat hands-off approach enabled the intelligence organizations to function independently and objectively. Further, Churchill was not as prone as Stalin to disbelieving bad news or filtering facts to fit his preconceptions. In fact, Churchill may have been too quick to accept the intelligence he received. For example, in 1941 Churchill badgered Commander-in-Chief Wavell and later Auchinleck to launch an offensive against German and Italian forces in North Africa despite their misgivings because he deemed Ultra intelligence infallible and believed it would guarantee operational success.^④

Josef Stalin, on the other hand, was not the type of leader to allow something of such importance to function without his constant oversight. By establishing himself at the top of the intelligence system,^⑤ and having reduced the number of high-ranking officers within the army through his brutal purges, Stalin prevented more experienced officers from leading intelligence collecting and processing efforts. This

① Ibid.

② Robertson, ed., *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, 87.

③ Ibid., 170.

④ Ibid., 132-36.

⑤ Robert Stephan, "Smersh: Soviet Military Counter-Intelligence during the Second World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 22, no.4 (1987): 589.

impractical hierarchy, combined with his extreme paranoia, enabled Stalin to filter intelligence according to what fit his preestablished perceptions, rather than allowing his perceptions to be shaped by incoming information. As previously mentioned, Stalin's preconceived notion was that a German attack was inevitable, but that it could not possibly happen so soon, as Germany had signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and relied heavily on its resources and military aid. Certain that this was true, Stalin was inclined to reject or disregard any piece of intelligence that claimed otherwise, as can be seen in the cases of intelligence from Fitin, Sorge, and others. Stalin also attributed much of the intelligence to be part of Germany's extensive misinformation campaigns. Barton Whaley cites Germany's deception plan as highly effective, because it accorded with Stalin's "desperate conviction that Hitler would not attack the East in 1941, or if he did, that the Soviets would at least receive an ultimatum and be able to preserve some room for diplomatic maneuver."^① Confident that Germany was merely attempting to apply pressure on the Soviet Union in order to coerce it into a closer partnership, Stalin saw no need to consider these tactics as anything but strongarming and believed that if he continued to accommodate Hitler, war could be avoided—or at least delayed.^② In Stalin's mind, if these warnings were not part of German misinformation, then they were likely part of Britain's ploy to pull the Soviet Union into the war by pitting it against Germany and thus lessening its burden of fighting the Nazis essentially on its own.^③ Stalin's distrust of the British not only led him to reject warnings coming from across the Channel, but also led him to focus much of the Soviet intelligence efforts on spying on the United Kingdom (which continued even after the Soviet Union allied with the Allied Powers).

Conclusion

Both Great Britain and the Soviet Union were home to impressive intelligence systems during the Second World War. Intelligence operations of both countries had their fair share of issues, such as poor organization and inadequate financing,^④ but both also received ample sources of intelligence warning them of an impending German invasion of the Soviet Union in the spring or summer of 1941. Both struggled to heed this intelligence due to a variety of factors: disinformation efforts, the current state of the war, and the circumstances of German-Soviet relations. Ultimately, it was the British that were able to accept the validity of such warnings and act accordingly by trying to warn Stalin, whereas Stalin remained obstinate to the bitter end, and was unable to counter the German offense until well after considerable damage and loss of

① Robertson, ed., *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, 89.

② Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Churchill's Warning to Stalin: A Reappraisal," *The Historical Journal* 29, no.4 (1986): 982.

③ *Ibid.*, 980.

④ Robertson, ed., *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, 187-214.

life had been wrought. This however is not to say that the British intelligence system was therefore far superior to its Soviet counterpart. The British intelligence community may have been able to change its perceptions based on intelligence about Barbarossa, but only at the last moment and only because of Ultra's timely ability to substantiate such information. At the time of the attack, British intelligence was still considered to have a minimal influence on strategy.^① And, like the Soviet Union, issues of perception and preconceived notions also hindered British intelligence in regard to its strategic application.

Operation Barbarossa proved that regardless of how formidable a state's intelligence system was, its success in informing wartime strategy ultimately rested on the perceptions and competence of its principal leaders. Such systems could not function properly and effectively if its leader did not support competency, innovation, and differing perspectives, nor if he did not allow them to inform wartime decisions. The British intelligence system included several channels for intelligence collection, as well as internal procedures to prevent uniform flow of intelligence leading to a single conclusion.^② Churchill, despite being at the top of the authority chain, allowed qualified intelligence workers to drive the initiative. Ultra staff and secret service agents were kept separate from operational decisions, and so they passed intelligence to authorized recipients without any operational deductions or proposals for action.^③

Conversely, Stalin dominated the chain of command, which dissuaded others from relaying information to him, and allowed him to filter intelligence according to his preconceptions. So, while Stalin knew that something like Barbarossa would happen eventually, he was certainly surprised that it indeed occurred at the forewarned moment. Operation Barbarossa was shocking in its ferocity and brutality, but it was not surprising. Nonetheless, eighty years on, this failure is still studied in depth and remains significant regarding considerations of intelligence capabilities, military strategy, and state decision-making.

① Robertson, ed., *British and American Approaches to Intelligence*, 136.

② *Ibid.*, 172.

③ *Ibid.*, 131.

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Cybersecurity

The EU's Position in the China-US 5G Digital Competition

Stefania Jiang

Executive Summary

The fifth generation (5G) of mobile telecom networks has already become part of our new reality. In recent years, China and the US have been leading the technological competition for global supremacy. While many countries around the world have been siding with one of the two powerhouses, the European Union (EU) represents an interesting case. Due to its lack of cohesiveness in terms of 5G strategies, the EU falls behind in the global race, as European companies have yet to develop a comprehensive framework towards 5G. Accordingly, this policy memo explores the reality of cyber security, the significance of the introduction of 5G technology for the EU and the EU's position in the China-US digital competition. Consequently, a few policy options are considered, and, in the end, a policy recommendation is proposed to address the current issue of cyber security in the EU – i.e., the coordination of a common 5G strategy at the regional level.

Issue Description: What Is 5G, China-US Competition, Huawei Ban

Since the development of first receivers in the 1980s to the present day, four generations of telecommunications technology succeeded one another.^① While 3G offered mobile internet and 4G provided mobile broadband, 5G represents the newest generation of connectivity infrastructure today.^② It is predicted that alongside 5G, a new range of products and services will be introduced that will cover all sectors of society.^③ More precisely, 5G is an essential tool for artificial intelligence systems; it is supplying real-time data for collection and analytical purposes.^④ Additionally, it will upgrade the cloud service “by enabling the distribution of computing and storage, such as edge cloud, and mobile edge computing.”^⑤

① Lorenzo Mariani and Micol Bertolini, “The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe,” *Istituto Affari Internazionali Commentaries* 19, no.16 (2019): 2.

② European Commission, “The EU Toolbox for 5G Security,” *European Commission Website*, January 29, 2020. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/eu-toolbox-5g-security> (accessed June 20, 2021).

③ *Ibid.*

④ European Commission, “5G,” *European Commission Website*, April 26, 2021. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/5g> (accessed June 20, 2021).

⑤ *Ibid.*

Two 5G key technological achievements have been recorded to this day: “enhanced machine-type communication and narrowband Internet of Things.”^① These two milestones have been reached by American telecommunications equipment company Qualcomm, and Chinese telecommunications company Huawei, respectively. Yet, China is currently a step ahead of the US, and it is leading the digital competition.^② Following closely after China and the US, the EU represents the third global hub for the development of 5G technology.^③ Based on 5G-technology market share, the EU is home to prominent high-tech companies, Ericsson and Nokia. These come in second and third place right after Chinese company Huawei.^④

In this regard, the use of 5G technology ignited a competition between two of the greatest leaders dominating the world technology scene: China and the US. This is because the introduction of this innovative wireless technology is predicted to impact our societies and economies to a greater extent.^⑤ Moreover, China-US rivalry has been going on for several years, as both great powers see 5G in geopolitical terms.^⑥ For the US, the main problem is associated with security risks of 5G networks: especially if Huawei is the company who developed these. Not surprisingly, in 2014 the US banned Huawei from telecom development in the country.^⑦

At the same time, the Trump Administration put pressure on its allies in Europe and elsewhere to not include Huawei in their national plans to develop 5G technology.^⑧ In essence, Washington tried to push its European partners to comply with the ban of Huawei technology by putting limitations on US cooperation, even in crucial areas like intelligence sharing cooperation.^⑨ As a consequence, a few European countries had no other choice but to comply with Trump’s policy to halt Huawei cooperation. However, the majority of EU member states have not yet adopted this strategy.^⑩

Stakes Analysis: Cybersecurity and Data Protection

① Qualcomm Technologies, “eMTC and NB-IoT,” *Medium*, August 2, 2017. <https://medium.com/iotforall/emtc-and-nb-iot-2339dd3833e1> (accessed June 22, 2021).

② Sheryl Tian and Tong Lee, “China Races Ahead of the U.S. in the Battle for 5G Supremacy,” *Bloomberg*, August 2, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-01/china-bets-on-5g-socialism-in-push-to-lead-global-tech-race> (accessed June 22, 2021).

③ Mariani and Bertolini, “The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe,” 14.

④ *Ibid.*

⑤ *Ibid.*, 1.

⑥ Francesca Ghiretti, “Europe’s Maneuvering on 5G Technology: The Case of Italy,” *Istituto Affari Internazionali Commentaries* 20, no.67 (2020): 1.

⑦ Gabriele Carrer and Otto Lanzavecchia, “Italy Feels the Pressure of Trump’s Ultimatum over Huawei Tech,” *Formiche*, August 18, 2020. <https://formiche.net/2020/08/italy-feels-the-pressure-of-trumps-ultimatum-over-huawei-tech/> (accessed June 20, 2021).

⑧ *Ibid.*

⑨ Mariani and Bertolini, “The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe,” 18.

⑩ *Ibid.*

One of the main concerns surrounding the use of 5G technology is the risk of mishandling private data online. China, the US and the EU all have different approaches when it comes to 5G and the handling of online data. Cyber security is a pressing issue in our contemporary world, as it involves virtually every citizen. Basically, anyone who has a smartphone and connection to the Internet has to deal with security while navigating online. In other words, cyber security is a crucial reality for everyone, since smartphones have become an integral part of our daily lives.

In particular, the EU has a long history of regulating data protection. One of the most recent scandals involved UK-based consulting firm Cambridge Analytica and US social media network Facebook. In 2018, a case was opened, where the former was found out to be collecting 2.7 million EU Facebook users' personal data without prior consent.^① In particular, Cambridge Analytica collected information from Facebook's private profiles for several political campaigns (e.g., Leave campaign for 2016 Brexit referendum and former US President Trump's electoral campaign in 2016). Following the scandal, Facebook was fined \$5 billion by the US Federal Trade Commission for privacy violations.^② In the end, Facebook had to include a new section in its Terms and Services: while it does not require any subscription fee, it has to ask for the user's consent before sharing their data for commercial ends.^③

Policy Options

Banning Huawei

Although the EU shares the US' concerns on national security, the total exclusion of Chinese technology is not a feasible option for Europe for two main reasons. First, the European Commission aims to keep a diversified and sustainable 5G supply chain in order not to form long-term dependency.^④ Therefore banning Huawei from the EU digital markets goes against the promotion of fair and open competition that the EU advocates for. Second, cutting out Chinese telecommunications companies may cause serious collateral damages, as Beijing is playing a leading role in today's global value chains.^⑤

Consequently, the one-way US strategy against Chinese companies appears to be counterproductive, considering that it is not evenly adopted by all American allies.^⑥ In this regard, the strategy of the EU to work towards a "coordinated and multilateral strategy seems to be having a more positive and effective

① Catherine Stupp, "Cambridge Analytica harvested 2.7 million Facebook users' data in the EU," Euractiv, April 9, 2018. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/data-protection/news/cambridge-analytica-harvested-2-7-million-facebook-users-data-in-the-eu/> (accessed June 18, 2021).

② Julia Carrie Wong, "Facebook to be fined \$5bn for Cambridge Analytica privacy violations - reports," *The Guardian*, July 12, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/12/facebook-fine-ftc-privacy-violations> (accessed June 18, 2021).

③ European Commission, "Facebook changes its terms and clarify its use of data for consumers following discussions with the European Commission and consumer authorities," *European Commission Website*, April 9, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2048 (accessed June 18, 2021).

④ European Commission, "The EU Toolbox for 5G Security."

⑤ Mariani and Bertolini, "The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe," 18.

⑥ *Ibid.*, 19.

impact.”^① Put briefly, banning Chinese technology altogether does not represent a winning strategy for the EU, who would not be able to catch up to its competitors and could potentially become overly-dependent on the US.^②

Hedging

The current China-US digital rivalry will lead to the creation of a bipolar global reality with two hubs. The majority of countries around the world will choose to adopt hedging strategies, including both American and Chinese technology. As explained by Professor Yan (2020), the hedging strategy can be distinguished from the non-alignment and neutrality strategies. While the latter two refer to the abstinence from taking sides, the hedging strategy favors interchangeably siding with one or the other party on a case-to-case basis. One classical example of hedging strategy is following China for economic reasons and the US for security-related reasons.^③

In addition, some European countries are discussing setting up a system compatible with both American technology and Huawei 5G, in order to avoid taking sides.^④ After the American threat to stop sharing intelligence data, this is the pragmatic solution that some EU member states are resorting to.^⑤ Yet, the current EU trend of decentralization makes it difficult for European member states to develop a comprehensive European telecommunications group.^⑥ Some instances of countries who successfully established their own independent telecommunications networks include South Korea and Japan, whose national systems cannot be accessed by foreign mobile phones.^⑦

Coordinating a Common Strategy at the EU Level

The reason why the EU is stuck between China-US competition is because it is unable to act independently. The EU cannot easily keep up with its global competitors, as it still highly depends on foreign technologies to develop 5G infrastructures.^⑧ In addition, the EU struggles, because of a significant lack of (1) investment in research and development (R&D), and (2) solidarity among member states to develop a common framework towards 5G technology to compete with the rest of the world.^⑨ The lack of a shared strategy has led to the creation of a diversified reality, marked by the presence of plenty of minor

① Mariani and Bertolini, “The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe,” 19.

② Ibid., 17.

③ Xuetong Yan, “Bipolar Rivalry in the Early Digital Age,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 13, no.3 (2020): 332.

④ Ibid., 339.

⑤ Mariani and Bertolini, “The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe,” 18.

⑥ Xuetong Yan, “Bipolar Rivalry in the Early Digital Age,” 335.

⑦ Ibid., 339.

⑧ Mariani and Bertolini, “The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe,” 14.

⑨ Ibid.

operators and different standards scattered all across the continent.^① In other words, the EU is advancing at a slower pace compared to the US and China. This is because of the plurality of 5G deployment among member states.^② Nevertheless, the European Commission aims to “facilitate coordination between member states regarding standardization to achieve specific security objectives and developing relevant EU-wide certification schemes.”^③

Policy Recommendation

Soon, most of the global economy will become dependent on 5G networks. All in all, while the development of 5G technology guarantees more efficiency, it could also significantly expose many sectors to potential risks.^④

The case of Cambridge Analytica and Facebook showed how the EU has previously dealt with data sharing without consent, adopting a stern position. Therefore, in the case of 5G too, the EU should guarantee a solid legal and technical support to minimize the danger posed on people’s data; this data could be subject to cyber-attacks by hackers or by intelligence agencies.^⑤

At the present moment, the EU member states are stuck in a difficult position between China and the US in the international technological race. So far, the hedging strategy has worked and may continue to work in the short term, however, it is time for the EU to seriously address the issue of cyber security and 5G. Due to its nature of being a supranational entity, the EU should establish a regional framework and promote a common digital policy on the development of 5G in Europe. This is crucial for three reasons: first, to bring together and maximize the potential that each member state has to offer. Second, to invest in local technology and support European tech leading companies.^⑥ Third, to become less dependent on foreign technologies and, at the same time, increase competitiveness. This will form a united response to the China-US race to dominate the international digital scene. To sum up, instead of trying to compete with the US or China, the EU should take advantage of its plurality and progressively start to develop an independent telecommunications network.

① Mariani and Bertolini, “The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe,” 14.

② Ibid.

③ European Commission, “The EU Toolbox for 5G Security.”

④ Mariani and Bertolini, “The US-China 5G Contest: Options for Europe,” 18.

⑤ Ibid.

⑥ Ibid., 16.

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- [2] European Commission. "5G." *European Commission Website*, April 26, 2021. <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/5g> (accessed June 20, 2021).
- [3] European Commission. "Facebook changes its terms and clarify its use of data for consumers following discussions with the European Commission and consumer authorities." *European Commission*, April 9, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2048 (accessed June 18, 2021).
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- [9] Tian, Sheryl and Tong Lee. "China Races Ahead of the U.S. in the Battle for 5G Supremacy." *Bloomberg*, August 2, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-01/china-bets-on-5g-socialism-in-push-to-lead-global-tech-race> (accessed June 22, 2021).
- [10] Wong, Julia Carrie. "Facebook to be fined \$5bn for Cambridge Analytica privacy violations - reports." *The Guardian*, July 12, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/12/facebook-fine-ftc-privacy-violations> (accessed June 18, 2021).
- [11] Yan, Xuetong. "Bipolar Rivalry in the Early Digital Age." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 13, No.3 (2020): 313-41.
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The East German Refugee Exodus of 1989

A Comparison of the Implications on the Bilateral Relations of Hungary with the GDR, BRD and USSR

Julian Kirchoff

Introduction and Relevance

In German popular opinion the fall of the Berlin Wall on the evening of the ninth of November 1989, set in motion by a chain of events following an ambiguous statement by the East German press secretary Günther Schabowski, marked the end of the Iron Curtain and paved the way for what would effectively cumulate in German reunification one year later. But while the event and the accompanying outpouring of joy in Berlin, which is still annually remembered as the “Mauerfall,” had a strong signal effect, it was not this spontaneous stroke of luck alone that led to the end of the intra-German border as is often portrayed. While the thousands of East Germans that successfully challenged the border guards at the Berlin wall that November evening certainly hastened the demise of the fortified division of Germany, it was only accelerated by a few weeks or days if the last West German de facto ambassador to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) Franz Bertele^① is to be believed. Rather than the product of a botched press conference, the “Mauerfall” was the inevitable product of a growing loss of control by the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) over its population, caused by economic stagnation paired with the unwillingness of the Honecker led government to adjust itself to the changing international environment of Glasnost and Perestroika.^② Apart from the increasingly well attended “Monday Protests” towards the end of 1989, the most obvious sign of this development was the massive refugee crisis, which began in summer that year as the Iron Curtain became more porous, owing to the fast-paced liberation in neighboring Hungary. Starting with the infamous pan-European picnic on the Austrian-Hungarian border, where over 300 GDR citizens were able to cross the iron wall mostly unimpeded,^③ the stream of refugees soon increased to many thousand a day, which not only tried to reach the west through Hungary, but also sought refuge in the West German embassies of Prague and Warsaw. Apart from the desire for more personal liberty and the opportunity to

① Reflection in his final report from the West German liaison office in East Berlin (1990).

② Steven Saxonberg, “The Fall: A Comparative Study of the End of Communism in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland,” *Slavic Review* 61, no.3 (2017): 576-87.

③ Volker Wagener, “Secrets of ‘Pan-European Picnic’ Still Shrouded in Mystery 30 Years Later,” *Deutsche Welle*, August 19, 2019, <https://www.dw.com/en/secrets-of-pan-european-picnic-still-shrouded-in-mystery-30-years-later/a-50059293> (accessed June 3, 2021).

travel freely, many of the refugees hoped for a better and more prosperous life in the capitalist west.^① The resulting crisis in the summer months required immediate decision making and laid bare the contradictions and incalculability in an Eastern Europe, where the long-standing political realities of the Soviet overlordship were crumbling, yet Moscow's reaction was still a matter of uncertainty.

While the spring of nations and fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 is well researched by historians and political scientists, existing analysis of the 1989 refugee exodus primarily focuses on the East German perspective as well as its implications for the German Democratic Republic. A stronger focus on the Hungarian perspective in light of its tumultuous 20th century history could yield additional insights. In my research paper I will focus on the case of Hungary and evaluate and compare how the refugee exodus affected Hungary's bilateral relations with the German Democratic Republic, the German Federal Republic (BRD) and the Soviet Union (USSR).

Literature Review

As many previously classified German documents concerning the happenings of 1989 were only released to the wider public from 2010 onwards, most relevant literature concerning the refugee exodus to Hungary and its implications are comparably new.^② A broad account on this topic is a 2015 paper by Polish social sciences professor Katarzyna Stokłosa^③ who focused on the situation and the implications of the East German refugees seeking refuge in the West German embassies in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest by analyzing among others, West German embassy cables exchanged during this period. While her comprehensive work contains valuable information and conclusions, some of which I might reference in my analysis, her paper strongly focuses on the situation in the West German embassies and the GDR response to it. In contrast to her work, my comparison will have a less narrow focus on the situation in the embassies and a stronger emphasis on assessing the political implications for Hungary omitting the already well researched topic of the factors that motivated East Germans to flee their own country.

The economic and political root causes of the following revolutions are also at the core of one of the most comprehensive English-language publications related to this topic, a 2017 book by author Steven Saxonberg.^④ The East German refugee exodus of 1989 is discussed in his book, although not with a very detailed analysis of its implications or comparisons, so some further focused research into this topic could still yield some additional insight.

① Katarzyna Stokłosa, "Die Letzte Fluchtwelle Aus Der DDR Im Jahr 1989. Aus Den Berichten Der Westdeutschen Botschaften in Budapest, Prag Und Warschau," *Zeitschrift Für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung*, 2015, 40–80.

② Tereza Procházková, "Der Ostdeutsche Exodus in Prag 1989 Und Seine Reflexion in Offiziellen Presse Der DDR Und ČSSR" (Master's Thesis, University Karlova, 2011).

③ Stokłosa, "Die Letzte Fluchtwelle Aus Der DDR Im Jahr 1989."

④ Saxonberg, *The Fall*.

Methodology

To answer the research question, I will introduce the historical background followed by an outline and analysis of the implications of the 1989 refugee crisis on Hungary's relationship with the GDR, the USSR, and the BRD. This is done by drawing on secondary sources such as some of the readings introduced above, as well as primary sources, among them documents and messages of the West German and East German foreign offices, which are publicly available through the library of the German foreign office. Hungary has also released some valuable documents from the concerned period, some of which have been translated. Furthermore, participating leaders such as Miklós Németh or Gyula Horn have given comprehensive accounts of their perspective through television interviews as well as in writing, both of which are publicly accessible.

Historical Background

The Communist Period

The communist period in Hungary began in earnest in 1949 when the Hungarian Communist Party, after having previously failed to win the majority in two more or less free elections, with Soviet backing forcibly integrated the remaining opposition parties into the new Hungarian Peoples Front. The new communist government was led by ardent Stalinist Matyas Rakosi, who instituted a personal cult around him and Stalin. His leadership was marked by tyranny signified by mass arrests and show trials, at one point even having his former right hand László Rajk executed.^① Due to the increasing resistance of the population and Communist Party cadres to his ruling style and his abuses, as well as the death of Stalin and the following de-Stalinization, Rakosi's power basis crumbled, and he was forced to resign in 1956. However, his resignation and replacement with Erno Gero failed to appease the masses and served as a precursor to the Hungarian revolution barely three months later.^②

The revolution of 1956 swept Imre Nagry to power who disbanded the feared secret service "Államvédelmi Hatóság" as well as among other measures, announced Hungary's neutrality and its exit of the Warsaw pact. These events forced the Soviet Union to intervene and violently crush the uprising.^③ Imre Nagy was exiled to Romania and later executed; his place was taken by fellow communist Janos Kadar. While the revolution of 1956 failed to achieve its initial objectives, it still laid the bedrock for a more liberal communism in Hungary the following decades. Coined the "Goulash communism," the Communist Party

① "Mátyás Rákosi (1892-1971)." *The Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, 2000, http://www.rev.hu/history_of_56/szerviz/kislex/biograf/rakosi.htm (accessed June 3, 2021).

② Johanna Granville, "1956 Reconsidered: Why Hungary and Not Poland?," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 80, no.4 (2002): 656-87.

③ Ibid.

still maintained absolute control, but limitations on speech, culture and private economic activities were less strict compared to most other communist countries.

The following decades turned out to be a period of stability, but Hungary was, despite its comparably more liberal economic system, not spared from the general economic downturn that affected the Soviet Union and many of its satellite states from the 1980s onwards.^① Inflation and growing economic woes increased the pressure on the Kadar government and gave reformist minded groups new uplift. Unlike in other Soviet satellite states such as East Germany or Czechoslovakia, many high-ranking members of the Hungarian Communist Party acknowledged the pressing need for economic as well as political reforms fearing a public uprising should the dire economic situation continue. Janos Kadar gave in to internal pressure in 1988 and retired to be replaced by reformist communist and economic expert Miklós Németh. After overcoming severe resistance inside the communist party Németh set Hungary on a path to economic and political liberalization, democracy, as well rapprochement with the West. His strategy was not without risk, while it embraced Gorbachev's call for perestroika, there was the acute and unpredictable danger that going too far in the eyes of Moscow would attract Soviet wrath.

The Proceedings of 1989

In May 1989 the Hungarian government started to dismantle its border fence with Austria. The move was primarily a financial decision, as a replacement and upgrade of the aging border fortification would need to be paid for in hard currency.^② This decision was coordinated with the Soviet Union and Hungary assured that vigilant border controls would be kept up to deter any illegal border crossings toward the West.^③ For Hungarian citizens the border fortification had been already irrelevant, with the introduction of a World Passport in 1988 they were already free to travel to the West legally if they wished so.^④ While initially not widely publicized, a symbolic fence cutting ceremony between Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock and his Hungarian counterpart Gyula Horn in June 1989 was covered by western media and the news found its way to East Germany, where it made many aware that the Hungarian – Austrian Border could be a possible pathway to the west.

Despite the lack of a border fence, the border was not open and Hungarian Border troops stopped countless illegal border crossing attempts by GDR citizens. This first gap in the border appeared in August 1989 with the Pan-European Picnic.^⑤ The Picnic was an idea of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne

① Saxonberg, *The Fall*.

② Walter Mayr, "Hungary's Peaceful Revolution: Cutting the Fence and Changing History," *Der Spiegel*, May 2009, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/hungary-s-peaceful-revolution-cutting-the-fence-and-changing-history-a-627632.html> (accessed June 3, 2021).

③ "Gorbachev Hat Nur Gelächelt - Interview Mit Miklos Nemeth," *Die Welt*, September 11, 2004, <https://www.welt.de/print-welt/article339849/Gorbatschow-hat-nur-gelaechelt.html> (accessed June 3, 2021).

④ Mayr, "Hungary's Peaceful Revolution: Cutting the Fence and Changing History."

⑤ Wagener, "Secrets of 'Pan-European Picnic' Still Shrouded in Mystery 30 Years Later."

and member of EU Parliament Otto von Habsburg and conducted in collaboration with the Pan-European Union and the reformist Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF). The idea was to host a picnic directly on the Hungarian – Austrian border with attendees from both sides, to showcase the idea of a Europe without borders. The organizers received a permit that allowed for temporary border crossings during the picnic. Once approved, flyers for the event were extensively circulated among East German’s holidaying in Hungary.^① Many of them understood the message and some showed up at the advertised date and location. Once the temporary border gate was opened for the event to begin, around 700 East Germans overwhelmed the border guards, which mostly just stood by, and crossed into Austria unimpeded.^② Following the Picnic, the Hungarian Government intensified their border controls again, but was faced with an increasing number of illegal border crossing attempts by tens of thousands of East Germans now assembled in Hungary. Absent of border fortifications, quite a few slipped through every day. Contrary to previous practice, East Germans that were caught at the border were merely temporarily arrested and not deported back to their home country. Furthermore, Hungarian Border Guards were instructed not to use lethal force. In addition to those trying to illegally cross the border to Austria, up to 700 East Germans sought refuge in the West German embassy in Budapest and an adjacent campground. With the cold autumn weather approaching and absent of a negotiated solution involving the GDR, Hungary decided to suspend its bilateral treaty governing visa free travel in early September and opened the border to Austria; effectively allowing the GDR citizens within the country to cross into the West unhindered.^③

Analysis

Implications on the relationship with the GDR

When the Hungarian Ministry of Interior officially informed the GDR of the impending removal of the border fortification in early May, a fact which had previously been merely treated as a rumor in GDR government circles, the Hungarians were well aware of the possible consequences for its socialist brother country. They assured the GDR, however, that the change was merely cosmetic and stringent border controls would be kept up.^④ Hungary was bound by long-standing bilateral agreements with the GDR, which stipulated that it would not allow GDR citizens to travel onward to the non-socialist west.^⑤ This was important, because GDR citizens could travel to Hungary visa-free and did so in large numbers every year for vacation purposes, a lucrative business especially in the vacation hotspots near Lake Balaton.

① Wagener, “Secrets of ‘Pan-European Picnic’ Still Shrouded in Mystery 30 Years Later.”

② Mayr, “Hungary’s Peaceful Revolution: Cutting the Fence and Changing History.”

③ “19 August 1989 – a step on the way to German Reunification,” *German Political Archive*, 2019, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/-pan-european-picnic--1662402> (accessed June 3, 2021).

④ Stoklosa, “Die Letzte Fluchtelle Aus Der DDR Im Jahr 1989. Aus Den Berichten Der Westdeutschen Botschaften in Budapest, Prag Und Warschau.” 47.

⑤ 20 Deutsches Politisches Archiv – Deutschlandpolitik (BRD), Handakten Staatssekretär Jürgen Sudhoff, B – 2 B STS/286, August 1989, <https://politisches-archiv.diplo.de/invenio/direktlink/955d5ebe-cf95-4785-b55f-f7d29ebb00bc/>.

With few illegal border crossings, due to the limited spread of information about the removal of border fortifications and continuing controls, the GDR leadership was satisfied at first, but grew increasingly concerned when news spread among East Germans through western television following the official border fence cutting ceremony in late June. The news of the removed border fortification motivated many GDR citizens, in addition to the regular holidaymakers, to travel to Hungary for the summer vacation in hopes of being able to cross into the west. In a meeting with West German emissary Jürgen Sudhoff in early August, Hungarian foreign Minister Gyula Horn noted that by the end of July 1989, 200,000 GDR citizens had arrived in Hungary, which was a matter of great concern to Erich Honecker.^①

During July and August, many GDR citizens tried to cross the border to Austria illegally, but the majority were stopped by Hungarian border guards. Other GDR citizens sought refuge in the West German embassy in Budapest from August onward.^② The GDR demanded those apprehended at the border be deported back home based on their bilateral treaty, while the BRD demanded that Hungary recognize GDR citizens, especially those trapped at the embassy, as “German citizens” and therefore allow them to travel west.^③ This put the Hungarian leadership in a bind. On the one hand, Hungary recognized the humanitarian issue at stake and also strived to improve its relationship with the west as part of its reformist agenda, on the other hand, there was little appetite in further straining its relationship with the GDR and other Warsaw Pact states. The GDR was not only still a socialist brother country, but also one of Hungary’s largest trading partners. Furthermore, GDR tourists made up a considerable chunk of the country’s tourism business.^④ Antagonizing the Warsaw Pact could also have serious repercussion on the domestic reforms happening in Hungary. Since before the start of the refugee crisis, reformist developments in Hungary were already regarded with great suspicion by the GDR leadership. An internal report on the public reburial of Imre Nagy in June 1989 and the accompanying reassessment of the happenings of 1956 concluded that the USAP was increasingly losing control over the domestic situation and that a Hungarian rapprochement with the West and NATO would be a realistic possibility if the country continued its current trajectory.^⑤ The report called for a united response of the Warsaw Pact countries to these anti-Soviet actions, noting that the Romanian Ambassador in Budapest had already voiced his strong displeasure with the reactionary event.

With the Warsaw Pact reaction still uncertain and Hungarian Foreign Minister Horn anticipating a unilateral border closure by the GDR, should the situation escalate, the Hungarian leadership responded with a compromise. On one side, they publicly declined the BRD interpretation on the matter of German

① 20 Deutsches Politisches Archiv – Deutschlandpolitik (BRD), Handakten Staatssekretär Jürgen Sudhoff, B – 2 B STS/286.

② “Einmaliger Akt.” *Der Spiegel*, August 27, 1989, <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/einmaliger-akt-a-58eefc7d-0002-0001-0000-000013495172> (accessed June 3, 2021).

③ 20 Deutsches Politisches Archiv – Deutschlandpolitik (BRD), Handakten Staatssekretär Jürgen Sudhoff, B – 2 B STS/286.

④ Stokfosa, “Die Letzte Fluchtelle Aus Der DDR Im Jahr 1989.”

⑤ 25 Deutsches Politisches Archiv – Grundsatzmaterialien zur Innerdeutschen Entwicklung, Lage in Ungarn (GDR), M 95-STG/712, June 1989, <https://politisches-archiv.diplo.de/invenio/direktlink/f5426943-b1cc-47d1-b339-a7c0d1bfbb93/>

citizenship, siding with the GDR, but they also ordered the border troops not to stamp documents or deport anybody back to the GDR who was caught illegally crossing the border. They clarified that the issue was primarily one concerning the BRD and the GDR and should be solved by both countries bilaterally.^① Nevertheless, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn worked actively behind the scenes to find a face-saving solution for all parties.^② The GDR proved relentless, however and GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer repeatedly declined proposals that would have provided a face-saving way for the GDR refugees into the West such as the formal granting of “Ausreiseanträge” (exit permits).^③ With the refugee situation becoming even more pressing during the course of August and a Soviet intervention becoming increasingly unlikely in the aftermath of the Pan-European Picnic, the Hungarian Foreign Minister put an ultimatum in front of his GDR counterpart Oskar Fischer. It stipulated that if he did not agree to any of the proposed solutions, Hungary would open its border to Austria and suspend its bilateral travel treaty with the GDR.^④ When this also failed to yield results, the Hungarian Government followed through with their threat in early September, allowing the GDR citizens to cross into the west unimpeded. This led to strong protest by the GDR and the East German Foreign Minister who accused Hungary of betraying the GDR and the Warsaw Pact.^⑤ But at this point Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn had already arrived at a conclusion which the GDR leadership still avoid acknowledging, namely that the internal situation in East Germany was heading toward a collapse.^⑥

The repercussions of the refugee exodus on the Hungarian – GDR relationship can be therefore characterized as negative. Despite Hungarian efforts to broker a face-saving solution the GDR leadership closed their eyes to the reality on the ground and refused a negotiated solution. The resulting border opening in September was met, not unexpectedly, with strong protest by the GDR, but with the larger threat of a Soviet intervention out of the way the Hungarian leadership accepted this consequence.

Implications for the Relationship with the USSR

The threat of a Soviet intervention hung for a long time over the events of Summer 1989. While Gorbachev allowed individual states more freedom as part of his new style of politics and declared that the USSR would not intervene in Eastern Europe, the limits of this declaration were still to be tested. This was especially relevant in the case of Hungary, which was the subject of a painful USSR intervention in 1956. When the Hungarian Government approached Gorbachev with regard to the dismantling of the border

① 20 Deutsches Politisches Archiv – Deutschlandpolitik (BRD), Handakten Staatssekretär Jürgen Sudhoff, B – 2 B STS/286.

② Stoklosa, “Die Letzte Fluchtwelle Aus Der DDR Im Jahr 1989,” 52.

③ “19 August 1989 – a step on the way to German reunification,” *German Political Archive*.

④ Stoklosa, “Die Letzte Fluchtwelle Aus Der DDR Im Jahr 1989,” 53.

⑤ “Horn informiert DDR-Führung über Grenzöffnung,” *Die Bundesregierung*, <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/horn-informiert-ddr-fuehrung-ueber-grenzoeffnung-471388> (accessed June 3, 2021).

⑥ Stoklosa, “Die Letzte Fluchtwelle Aus Der DDR Im Jahr 1989,” 56.

fortifications, they cited primarily financial reasons. The original border fortifications and fences that were delivered by the USSR in the 1960s were rotten and broken, and would require extensive refurbishment.^① Hungary was unwilling to invest precious hard currency in the renovation, so if the USSR was not willing to shoulder the cost of the renovations either, it would be removed.^② According to Hungarian Prime Minister Nemeth, Gorbachev smiled and told him that the Brezhnev times were over, that Hungary would be free to do whatever it deems necessary in this matter, and that the USSR would not pay for any renovations. He also gave Nemeth the assurance that as long as he was in charge, 1956 would not be repeated.^③ Nevertheless, the looming refugee crisis sparked large concerns of Soviet interference should matters escalate. In his discussion with West German emissary Dr. Sudoff, Hungarian Foreign Minister Horn described his fear that any further easing of the border restrictions would attract large numbers of refugees from Romania, Czechoslovakia or even the USSR itself. He did not want Hungary to become the gateway to the West as this could attract severe repercussions from the Warsaw Bloc or even the USSR itself.^④

After the dismantling of the border fence, patrols were kept up, and while some refugees managed to slip through, many were stopped. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's reaction to a full and the intentional border opening was unclear. This changed with the Pan-European Picnic in August when the border fence was deliberately opened, albeit on a small scale, and GDR refugees could pass through unimpeded. The event was well publicized beforehand and Soviet authorities were certainly aware of it.^⑤ In a 2009 television interview, Nemeth described the event as an intentional test of the Soviet reaction.^⑥ After no serious negative reactions followed, he judged that a Soviet intervention was indeed unlikely and decided to open the border should no deal with the GDR be reached in the near future.^⑦ This was the case in early September, and while the Soviet leadership watched the proceedings with concern, they stuck to their hands-off approach.

Consequently, the implications of the refugee exodus on the Hungarian – USSR bilateral relations can be characterized as positive from the Hungarian perspective. While Gorbachev promised Hungarian leader Nemeth that he would not intervene in Hungary, the real implications of this promise were yet to be tested.

① Mayr, "Hungary's Peaceful Revolution: Cutting the Fence and Changing History."

② "Gorbachev Hat Nur Gelächelt" *Die Welt*.

③ Ibid.

④ 20 Deutsches Politisches Archiv – Deutschlandpolitik (BRD), Handakten Staatssekretär Jürgen Sudhoff, B – 2 B STS/286.

⑤ Bundesstelle Stasi Unterlagen, "Schlaglicht: Paneuropäisches Picnic - Geschichten - BStU," *Das Bundesarchiv*, <https://www.bstu.de/geschichten/die-stasi-im-jahr-1989/schlaglicht-paneuropaeisches-picnic/> (accessed June 3, 2021).

⑥ Al Jazeera, "Frost Over the World - David Hasselhoff - 6 Nov09- Pt4," *YouTube* video, 15:51, November 7, 2009, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TaP9cMplK1M>.

⑦ Christian Erdei, "The Picnic That Changed European History," *Deutsche Welle*, August 19, 2014, <https://www.dw.com/en/the-picnic-that-changed-european-history/a-4580616> (accessed June 3, 2021).

Soviet inaction in light of the border opening was proof that Gorbachev stood by his word and commanded enough authority in Moscow to restrain any hardline factions which might have decided otherwise.

Implications for Hungary's Relationship with the BRD

Throughout the summer, the BRD worked hard to find a solution for the thousands of East Germans that were looking for a way to the west. The lengthy discussions with Hungarian officials transcribed in the German political archive were in a friendly but constructive atmosphere. While Hungary did not share the West German interpretation that there was only one German citizenship and tried to avoid a too obvious border opening in fear of GDR or Soviet repercussions, they compromised on other important BRD demands such as the request that no GDR citizen be deported back to the GDR.^① Furthermore, Hungary was very supportive with regard to the situation at the West German Embassy in Budapest, allowing them to add several apartments and a campground to improve the situation for the countless refugees there, which was a contrast to the decision-making in neighboring Czechoslovakia.^②

Despite calling on the GDR and the BRD to solve the refugee problem bilaterally, the Hungarian leadership around Foreign Minister Horn worked diligently on brokering a face-saving solution to the issue with the goal of ultimately allowing the refugees to continue on to the West, something which was very much appreciated in BRD government circles. Once the decision was made to open the border to Austria unilaterally, Prime Minister Nemeth flew personally to Helmut Kohl in Bonn to inform the BRD of this intention.^③ The German Chancellor was deeply touched and later remarked that it was Hungary who pushed the first stone out of the Berlin Wall. While the Hungarian decision to open the Border was not directly tied to any financial incentives (Nemeth remarked "Hungary does not sell people"), Germany decided to extend favorable credits of over one billion Deutsche Mark to Hungary in October 1989, a decision which was likely heavily influenced by the preceding events.^④ The ramifications of the refugee exodus on the Hungarian – BRD relationship can be therefore characterized as positive, and it certainly benefited the Hungarian rapprochement with West Germany to a degree.

Conclusion

The refugee exodus in 1989 had far reaching implications on Hungarian bilateral relations and accelerated the process of detaching from the Warsaw Pact and turning toward the west which had begun in the previous year. The most important realization of the events was that Gorbachev would indeed stick

① 20 Deutsches Politisches Archiv – Deutschlandpolitik (BRD), Handakten Staatssekretär Jürgen Sudhoff, B – 2 B STS/286.

② "Einmaliger Akt," *Der Spiegel*.

③ "Das Geheimgespräch Auf Schloss Gymnich," *Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk*, August 26, 2010, <https://www.mdr.de/zeitreise/stoebern/damals/grenzoeffnung-ungarn-ausreise100.html> (accessed June 3, 2021).

④ "Das Geheimgespräch Auf Schloss Gymnich," *Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk*.

to his promised hands-off approach when push came to shove, something which many in Hungary long doubted in light of the painful intervention in 1956. With the looming threat of interference out of the way, Hungary was able to act with less restraint in foreign and domestic politics.

The Exodus to some degree also marked an end of cordial relations with the GDR. While the new reformist Hungarian leadership never particularly liked their East German counterparts (in a discussion between Gyula Horn and German emissary Dr. Sudhoff, Horn remarked that: “we never liked Erich Honecker and he doesn’t like Hungary either”)^① they nevertheless sided with their socialist brother country during important questions in the early stages of the crisis and worked towards finding a solution that would have saved the GDR’s face. With Soviet intervention increasingly unlikely, and no negotiated solution in sight, Hungary abandoned those efforts and opened the border unilaterally regardless of potential consequences by the GDR.

In contrast to the negative implications for the GDR, the BRD-Hungarian relations benefited from the refugee crisis in 1989. The events led to intense dialogue between the BRD and the Hungarian leadership, and West Germany appreciated the border opening in September. Despite it not being tied to any financial incentives, Hungary benefited from the generous West German support in the aftermath of the crisis.

Limitations

Due to the limited length of the resulting paper, I will be only able to focus on a narrow scope in my research. In the light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the German political archive was not accessible for in-person visits at the time of writing, and only a subset of the available files is digitalized. For this reason, I have had to rely in part on secondary sources of authors who have had access to those files.

^① 20 Deutsches Politisches Archiv – Deutschlandpolitik (BRD), Handakten Staatssekretär Jürgen Sudhoff, B – 2 B STS/286.

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Germany and the Arms Trade Treaty

Julian Kirchoff

Introduction

The following paper will argue that Germany should stay in the Arms Trade Treaty and contribute to its proliferation. After an introduction into the treaty, I will present a cost-benefit analysis of Germany's participation in the treaty which underpins my argument.

Introduction to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

The idea of creating a comprehensive treaty regulating the international trade with conventional weapons was first introduced by a group of Nobel laureates in the 1990s in the light of the violent armed conflicts in Yugoslavia and West Africa and formally introduced into the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2006 as part of resolution 61/89, which asked for the views of UN member states on this issue.^①

The motivation behind the Arms Trade Treaty was the perception that unregulated and irresponsible arms transfers intensify and prolong conflicts, lead to regional instability, human rights abuses, and have a negative impact on the social and economic development of affected countries.^{②③} This does not only apply to illegal black-market transactions, as studies have highlighted the relative importance of the diversion and misappropriation of officially authorized transfers in that regard.^④ By promoting responsibility, transparency, and accountability in the global arms trade and thereby stopping potential harmful weapon sales, the ATT aims to address and mitigate those negative consequences. Furthermore, it intends to create a safer environment for the United Nations and other organizations to carry out humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, and to attain globally agreed development goals.^⑤

The core component of the ATT requires that signatory states establish and maintain an effective national control system for the export, import, transit, and transshipment of conventional arms covered by the ATT; exports of related ammunition and components used for assembling conventional arms; and

① Peter Woolcott, "The Arms Trade Treaty," *United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law*, 2014, https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/att/att_e.pdf (accessed June 23, 2021).

② "Arms Trade Treaty Implementation Toolkit," *United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs*, August 21, 2015, 2013, <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-21-Toolkit-Module-1.pdf> (accessed June 23, 2021).

③ "Arms Trade," *United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs*, 2021. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/att/> (accessed June 23, 2021).

④ Owen J Greene and Nicholas Marsh, *Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence* (London: Routledge, 2012).

⑤ "Arms Trade Treaty Implementation Toolkit," *United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs*.

brokering activities related to such controlled items. The established control list should then be made available to other state actors.^① Signatory countries must perform a national export assessment when conducting arms sales, which thoroughly evaluates the risk of potentially adverse consequences for security, peace, and human rights. If such an assessment determines that there is an overriding risk that the exported arms will be used to commit or facilitate any serious violations of international human rights, war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity or grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the arms transfer shall be denied.^{②③} The ATT does not limit or restrict the types or quantities of arms that states can buy, sell or possess, and there are no implications for the signatory countries' domestic gun control laws.^④ The ATT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2013 as a resolution after a 154 to 3 vote with 23 countries abstaining. The treaty was opposed by Iran, North Korea and Syria.^⑤ After the UN vote, the ATT opened for signatures and formally entered into force on 24th December 2014. As of present, 110 states have acceded to the ATT, including many of the world's leading arms producers such as the United Kingdom, France, China and Germany.^⑥ The United States and Russia, two major arms producers and traders, are notably absent and have not signed the ATT.

Benefits of the Arms Trade Treaty for Germany

As the fourth-largest arms producer worldwide with a market share of over 5.5%, the Arms Trade Treaty is very relevant for Germany. Many prestigious companies in the defense industry such as Rheinmetall and Heckler & Koch are located there, and the defense industry contributes a sizeable share to the country's economy. Despite the economic relevance of the arms industry, however, many Germans are not quite comfortable with Germany's role in the global arms trade. According to a recent survey, around 83% of all citizens oppose arms exports, fearing that the weapons could be used to violate human rights.^⑦ The perception of the issue is also partially shaped by the historic role Germany played during the two world wars. Since then, Germany has committed itself to a foreign policy that aspires to promote peace and human rights. Nevertheless, the arms trade remains relevant for its economic and political benefits, with weapon transactions being used to foster and strengthen bilateral relations between Germany and other countries. Signing on to the Arms Trade Treaty provides Germany with the opportunity to demonstrate that, despite

① Daryl G. Kimball, "The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance," *Arms Control Association*, August 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms_trade_treaty (accessed June 23, 2021).

② "The Arms Trade Treaty," *United Nations*, 2013, https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253 (accessed June 23, 2021).

③ Kimball, "The Arms Trade Treaty at a Glance."

④ Ibid.

⑤ Woolcott, "Historical Context of the Arms Trade Treaty."

⑥ "Treaty Status," *Arms Trade Treaty*, 2018, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-status.html?templateId=209883> (accessed June 23, 2021).

⑦ Charlotte Kehne, "83 Prozent Der Bevölkerung Sagen NEIN Zum Waffenexport," *Ohne Rüstung Leben*, February 2, 2016. <https://www.ohne-ruestung-leben.de/nachrichten/article/83-prozent-gegen-waffenexporte-33.html> (accessed June 23, 2021).

its leading role as an arms producer, it is committed to preventing its weapons from being abused to commit crimes. The audience of this effort is domestic as well as international, and the rules of the ATT provide a clear framework for it. While not explicitly required, there is an ongoing discussion in German government circles regarding whether arms exports should be limited to other ATT signatories as a signal of commitment to the cause and a way to promote the ATT. However, it would be unrealistic to block exports to its NATO partner, the United States, which has not ratified the ATT. As a nation committed to a more peaceful world, Germany appreciates the positive mission of the ATT in reducing armed conflicts globally. The ATT also benefits the safety of German troops involved in peacekeeping efforts abroad in places such as Afghanistan or Mali, who could be targeted in attacks using illegally trafficked weapons.

Costs of the Arms Trade Treaty for Germany

The costs of the Arms Trade Treaty for Germany include costs incurred to implement, maintain, and promote the screening procedures stipulated in the treaty, as well as costs incurred due to lost revenue if exports are blocked. The costs of the first category are partially publicized and according to the German Foreign Ministry, the federal government donates 3.5 million euros per year to the UN donor facility, the UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR). Furthermore, Germany was instrumental in helping to set up the Voluntary Trust Fund in 2016, which helps countries implement the ATT. With almost 1.5 million euros per annum, Germany is the Fund's second-largest donor.^① The lost revenue due to blocked exports is difficult to estimate. Germany did in fact block multiple potentially lucrative weapon shipments to Saudi Arabia and Turkey since the establishment of the ATT for fear of human rights violations, but in these cases other political considerations played a role as well.

Suggestions for Germany's Stance on the Arms Control Treaty

In light of the cost-benefit calculation of the ATT for Germany, I would suggest that Germany should stay committed to the treaty. The treaty provides Germany the opportunity to demonstrate that, despite being the world's fourth-largest arms producer, it is a responsible actor committed to protecting human rights. Similarly, I suggest that Germany should stay invested in the treaty's proliferation. A common criticism of the ATT is that it lacks teeth and could be considered a paper tiger. This is justified by the countless loopholes in the treaty by which countries can circumnavigate its provisions if they wish to do so. Countries can withhold information on arms sales for commercial or national security reasons, as has been done by Sweden, Australia, and Italy among others. Additionally, there is some ambiguity regarding dual-use goods or "training goods" which can be exploited. While an amendment of the treaty to make it more

^① "Putting an End to Unregulated Arms Trading around the World," *German Federal Foreign Office*, December 14, 2018, <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/aussenwirtschaft/-/2171732> (accessed June 23, 2021).

sweeping is unrealistic considering international opposition, Germany should nevertheless try to use its soft power and friendly relations with other countries to emphasize adherence to the key provision within the community of signatories. At the same time, Germany should continue to live up to the spirit of the treaty, maintain the required transparency, and block arms exports when necessary.

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Ideology, Revolution, and Totalitarianism

Sining Li

A non-negligible aspect of ideology is its association with revolutions and the prevalence of totalitarianism. Though modern ideologies can have both positive and negative ends and implications, their great potential for social mobilization and fanaticism as well as propensity for domination and revolution are recognized by many.^① As was argued by Albert Camus (1913-1960), the prevalence of ideologies in modern history has caused numerous tribulations and incidences of terrorism despite many aiming to diminish human suffering.^② How did ideology transform from the initial “science of ideas”^③ to the terror of absolute freedom, and how does it relate to the emergence of revolution and modern totalitarianism? This paper traces the origin of ideology to the French Revolution and identifies its two major alterations during modernization: the former concerned with the rise of Marxism and Communist revolutions and the latter the birth of modern totalitarianism.

The term “ideology” first appeared in its French form during the French Revolution of 1789 and was originally used by French philosopher Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) as a technical term referring to the epistemological study of ideas. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), however, expanded the paradigm of ideology into social practices and historical changes and gave the term a pejorative color. Recognizing the ubiquitous alienation, Hegel pointed out that social reality is constructed by ideology rather than being a God-given or natural order. The terror of ideology, in Hegel’s analysis of the French Revolution, comes from the destructiveness of absolute freedom. Largely affected by the principles of utility that lie at the core of the Enlightenment, which Hegel considered groundless and empty in itself,^④ individuals who pursue utility become free and detached selves that are unrestrained by social rules; thus, Spirit achieves absolute freedom.^⑤ This internal revolution of spirit echoes the social revolution of the physical world. As is shown in the 40 years that came after the 1789 French Revolution, absolute freedom or the collective pursuit of universal freedom is naturally destructive and problematic for it negates everything and tolerates nothing. As Hegel put it, “this undivided Substance of absolute freedom ascends

① T.A. van Dijk, “Politics, Ideology, and Discourse,” in *Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics*, ed. Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006): 730.

② Anthony Bower, trans., *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt* (New York: Vintage, 1992).

③ Termed by A.-L.-C. Destutt de Tracy.

④ See “That is to say, of the being-in-and-for-itself of the Useful qua object, consciousness recognizes that its being-in-itself is essentially a being-for-an-other; being-in-itself, as devoid of self, is in truth a passive self, or that which is a self for another self.” in A.V. Miller, trans., *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ¶ 583.

⑤ *Ibid.*, ¶ 584.

the throne of the world without any power being able to resist.”^① Universal freedom is thus merely a negative action and the fury of destruction.^② History becomes an incessant sequence of oppressions and revolts, in which lives and principles are wiped out, in which there is no way out and the ultimate conclusion is death, which, in Hegel’s words, “has no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point of the absolutely free self.”^③ As a result, revolutionary terror becomes the defining feature of the period, where the ruling government is merely the victorious faction, and in the very fact of it being a faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow; and it being government makes it, conversely, into a faction and therefore guilty.^④

Another figure who not only redefined ideology and its relationship with revolution but also left a significant ideological legacy is Karl Marx (1818-1883), whose thoughts greatly inspired 20th-century socialist revolutions worldwide. In Marx’s *Theory of Ideology*, the term “ideology” is also given a pejorative connotation and is considered a false consciousness of previous German thinkers. He criticizes German ideologists and the Hegelian illusions of consciousness. For him, past philosophers made the mistake of separating philosophy from reality and their own material surroundings.^⑤ Though Marx considered Hegel to be the first bourgeois thinker to have been aware of the alienation from his own thought,^⑥ he negated Hegel’s idea of absolute idealism and the subordination of materials to the spirit. To Marx, contemporary German ideology was a false consciousness and a symbol of alienation for it deviates from the real basis of society, the division of labor and property, and concentrated only on the state. Moreover, societies were ruled by bourgeois ideology, which was the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships at the time.^⑦ Since Marx saw bourgeois ideology at the brink of collapse, he argued that the role of philosophy was to lead the proletariat revolution. He saw revolution as the driving force of history: “all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism . . . but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug.”^⑧ In order to overthrow bourgeois ideology, a communist revolution was necessary, and only through this can a new society be born from the muck of ages.^⑨ It should be noted that though Marx recognized the utility of necessary violence in the said revolution, which would be a total revolution of “combat or death, bloody struggle or extinction,”^⑩ he never expressed approval or rallied for the reign of terror, which, judging from

① A.V. Miller, trans., *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Φ 585.

② Ibid., Φ 589. Note “Die Furie des Verschwindens” is translated as “the fury of disappearing” in other versions.

③ Ibid., Φ 590.

④ Ibid., Φ 591.

⑤ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: Prometheus, 1998), 36.

⑥ H. M. Drucker, *The Political Uses of Ideology* (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), 17.

⑦ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, 67.

⑧ Ibid., 61.

⑨ Ibid., 60.

⑩ Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1955), 118.

the lesson of the French Revolution, implies useless cruelties perpetrated by the frightened leadership in self-reassurance.^① It was likely beyond Marx's expectation that Marxism as an ideology its own would later contribute to the reign of terror in many communist countries, one prominent example being the Great Purge (1936-1938) in the Soviet Union. At this point, one might wonder what makes modern ideologies so dangerous and inclined to terror despite some (like Marxism) striving to diminish oppression? The answer lies in its close relationship with the emergence of modern totalitarianism.

After WWI, totalitarianism emerged as a result of the decline of nation-states and the end of the rights of man. Abandoning the rule of law, totalitarianism found its legitimacy in ideology. As was pointed out by Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), all ideologies contain totalitarian elements,^② and communism is no more totalitarian than any other ideology in principle. Ideology's inclination to totalitarianism is determined by ideology's nature as an instrument of explanation that refines and redefines history. An ideology is established with its own idea, logic, and motion. The danger of ideology lies in the assumption that one set of ideas is sufficient in explaining everything and that no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction.^③ Therefore, the tyranny of logic in ideology is exploited by totalitarian rulers as the source of legitimacy that justifies compulsion and terror. For instance, according to Stalin, it was not the idea but the "irresistible force of logic" that thoroughly seized the masses.^④ The real power of Marxist ideology, as he saw it, lies not in the idea itself but in its logical process. This logical process becomes a self-coercive force against individuals and makes them submissive to the colossal movement of history that uses mankind as its material. Totalitarianism rises as a new form of rule whose principle of action is the logical process of ideology and whose essence is terror. Ideology prepares men for submission, and terror secures their loyalty and willingness to sacrifice. Terror diminishes the plurality of men, reducing them to one motion of the course of history and a device to liberate historical forces. As a result, under the rule of totalitarianism, men lose the capacities for both experience and thought, and can no longer distinguish fact from fiction.

In conclusion, the essence of ideology shapes and is shaped by the zeitgeist of different periods of time. It has been largely expanded from a scientific subject to a complex mixture of both practical means and theoretical ends. Ideology was first associated with the incessant destruction of the reign of terror in the French revolution, and later, under the influence of Karl Marx, was considered a false consciousness that should be overthrown by the communist revolution. Moving toward modern times, ideology has become increasingly associated with totalitarianism. It is clear that since its creation, the idea of ideology was inexorably connected with the creation and destruction of political regimes. Throughout the course of social

① George Fabian, *Karl Marx, Prince of Darkness* (Bloomington: Xlibris, 2011), 524.

② Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973), 470.

③ *Ibid.*, 470.

④ *Ibid.*, 472.

progress and disenchantment with authority, the dangerous implications of ideology as a powerful tool of destruction and domination begins to reveal itself a truth which hopefully be recognized and upheld by those who pride themselves as being members of the new modernity.

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Asia's Dragons

Explaining Sino-Indonesian Economic Cooperation amid Anti-China Sentiment in the COVID-19 Era

Christian Pairera

Introduction

Dragons hold an important role in both China's and Indonesia's cultural heritage. Both countries emphasize dragons in their folklore and recognize its dominance over other creatures. With that in mind, both countries, just like dragons, also play an important role in the current geopolitical context. China's rising power in Asia and across the globe, as well as Indonesia's key role in the rapidly growing region of Southeast Asia resemble the role of the dragons. The relationship between Asia's dragons has gone through up and downs and evolved over decades, and yet they have kept close to each other amid rising uncertainty.

Both countries have nurtured a close bilateral relationship since the 1950s, with Indonesia being one of the earliest countries to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) and establish formal diplomatic ties. However, over time, the relationship has been tainted by domestic political developments, such as the heightened tension between Indonesia's National Army and the China-backed Indonesia Communist Party (PKI) during Sukarno's rule (1945-1967). The final blow was dealt by the Suharto regime (1966-1998), which banned PKI in 1967 and froze Sino-Indonesian relations for more than two decades.

Anti-China sentiment also stemmed from government policies that discriminated against the Chinese ethnic minority in Indonesia. The sentiment was further exacerbated by the critical role the Chinese minority had played in the economy since colonial times, which resulted in jealousy and negative perceptions among the indigenous masses. This tension never eased, even during the second term of President Joko Widodo (2019-present), who has been accused by his political opponents of having a special relationship with the communist state.^① It is apparent that COVID-19 has amplified bias toward the PRC administration as well as toward the Chinese ethnic minority in Indonesia. However, amid these challenges, bilateral relations have strengthened in terms of economic cooperation. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is growing in Indonesia and China has become one of Indonesia's biggest trading partners.

This essay seeks to explain the origin of anti-China sentiment in Indonesia and how the current pandemic affects the political and economic relationship between the two countries.

① Ricky Mohammad Nugraha, "Rumor of Communist PKI Jokowi Looms over Indonesia Election," *Tempo*, March 18, 2019, <https://en.tempo.co/read/1186429/rumor-of-communist-pki-jokowi-looms-over-indonesia-election> (accessed February 13, 2022).

Anti-China Sentiment in Indonesia

As previously mentioned, anti-China sentiment has deep roots in Indonesia. In 1959, the Indonesian government implemented Government Regulation No. 10, which prohibited “aliens” (ethnic minorities) from engaging in retail trade in rural areas. Moreover, under the Suharto administration, the public was banned from expressing their Chinese heritage and was forced to assimilate with the local culture.^① Tension between the two countries decreased and cooperation reached a new height during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration, in which both countries elevated their relations to the status of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.^② However, the recent global anti-China wave stirred by geopolitical disputes^③ has further complicated Indonesia’s anti-China problems. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center found that favorable views of China are at or near historic lows.^④ Similarly, favorable views of China among Indonesians reached a new low in 2019.^⑤ While the emergence of Covid-19 is generally to blame for these views, the case of Indonesia is more complex. Politically, bilateral relations have always been challenged by internal and external factors, such as China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea since 2009.^⑥ Additionally, the Indonesian public felt that China’s growing economic intrusion disturbed the local market. This chain of events triggered the free-market community in Indonesia, pressuring the government to back out of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area Agreement in 2010.^⑦ This combination of political and economic issues, as well as Indonesia’s public criticism of the Uyghur situation,^⑧ has created a dilemma in the high-level political sphere. This series of events has caused the Indonesian government to carefully assess their relationship and avoid being closely associated with China.^⑨

Evolving Pragmatic Cooperation

① Dewi F. Anwar, “Indonesia-China Relations: To Be Handled with Care,” *ISEAS Perspective* 19 (2019): 1-7.

② *Ibid.*, 4.

③ Sakshi Venkatraman, “Anti-Asian hate crimes rose 73% last year, updated FBI data says,” *NBC News*, October 26, 2021, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/anti-asian-hate-crimes-rose-73-last-year-updated-fbi-data-says-rcna3741> (accessed December 23, 2021).

④ Laura Silver, “China’s international image remains broadly negative as views of the U.S. rebound,” *Pew Research*, June 30, 2021, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/06/30/chinas-international-image-remains-broadly-negative-as-views-of-the-u-s-rebound/> (accessed, December 20, 2021).

⑤ “Global Indicators Database: Indonesia,” *Pew Research Center*, 2020, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/24/country/id> (accessed December 20, 2021).

⑥ Anwar, “Indonesia-China Relations,” 4.

⑦ Alexandra C. Chandra and Lucky A. Lontoh, “Indonesia-China Trade Relations: The deepening of economic integration amid uncertainty?” *International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)*, 2011.

⑧ Rakhmat M. and Aryansyah W., “Rising Anti-Chinese Sentiment In Indonesia,” *The ASEAN Post*, December 19, 2021, <https://theaseanpost.com/article/rising-anti-chinese-sentiment-indonesia> (accessed December 20, 2021).

⑨ Evi Fitriani, “Indonesian perceptions of the rise of China: dare you, dare you not,” *The Pacific Review* 31, no.3 (2018): 391-405.

Despite domestic pressure and the effects of COVID-19, on paper, Sino-Indonesian economic relations are stronger than ever.^① This raises an important question as to whether both countries can maintain effective bilateral cooperation amidst heightened political tensions, weakened political relations, and limited public acceptance in Indonesia, especially given rising anti-China sentiment and the global economic downturn due to Covid-19.

Scholars that study the impact of political relations on economic cooperation have identified several links between political relations and economic cooperation. An early argument by Nich (1985) shows that political aspects of investments are driven by the subjective perception of investors from the investing country.^② To further explain, Glaeser (2005) developed a model of rational public choice in which public perception is influenced by domestic politicians or leaders.^③ Following the same logic, a change in a country's political relationship with another country may be affected by public perception, which then in turn affects all participants in the economy, including consumers, exporters, and importers.^④ This study suggests a high potential for political perceptions to affect economic activity. Therefore, media and public outcry over anti-China sentiment and the spread of COVID-19 played a significant role in determining the course of international economic exchange. However, China's approach to international cooperation is quite different from that of the Washington Consensus. With a firm foundational outlook on development cooperation, China was able to suppress political barriers to foster effective and pragmatic solutions. The Beijing Consensus is a model that emphasizes pragmatism and flexibility and differs from the "Washington Consensus," which is dogmatic and hierarchical in its application.^⑤ As pragmatism is the key concept, China places economic development at the center of its cooperation, making it a mainstay of developmentalism.^⑥ This idea resonates well with developing countries that need a flexible approach to overcome political or bureaucratic shortcomings. This approach is one reason that China is capable of pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation with developing countries. For China, development is seen as the *pièce de résistance* of its cooperation strategy.

The Reality of Sino-Indonesian Trade and Investment Cooperation

① Muhammad Z. Rakhmat and Habib Phasya, "Indonesia-China cooperation: Standby for take-off," *Lowy Institute*, December 10, 2020, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-china-cooperation-standby-for-take-off> (accessed December 21, 2021)

② Douglas Nich, "The Effect of Political Events on United States Direct Foreign Investment: A Pooled Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis," *Journal of International Business Studies* 16, no.1 (1985): 1-17.

③ Edward L. Glaeser, "The Political Economy of Hatred," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 1, no.120 (2005): 45-86

④ Brian M. Pollins, "Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows," *American Journal of Political Science* 33, no.3 (1998): 737-61.

⑤ Joshua Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 4.

⑥ Arif Dirlik, "Developmentalism," *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 16, no.1 (2012): 30-48.

Findings from studies on China's development cooperation concerning international politics supports the "Beijing Consensus" and China's philosophical outlook. Whitten *et al.* formulated a study to determine whether political relations will affect international trade for twelve of China's main trading partners, including Indonesia. The study proposed that a positive shock of political events has a larger effect on China's exports to partner countries than on the partner countries' exports to China.^① Moreover, the study suggested that, despite a positive shock to Indonesia, Indonesian exports to China declined quickly after the occurring shock. However, the same inter-connection of political shock and exports would have minimum impact for China. The impacts of political relations between Indonesia and China towards China's exports to Indonesia would have minimal influence, thus creating stable trade relations. Therefore, this study supports the notion that trade from China to Indonesia rarely depends on Indonesia's political perception of China, because a negative shock would have less effect on the Chinese side of trade relations, and a positive shock would boost China's exports to Indonesia.^② This supports Ramo's argument that pragmatism is the core concept of China's economic relations with other countries. While political relations between China and Indonesia are currently experiencing a slump, economic relations will remain pragmatic and stable.

Trade analysis indicates that despite the recent negative political shocks, both countries have been able to maintain a high level of trade cooperation. Data from the Indonesian Ministry of Trade reveals that the total value of exports from Indonesia to China reached USD 23 billion in 2017,^③ with the current value having almost doubled to USD 42 billion.^④ China maintained a similar total export value, reaching USD 39 billion by the end of 2020.

In regard to China's outbound FDI, Li and Liang formulated a study that analyzed China's outbound investment flows from the enterprise level and the dyadic level (Chinese government and investment recipient country) based on Chinese outbound FDI flows to 95 countries from 2003 to 2005. Their findings show that on both levels, interstate political relations have a positive correlation with FDI.^⑤ This means that Chinese FDI would more likely flow to countries with which the Chinese government has good political relations. With regard to developing countries like Indonesia, the findings suggest that when Chinese stakeholders invest in countries with political instability and poor institutional quality, they will choose countries with which they have better political relations.^⑥ Despite the state of political relations between

① Gregory Whitten, Xiaoyi Dai, Simon Fan, and Yu Pang, "Do political relations affect international trade? Evidence from China's twelve trading partners," *Journal of Shipping and Trade* 5, no.21 (2020): 13-24.

② Whitten et al., *Do political relations affect international trade*, 13.

③ Data retrieved from "Neraca Perdagangan Indonesia Dengan Rep.Rakyat Cina," *PDSI Kementerian Perdagangan*, 2019, <https://satudata.kemendag.go.id/balance-of-trade-with-trade-partner-country> (accessed December 20, 2021).

④ Data retrieved from "Export and Import," *Statistics Indonesia*, <https://www.bps.go.id/exim/> (accessed October 2021).

⑤ Quan Li and Guoyong Liang, "Political Relations and Chinese Outbound Direct Investment: Evidence from Firm- and Dyadic-Level Tests," *Indiana University Research Center for Chinese Politics and Business Working Papers* 19 (2012).

⑥ *Ibid.*, 18.

China and Indonesia, there was a 48% increase in Chinese FDI projects in Indonesia from 2018 to 2020.^① Furthermore, data from the Indonesian Ministry of Investment shows that the value of these investments rose from USD 2.38 billion in 2018 to USD 4.84 billion in 2020.^② In regard to Li and Liang's findings, this suggests that China did not perceive the current political state between China and Indonesia as threatening to their cooperation agenda. This is also in line with Ramo's argument that China will overlook political and institutional shortcomings as long as pragmatic cooperation is possible for both sides.

Findings

By examining existing academic literature and the current state of Sino-Indonesian political and economic relations, this essay reaches four key conclusions:

1. COVID-19 worsened the global perception of China, that of Indonesia being no exception. However, in terms of economic cooperation, it did not hamper trade and investment.
2. Anti-China sentiment and other recent turmoil between the two states have not presented high-level political challenges. It is for this reason that pragmatic cooperation between both countries continues to improve.
3. While the Indonesian public viewed recent events between China and Indonesia as a decline in relations, China's administration and private sector are still confidently investing in Indonesia.
4. Growing anti-China sentiment is not only a by-product of COVID-19 but also a combination of historical, domestic, and international factors.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic presents new challenge and opportunities for Sino-Indonesia cooperation. While the current political atmosphere is tense, Jakarta-Beijing can maintain a pragmatic, mutually beneficial outlook. This essay suggests that China is willing to cooperate despite political and institutional shortcomings, and that Indonesia is increasingly willing to accept China's proposal, as seen by the 48% increase in Chinese FDI and the doubled trade value. The aforementioned trends suggest that mutual cooperation can be increased for the benefit of both countries, especially in the post-pandemic era.

① Data retrieved from "China FDI Inflow," *National Single Window for Investment*, https://nswi.bkpm.go.id/data_statistik (accessed December 20, 2021).

② Ibid.

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The TTP Negotiations

An Examination of 2021 Peace Talks

Farhan Sheikh

Abstract: Negotiations between rebel groups and the government are complicated and have historically remained prone to failure. What constitutes stable peace talks, and which factors can contribute to a successful outcome? This paper examines the recent negotiation failure between the Pakistani government and the designated terrorist group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The article develops seven hypotheses drawn from the literature available on rebel negotiations, and then tests the hypotheses with the recent TTP-government negotiations with a historical backdrop. The paper finds that rebel service provision, religious demands, and timing are the key factors in determining the peace talks' stability. In contrast, third-party mediation shows no effect on the outcome.

Keywords: *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, rebel negotiations, third-party mediation*

Introduction

On December 16, 2014, armed militants entered Army Public School in the city of Peshawar, Pakistan, and opened fire on children and school staff. It was one of the most tragic events in the country's history, with 149 people, mostly children, killed in cold blood. The perpetrators belonged to the banned insurgent group called Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), independent from the Afghan Taliban: the group that took credit for the attack and claimed that the attack was revenge against the Pakistan Army's intensive military campaign "Zarb-e-Azb" in the northwest region of Waziristan.^① The TTP has remained one of the most dangerous insurgent groups responsible for much of the deadly terror attacks in Pakistan since 2004. In the coming years, the Pakistan Army significantly broke down the operational capacity of TTP through sustained military operations, consequently reducing the rate of terror attacks by over ninety percent.

Following the Afghan Taliban's ascendancy to power in August 2021, reports started pouring in that the TTP and the Pakistani government were holding secret talks, which was eventually confirmed by Prime Minister Imran Khan.^② On November 8, 2021, the government and the insurgents declared a ceasefire,

① "Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar school attack leaves 141 dead," *BBC News*, December 16, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30491435> (accessed January 20, 2022).

② "Govt in talks with TTP groups for reconciliation process: PM Imran," *Dawn*, October 1, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1649520> (accessed January 20, 2022).

adding that talks were underway for a reconciliatory process. The Afghan Taliban were acting as a mediator for these talks. However, just under a month after the cessation of hostilities, the TTP unilaterally announced an end to the fragile truce. They accused the government of renegeing on its promises.^①

Why are negotiations between rebel groups and governments so fragile and prone to failure when theoretical and conventional wisdom suggests that peace benefits both parties? What are the conditions under which stable talks can take place? The recent TTP negotiations present these interesting questions that, in this paper, I will try to examine and scrutinize.

The article follows a systematic approach. In the first section, I review the existing literature on negotiating conditions and strategies. In the second section, I summarize the hypotheses derived from the reviewed literature. The third section explores the historical background of the origins and decline of the TTP to add depth to the case discussion. The fourth section tests the hypotheses in the light of recent TTP talks. The fifth section discusses important finding from the study.

Literature Review

When it comes to insurgents who are labeled as terrorists, the public stance against negotiating with them by the government is relatively simple; never to give in to the terrorists and their methods.^② The argument implies that talks can weaken the mainstream political status quo and undermine efforts for outlawing terrorism. In reality, governments have often engaged in negotiations with such groups. However, the primary goal for any government considering talks is not simply an end to violence but to do so in a way that diminishes the threat of setting dangerous precedents and destabilizing its political system.

Although some skeptics like Alan Dershowitz argue that negotiations with insurgents who engage in terrorism are useless,^③ Neumann argues that successful talks are possible only when insurgents are at a strategic juncture: questioning the utility of violence, but not on the verge of defeat.^④ This suggests that one of the critical factors of successful negotiations is timing. Any attempts for earlier or later talks might overwhelm the government itself, causing it to be counterproductive.

Another crucial factor for successful negotiations is the government posturing, process, and procedure. Paul Wilkinson, a British terrorism expert, argues that the government should make no concessions since it considerably undermines the existing political system,^⑤ others disagree. Neumann believes that involving multiple stakeholders, such as opposition parties, increases the chances of success since it exposes the rebel

① Asad Hashim, "Pakistani Taliban ends ceasefire, future of peace talks uncertain," *Al Jazeera*, December 10, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/10/pakistan-taliban-ceasefire-peace-talks-ttp> (accessed January 20, 2022).

② Peter R. Neumann, "Negotiating with Terrorists," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no.1 (2007): 128.

③ Alan M. Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

④ Neumann, "Negotiating with Terrorists."

⑤ Paul Wilkinson, "International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response," *European Union Institute for Security Studies* No.84 (2005): 7-53.

group to democratic practices.^① Having various parties on board also helps in soothing any future unrest. A broad political process helps manage public expectations since there is always the risk of public agitation ahead of talks. This is especially true if the public were the victims of insurgent violence. Isak Svensson also emphasizes the importance of third-party mediation. His empirical research found that having a mediator in the negotiations significantly affects successful settlements.^②

Another question governments face is whether the opposing group can make good negotiation partners. One way that the government can determine if a group will be a good negotiating partner is by looking at the group's stated aim and ideology. Isak Svensson finds in his research that if one of the belligerents has made explicit religious demands, the chances for a negotiated settlement are low.^③ That is because the subjective value of the conflicting issue increases when the demands are anchored in a religious tradition, which makes the issue at stake indivisible. The problem cannot be divided without a substantial loss of subjective value.

Another indicator of a rebel group that may enter into serious negotiations is whether they provide social services in their constituents. Such provisions can be welfare, food, medical services, education, and/or religious services. Heger and Jung conclude that service-providing rebel groups are more likely to enter into negotiations, and that the subsequent talks will be more stable.^④ Service-providing groups often have a large support base and a more centralized organizational structure. These features deter potential spoilers that break during negotiation processes, thus encouraging governments to engage in talks since the threat from spoilers is smaller.

Finally, in his study on the 2006 Darfur settlements, Johnston examines how governments manipulate peace processes to advance their political interests and gain an advantage in future counterinsurgency operations.^⑤ He argues that governments employ a divide-and-rule tactic to weaken and gain intelligence on various insurgent factions. This intelligence gathering enhances their military capabilities.

Hypotheses Summary

Reviewing the existing literature on rebel negotiations with the government in the previous section gives a sense of understanding regarding the conditions under which such talks can succeed. Before analyzing the recent TTP negotiations, I derive seven hypotheses for testing.

① Neumann, "Negotiating with Terrorists."

② Isak Svensson, "Fighting with Faith," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no.6 (2007): 930–49.

③ Ibid.

④ Lindsay L. Heger and Danielle F. Jung, "Negotiating with Rebels: The Effect of Rebel Service Provision on Conflict Negotiations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no.6 (2017): 1203–29.

⑤ Patrick Johnston, "Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War: Evidence from Darfur," *Civil Wars* 9, no.4 (2007): 359–77.

The hypotheses derived are aptly split into three aspects of negotiations: Who, When, and How. The three aspects will hopefully give a holistic view of the nature of rebel–government talks. The hypotheses are:

Who?

1. Governments are more likely to enter into negotiations with service-providing rebel groups.
2. Negotiations involving service-providing rebels are likely to be more stable than non-providers.
3. There is a low chance for a negotiated settlement if one party has made explicitly religious demands.

When?

4. For talks to succeed, the rebel group must be at a strategic juncture: contemplating the utility of violence but not on the verge of defeat.
5. When under a relatively high public pressure for peace, governments deliberately enter into failed negotiations to gain an intelligence advantage for future counterinsurgency operations.

How?

6. Negotiations with fewer stakeholders as part of a broad political process are less likely to succeed.
7. Third-party mediation dramatically increases the chances of successful talks.

The TTP: A Historical Overview

The emergence of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is closely linked with the fall of the Afghan Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. After the US invasion, the Afghan Taliban and even al-Qaeda members crossed the extremely porous northern Pakistan–Afghanistan boundary into the tribal area of Waziristan. With shared tribal and ethnic links, the fugitive Afghan Taliban members worked to recruit more followers in their fight against the US occupation.^①

The area of Waziristan and other adjoining areas, back then, was a semi-autonomous region of Pakistan called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where Pakistani officials relied on tribal elders for governance. Under US pressure of “either you are with us or against us,” the Pakistan Army entered FATA for the first time in history for military operations against al-Qaeda-linked operatives. The local tribes saw this as an act to subjugate them, which catalyzed the militancy. Eventually, in December 2007, TTP emerged as a loosely knit organization of various militant groups under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud.

Even though TTP started out by framing its military intentions as a defensive war, the group—influenced by the early “Talibanization”—hoped to follow in the Afghan Taliban’s footsteps. They changed their war

^① Mona Kanwal Sheikh, *Guardians of God: Inside the Religious Mind of the Pakistani Taliban* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

goals to establish a sharia system according to their Islamic interpretation. However, unlike the Afghan Taliban, the TTP leadership tended to be poorly educated despite employing a religious vocabulary.^①

The Pakistani government and military entered into multiple negotiations and peace talks with the militant groups, all of which ultimately failed.^② The TTP utilized an asymmetric warfare and terror tactics against The Pakistan Army and civilians alike. This peaked in 2010 with over four hundred attacks.^③ A renegotiated counterterrorism pact between the CIA and the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) involving advanced Reaper and Predator drones and hi-tech surveillance systems from 2008 to 2014,^④ and an intensive military campaign “Zarb-e-Azb” from 2014 to 2017 eventually broke the back of TTP operational capacity. Coupled with a leadership crisis, the terror attacks dramatically reduced by over ninety percent in 2018 when compared to 2014.^⑤

The past couple of years have seen a modest increase in attacks, which coincides with the 2020 Doha agreement between the Afghan Taliban and the US government. This shows signs of a resurgent TTP. Several splinter groups announced their merger with the TTP in 2020.^⑥ The collapse of the Ghani administration and the Afghan Taliban takeover in Kabul have raised alarms over TTP revival prospects since the latter claims to be a part of the former’s movement. Even though the Afghan Taliban deny these claims, it is widely believed that the Afghan Taliban’s ascendancy will undoubtedly serve as a morale booster for the battered insurgents.

In October 2021, Prime Minister Imran Khan confirmed that fresh talks were underway for a reconciliatory process. The TTP and government spokesmen eventually announced a month-long cessation in hostilities, with the Afghan Taliban foreign minister confirming that their group was acting as a mediator. However, in December 2021, the TTP unilaterally withdrew from the ceasefire, citing the government’s inability to follow through with its promises. This marked the end of another round of failed talks between the insurgents and the Pakistani government.^⑦

① Amira Jadoon, “The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan,” *United States Institute of Peace*, no.494, May 2021. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/sr_494-the_evolution_and_potential_resurgence_of_the_tehrik_i_taliban_pakistan.pdf (accessed January 20, 2022).

② Abdul Basit, “Pakistan’s Peace Talks with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan: Ten Times a Failure?” *Terrorism Monitor* 19, no.20 (2021): 5-7.

③ Jadoon, “The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the TTP.”

④ Asfandiyar Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the US Drone War in Pakistan,” *International Security* 43, no.2 (2018): 45–83.

⑤ Jadoon, “The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the TTP.”

⑥ “Splintered militants rejoin Pakistani Taliban, vow holy war,” *AP News*, August 17, 2020, <https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-pakistan-taliban-militant-groups-asia-pacific-76dd240f535d90957f8b44531a5fa952> (accessed January 20, 2022).

⑦ Hashim, “Pakistani Taliban ends ceasefire, future of peace talks uncertain.”

Findings

Negotiating with insurgents is always tricky. Although there are many models, such as the popular Bargaining Theory, real-world scenarios involve many unforeseeable factors. The TTP talks also demonstrate the effect of unseen elements, some of which are hidden behind classified documents. This is contrary to conventional and rational understanding. Nevertheless, with the help of the seven hypotheses presented in the previous section, I will hopefully try to explain the failure of the recent attempt at a peace settlement.

Hypothesis 1: Governments are more likely to enter into negotiations with service-providing rebel groups.

The TTP has acted as an umbrella organization for various fighting groups throughout its insurgency. Its structure is highly decentralized, so much so that its apparent lack of a robust and central hierarchy proves to be one of its significant weaknesses. Because of the lack of a central order, the TTP does not have a wing dedicated to social provisions. Hence, it cannot be recognized as a service-providing rebel group.

Recent history tells us, however, that the Pakistani government has entered into negotiations with TTP in the past. This happened once when the TTP was not fully formed but its groups were militarily active, called the Waziristan Accords.^① Another time, The TTP and the government reached a ceasefire among news of fresh talks. This attempt ultimately failed.^② The recent attempt at peace engagement is nothing new. Hypothesis 1 is thereby not supported by historical evidence as the government has initiated multiple talks, despite the TTP not being a service-providing rebel group.

Hypothesis 2: Negotiations involving service-providing rebels are likely to be more stable than non-providers.

Despite the TTP not being a service-providing rebel group, it has entered into multiple negotiations with the government. These negotiations did not yield any results and were broken at the first sight of mistrust. The talks also garnered criticism which further strained peace prospects. Considering that the TTP resumed hostilities after just a month, the recent negotiations can be said to be unstable. Thus, it can be safely said that the TTP negotiation case supports Hypothesis 2.

① Pazeer Gul, "Waziristan accord signed," *Dawn*, September 6, 2006, <https://www.dawn.com/news/209220/waziristan-accord-signed> (accessed January 20, 2022).

② Carlotta Gall and Ismail Khan, "In Pakistan, Doubts Over the Fight in Tribal Areas," *The New York Times*, February 12, 2008. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/world/asia/12pakistan.html> (accessed January 20, 2022).

Hypothesis 3: There is a low chance for a negotiated settlement if one party has made explicitly religious demands.

Religion can add complexity to the delicate art of negotiations, particularly when the demands are anchored on a religious tradition. The TTP started as an organization that presented a united front to the Pakistan Armed Forces. However, taking influence from the Afghan Taliban, the group quickly evolved its war goals to demanding a sharia rule in Pakistan according to their Islamic interpretation. This added a religious dimension to the rebel group.^① The failure of recent talks supports this Hypothesis since there is a religious incompatibility between the interlocutors in its aims and demands.

Hypothesis 4: For talks to succeed, the rebel group must be at a strategic juncture: contemplating the utility of violence but not on the verge of defeat.

Arguably, the TTP was at the pinnacle of its power in 2012, with estimates putting their numbers at around twenty-five thousand members.^② An intense military campaign by the Pakistan Army in the form of “Zarb-e-Azb” and “Radd-ul-Fasaad”, coupled with legislative support in the form of military courts, curbed TTP’s operational capacity to a minimum in 2018. However, there have been signs of a resurgent TTP in the past two years. There was the announcement of splinter groups joining with the TTP and an increase in the terror attack rate.^③

Recognizing a strategic juncture is difficult, as it can be easily overestimated. In my opinion, the optimum strategic moment for the TTP negotiations was in 2018 (when the insurgents were at their lowest). The recent revival wave has dispelled their contemplation about throwing down their arms and accepting a peace deal. This can be one of the reasons for the failure of recent TTP talks. In conclusion, the logical evidence supports the statement presented by Hypothesis 4.

Hypothesis 5: When under a relatively high public pressure for peace, governments deliberately enter into failed negotiations to gain an intelligence advantage for future counterinsurgency operations.

As explained by Johnston taking the 2006 Darfur agreement as a case study, governments sometimes manipulate peace talks for future military advantages to weaken rebel groups. Such manipulation only occurs when the government is under pressure for peace, either from the international society or the local population. By engaging or excluding certain splinter groups, the government can influence defections in

① Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan.” *CTC Sentinel* 1, no.2 (2008): 1–4.

② Jadoon Jadoon, “The Evolution and Potential Resurgence of the TTP.”

③ Madiha Afzal, “Terrorism in Pakistan has declined, but the underlying roots of extremism remain,” *Brookings*, January 15, 2021, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/01/15/terrorism-in-pakistan-has-declined-but-the-underlying-roots-of-extremism-remain/> (accessed January 20, 2022).

the leading group. The negotiations can also serve as a front for intelligence gathering tactics, which can be helpful in further counterinsurgency operations.

Nevertheless, the recent TTP talks were mainly shrouded in confidentiality, leaving little public information. Even though the government has changed its intelligence strategy when dealing with TTP,^① the ceasefire withdrawal is still relatively recent, which leaves little room to determine whether the government gained an advantage or not. Thus, Hypothesis 5 remains inconclusive.

Hypothesis 6: Negotiations with fewer stakeholders as part of a broad political process are less likely to succeed.

Although there was very little public information about the negotiations, it is observed that on the surface, the only stakeholders involved were the insurgents and the government officials. The Afghan Taliban acting only as mediators. The negotiations didn't include the wide spectrum of Pakistan's political parties and some tribal elders (both of whom were possibly equal stakeholders in the violent consequences of the war). The involvement of multiple parties can complicate negotiation points, both for the rebels and the government. Nevertheless, the talks failed, which reinforces and supports Hypothesis 6.

Hypothesis 7: Third-party mediation dramatically increases the chances of successful talks.

On November 15, nearly a week after the ceasefire, Afghan acting foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi confirmed that the Afghan Taliban has acted as a mediator in the recent negotiations.^② The presence of a mediator is something the past talks between the groups lacked. Nevertheless, the ceasefire lasted only for about a month before the TTP withdrew. The unilateral withdrawal of the TTP from peace talks suggests that the presence of a mediator did not affect progress in negotiations. Consequently, Hypothesis 7 is not supported by the evidence.

Summary

Table 1 hereunder summarizes the findings of the hypotheses, as observed by studying the recent TTP and government negotiations, to wit:

① Al Jazeera, "Pakistan–Taliban: Ceasefire ends between TTP and the government," *YouTube* video, 3:33, December 9, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00i8TfgSqzw>.

② "Kabul Mediating between Pakistan Govt, TTP: Muttaqi," *Dawn*, November 15, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1658160> (accessed January 20, 2022).

Sr. No.	Result
Hypothesis 1	Not supported
Hypothesis 2	Supported
Hypothesis 3	Supported
Hypothesis 4	Supported
Hypothesis 5	Inconclusive
Hypothesis 6	Supported
Hypothesis 7	Not supported

Table 1: Summary of hypotheses

Discussion

The TTP–Government talks present an interesting perspective on the factors which affect rebel negotiations. Every rebel group is unique in its own way, through its history, ideological affinity, and organizational structure. Nevertheless, by testing the hypotheses on the TTP negotiations, four key findings can be concluded.

First, the effect of rebel service provisions plays a significant role in determining the stability of talks. Drawing on Heger and Jung (2015), the impact of spoilers in non-service provider rebels is much larger. This makes the negotiation very fragile. Since the TTP does not have a non-violent wing dedicated to public services, it cannot be classified as a service-providing group primarily (due to its decentralized hierarchy). Any prospects for peace talks are plagued by a spectrum of views, where radical elements within the TTP have enough influence to make a compromise near impossible.

Second, the explicit religious demands by the TTP played an essential part in the negotiation failure. Even though the TTP originated to present a defensive front to the Pakistani military, it quickly evolved its war goals to demand a sharia system in Pakistan according to their brutal interpretation of Islam. A religious dimension adds a “non-fungibility” element to the talks. Thus, by showing religious incompatibility, they perceive the conflicting issues to be indivisible. After all, any other government system apart from the rebel understanding of sharia would not be of equal value for the TTP. Therefore, anchoring the demands in religious traditions complicated the talks, which led to the negotiation failure.

Third, the timing of the talks is a crucial feature in rebel negotiations, and it has played its part in the TTP talks. Neumann (2007) determines that the rebels should be at a strategic juncture for talks to be successful: considering throwing arms but not yet defeated. Any attempts for earlier talks would be counterproductive, whereas late negotiation attempts are not rationally considered since a military victory

becomes viable. The TTP were at their lowest point in 2018. However, the Afghan Taliban takeover in Afghanistan has invigorated them, including other regional militants. The negotiation failure shows that the timing for peace talks was not optimal since the insurgents had disregarded their contemplation for the utility of violence.

Finally, third-party mediation has shown no effect on negotiation success. Even though Svensson (2007) shows in his study that third-party mediation strongly influences the success rate, the TTP case study suggests that the characteristics of the third party may also play a role in successful mediation. The TTP–government talks were mediated by the Afghan Taliban, who are regarded as having the most influence over the insurgents. The influence dates back to when the Afghan Taliban were fugitives in Waziristan, resembling today's TTP insurgency. However, the Afghan Taliban mediated the TTP talks as a governmental entity, which fundamentally transforms their characteristics from their era as insurgents. This was where they had their highest influence over the TTP. The collapse of talks, therefore, suggests that the attributes of the mediator are far more important than just having a mediator.

Conclusion

The TTP and the Pakistan Armed Forces have fought a long, bloody war that started at the behest of an invading superpower. Over the years, the rebel group became responsible for committing some of the most heinous and violent attacks on Pakistani soil. The scars of the violence run deep in the Pakistani population, and any prospects for a political settlement will be met with a public backlash.

Nevertheless, as long as Pakistan's political system is not disturbed, peace remains the most rational option for both parties. The recent attempt at negotiations displayed its fragility, proving that achieving a settlement is far trickier than expected. Yet, with the Afghan Taliban taking power next door, there is a renewed interest in ceasing violence. The Afghan Taliban's road to recognition will be harder to achieve if there is instability on their doorstep, which incentivizes them to use their influence on the TTP.

Even though the first attempt at negotiation failed, it would be unwise to say that it was predictable. The recent failure can be rationally broken down by testing the seven hypotheses to determine the cause and act accordingly. The TTP demands for sharia law, accurate recognition of strategic negotiation timings, and the need for involving multiple parties remain the main concerns for successful talks and any potential settlement. Although the Pakistani government can go down a military path, an agreement that does not set dangerous precedents remains a far more attractive option. In the end, there is hope that both parties can compromise to some extent to move past the path of violence.

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When Does Leftist Ideology Fail to Prevent Rape? An Analysis of the Leftist Rebel Groups in Colombia in the 2010s

Hiroki Watanabe

Abstract: Leftist rebels rarely perpetrate rape, as leftist ideology calls for gender equality. Failure to prevent sexual violence committed by their rebel members will anger and alienate their supporters, so these groups have strong incentives to prevent rape through oversight or political education. However, according to the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset, there existed two leftist rebel groups in Colombia that committed massive sexual violence. From 2010 to 2013, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) were reported to have committed massive sexual violence to the degree that no other leftist rebels except the Khmer Rouge have ever committed. This paper addresses why these two rebel groups, which advocated leftist ideology, failed to keep their members from committing sexual violence. It shows that the prevalence of sexual violence coincided with the moment when these rebel groups were facing the increased need to show their strength; these groups were trying to negotiate for better terms with the Colombian government under the leadership of President Santos, who advocated negotiated settlements with them. Based on these findings, this paper suggests that rebel groups may choose to forsake their ideological ideals when their organizational survival is at stake, implying that rebel commanders may condone sexual violence committed by their combatants as a “necessary evil” to improve their military effectiveness.

Keywords: *rebel groups, leftist ideology, sexual violence*

Introduction

There is evidence to show that rebels rarely commit rape because leftist ideology^① advocates gender equality. Put differently, committing sexual violence is contradictory to their ideal. According to Mehwish Sarwari, failure of rebels to conform to the ideals advocated by the groups will disappoint the civilians supporting these groups. Additionally, rebel groups face the risk of losing support of foreign actors “with

① This study uses the same ideological classification used in Mehwish Sarwari, “Impact of Rebel Group Ideology on Wartime Sexual Violence,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6, no. 2 (2020). According to Sarwari, leftist ideology includes “Marxism-Leninism, socialism, democratic socialism, communism, or leftism” and rebel groups that advocate any of these values are, therefore, considered “leftist rebel groups.” See Sarwari’s footnote 7 on page 5.

comparable gender equality values” or even get punished if the rebels keep committing sexual violence. Therefore, leftist rebel groups have an incentive to prevent sexual violence committed by their members.^①

This paper focuses on the two leftist rebel groups in Colombia that had committed massive sexual violence. According to the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset provided by Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås in 2021, which contains 6168 cases of “conflict-related sexual violence committed by armed actors during the years 1989-2019,”^② the two rebel groups (i.e., the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or the FARC and the National Liberation Army, or ENL in Spanish) are the only leftist rebel groups that reportedly perpetrated massive sexual violence in the 21st century. The objective of this study is, thus, to explore why leftist values sometimes fail to keep rebel groups from committing massive sexual violence.

Case Selection: Why Colombia

Sarwari argues that whether a rebel group would commit sexual violence depends on the type of ideology the rebel group upholds. Sarwari’s statistical model shows that groups with leftist ideological values are less likely to commit sexual violence. Sarwari’s estimate of the probability of a leftist rebel group committing no sexual violence is 0.961 while that of a non-leftist rebel group is 0.734. In terms of committing “wide-spread sexual violence,”^③ the probability is 0.003 for a leftist rebel in contrast to 0.049 for a non-leftist rebel.^④ Also, Sarwari shows that receiving aid from a leftist foreign actor decreases the likelihood of a rebel group committing sexual violence; if the rebel is leftist as well, the chance of having sexual violence reported becomes even smaller.^⑤

Sarwari uses the SVAC dataset provided by Cohen and Nordås,^⑥ which “capture[s] the prevalence of sexual violence penetrated by individual conflict actors.”^⑦ In the dataset, the value ranges from 0 (no report of sexual violence) to 3 (massive number of sexual violence reported),^⑧ Sarwari also uses the dataset

① Mehwish Sarwari, “Impact of Rebel Group Ideology on Wartime Sexual Violence,” *Journal of Global Security Studies* 6, no.2 (2020).

② “Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset Dataset,” Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, <http://www.sexualviolencedata.org/dataset/> (accessed March 2, 2021).

③ This means that the value of 2 out of 3 is given to the case. The value indicates the prevalence of sexual violence in an armed conflict. For more details, see Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås, *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Data Project (SVAC) 3.0, 1989-2019 Codebook and Instruction Manual* (2021): 9.

④ Sarwari, “Impact of Rebel Group Ideology on Wartime Sexual Violence,” 14.

⑤ The probability is 0.961 if a rebel group is leftist and 0.773 otherwise. See Sarwari, 15.

⑥ In the paper published in 2020, Sarwari used an older dataset created in 2014 by Cohen and Nordås. This study uses the latest version created in 2021.

⑦ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

⑧ Cohen and Nordås measure the prevalence of sexual violence in armed conflicts based on how sexual violence was described in their sources. It is said on page 9 of their codebook that if “sexual violence in an armed conflict was described as “systematic” or “massive” or “innumerable,” or actors are said to have used sexual violence as a “means of intimidation,” “instrument of control and punishment,” “weapon,” “tactic to terrorize the population,” “terror tactic,” “tool of war,” on a “massive scale,” a case is given the value of 3. Also, on the same page, it is also said that even if these terms were not found in these sources, “a count of 1,000 or more reports of sexual violence” also satisfies this requirement. For their coding rules, see Cohen and Nordås, *Codebook and Instruction Manual*.

created by Reed M. Wood and Jakana L. Thomas in 2017. In this dataset, rebel groups are coded as 1 if they are leftist^① and 0 otherwise. This is to see the relationship between the prevalence of sexual violence committed by a rebel group and the ideological disposition of the rebel group.

Out of 3,020 cases of civil wars involving rebel groups (of which the case's value of the *actor_type* variable is 3), there are 371 cases where leftist rebel groups were involved. Furthermore, corroborating Sarwari's finding that leftist rebels seldom rape, there exist only 16 cases out of 371 in the dataset in which sexual violence had been reportedly committed by leftist rebels. If the results are confined to the cases of "massive sexual violence," or one of the three variables indicating the level of sexual violence committed by rebel groups (*state_prev*, *ai_prev*, or *hrw_prev*) has the value of 3, there will be only nine cases wherein leftist rebel groups have committed prevalent sexual violence.

Year	Actor	Leftist	Forced Recruitment	Location	state_prev	ai_prev	hrw_prev
2015	ELN	1	1	Colombia	1	0	0
2014	ELN	1	1	Colombia	1	1	0
2013	ELN	1	1	Colombia	3	0	0
2012	ELN	1	1	Colombia	3	1	0
2011	ELN	1	1	Colombia	3	0	0
2010	ELN	1	1	Colombia	3	1	0
2009	ELN	1	1	Colombia	1	0	0
2004	ELN	1	1	Colombia	1	0	0
2015	FARC	1	1	Colombia	2	0	0
2014	FARC	1	1	Colombia	2	0	0
2013	FARC	1	1	Colombia	3	0	0
2012	FARC	1	1	Colombia	3	0	0
2011	FARC	1	1	Colombia	3	0	0
2010	FARC	1	1	Colombia	3	0	0
1994	KR	1	1	Cambodia	1	0	3
1991	Sendero Luminoso	1	1	Peru	2	0	0

Table 1: The list of conflicts that involved leftist rebel groups that had reportedly committed sexual violence. The rows in red are the ones that one of the sources reported massive sexual violence. Variables other than "leftist" and "forced recruitment" are from Cohen's Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset (Version 3). The other two variables (i.e., "leftist" and "forced recruitment") are from the dataset created by Wood and Thomas in 2017. "state_prev" indicates the report of the US Department of State. "ai_prev" is the report of Amnesty International, and "hrw_prev" is the report of Human Rights Watch.

① On page 39 of their paper, Wood and Thomas state that "[l]eftist ideologies include all groups that adopt a Marxist-inspired ideology (e.g., socialist, communist, Maoist, or Marxist-Leninist) and those that were otherwise coded as 'leftist' in the aforementioned datasets." See Reed M. Wood and Jakana L. Thomas, "Women on the Frontline: Rebel Group Ideology and Women's Participation in Violent Rebellion," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no.1 (2017).

Focusing on the cases wherein leftist rebel groups committed sexual violence at the level of 3 allows us to select anomalous groups. The only leftist rebel groups that meet the requirement are the ELN, the FARC, and the notorious Khmer Rouge. The first two cases are worth our attention, for they are the unlikely events taking place both at the same period of time and in the same country. Kathryn Farr, who studies the patterns of “extreme war rape,” also refers to both Colombia and Cambodia as countries where sexual violence was rampant. As for Colombia, Farr says, sexual violence committed by armed groups had become so common that about one fourth of 410 displaced women were said to have been raped there; the reported cases of rape between 2000 and 2002 amounted to 40,000. Moreover, 20,000 to 35,000 children were said to be forced into sexual slavery.^① Table 1 shows that sexual violence remained so prevalent across Colombia until 2016, when the government of Colombia and the FARC finally reached a peace agreement.^②

While this paper does not cover the Cambodian case in 1994, it does not mean that the Cambodian case is totally irrelevant. The 1995 report of Human Rights Watch says that “[r]eports of grave abuses committed by both [the Khmer Rouge and the government’s military] during the fighting were widespread, including allegations that civilian women were raped and prisoners of war summarily executed.”^③ Meanwhile, it also admits that “[i]nformation on Khmer Rouge abuses is sporadic, due to the lack of access to areas under their control.”^④ Although the Cambodian case is isolated from the other cases in Colombia both geographically and chronologically, this study may provide researchers with some insights into the sexual violence committed by the Khmer Rouge as well.^⑤

In Colombia, when Farr published her work in 2009, the main perpetrator was the state. The largest rebel groups (in Colombia’s case, the FARC) that were involved in the four nation-wide conflicts (categorized as the cases of “State-Led/Enemy-Targeted Pattern” by Farr) committed “very little war rape.”^⑥ Farr speculates that “[all] of these rebel groups enjoy considerable support, including combat support, from women who share their commitment to the “cause,” a factor which likely is related to the low rape rate among them.”^⑦ Nevertheless, Farr also acknowledges that these rebel groups often abducted children to recruit new members.

① Kathryn Farr, “Extreme War Rape in Today’s Civil-War-Torn States: A Contextual and Comparative Analysis,” *Gender Issues* 26, no.1 (2009): 27.

② For details, see “Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace.” *PA-X: Peace Agreements Database*, National Government of Colombia and FARC-EP, November 24, 2016, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1845/Final%20Agreement%20to%20End%20the%20Armed%20Conflict%20and%20Build%20a%20Stable%20and%20Lasting%20Peace> (accessed January 8, 2022).

③ “Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 - Cambodia,” *Refworld*, January 1, 1995, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/467fcaa5c.html> (accessed 3 March 2022).

④ *Ibid.*

⑤ For example, Human Rights Watch reports that ransom kidnapping of civilians by the Khmer Rouge guerrillas was common. See “Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 – Cambodia.” The relationship between kidnapping and sexual violence will be discussed later in this paper.

⑥ Farr, “Extreme War Rape in Today’s Civil-War-Torn States,” 21.

⑦ Farr, “Extreme War Rape in Today’s Civil-War-Torn States,” 21.




Figure 1. The prevalence of rape committed by FARC. The data is obtained from Cohen’s Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset (Version 3). From 1989 to 2009, the group is named “FARC-EP”, from 2010 to 2015, “FARC,” and from 2018 to 2019, “FARC dissidents.” Values outside the range of 0 to 3 are omitted.

Farr was right—until 2010. The FARC did not commit massive sexual violence before 2010. However, in 2010, the group suddenly started committing massive sexual violence despite their ideological cause. The massive sexual violence committed by the FARC continued until 2013, when the intensity of sexual violence was somewhat moderated. The ELN, another major rebel group in Colombia that shared a similar leftist ideological disposition with the FARC, also shows a similar change in the 2010s. After the peak of sexual violence from 2010 to 2013, the intensity of sexual violence committed by both rebel groups declined.^①

① The reports of the two human rights organizations besides the US Department of State may not reflect the reality in Colombia in this period, given that the reports of the United Nations and ABColombia say that the rebel groups indeed committed sexual violence. These two human rights organizations put more emphasis on sexual violence committed by rightist paramilitaries as well as state security forces. It would be important to keep in mind that such liberal organizations may play down atrocities committed by leftist groups, while it is also true that the reports of the US Department of State may well be biased against those anti-American leftist groups. According to ABColombia’s report, as of 2008, with regards to the 183 cases under investigation, more than half of sexual violence was committed by paramilitaries and state security forces (58 percent and 23 percent respectively), while only 8 percent of the cases was attributed to the guerrilla groups. See “Colombia: Women, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Peace Process,” *ABColombia*, 2013, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ABColombia_Conflict_related_sexual_violence_report.pdf (accessed January 8, 2022), 17; “Conflict-related sexual violence: report of the Secretary-General,” UN Secretary-General (UNSG), *Refworld* January 13, 2012, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f27a19c2.html> (accessed January 8, 2022), 6.




Figure 2. the prevalence of rape committed by ELN. The data is obtained from Cohen’s Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset (Version 3). The intensification of sexual violence committed by FARC and ELN first took place around 2009.

Why did these two Colombian rebel groups suddenly started committing massive sexual violence even though leftist/Marxist rebel groups are supposed to be less inclined to commit sexual violence? Addressing this puzzle requires a case study that focuses on why the rebel groups that had not committed sexual violence all of a sudden started perpetrating it in 2010.

Testing Theories

The first hypothesis is based on the argument made by Dara Kay Cohen, who contends that rebel groups use rape to enhance group cohesion. Put differently, in Cohen’s words, “[by] participating in group rape—and perhaps by bragging about the individual rapes they have committed—combatants signal to their new peers that they are part of the unit and are willing to take risks to remain in the group.”^① Their need for an improved group cohesion often hinges on how these groups recruit new members, and those groups that enjoy greater cohesion tend to use a “voluntary recruitment mechanism.” Cohen argues that rape is a risky behavior that is costly even to the perpetrators. In addition to the risk of contracting venereal disease, there will be some “emotional toll” on perpetrators themselves. Furthermore, rape is time-consuming; although sometimes regarded as a genocidal tool, rape is usually less efficient than other means of warfare.^② The militarily ineffective nature of rape, however, contributes to the very essence of the function of rape. With

① Dara Kay Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),” *American Political Science Review* 107, no.3 (2013): 465.

② *Ibid.*, 465.

regards to this argument, biological desire of individual combatants that leads to their opportunistic behaviors and military aspects of rape are of secondary importance. Cohen details her point as follows:

[t]he argument merely posits that, when trapped in a group of hostile strangers, individuals are likely to choose participation in costly group behavior over continued estrangement from their new peers...By participating in group rape—and perhaps by bragging about the individual rapes they have committed—combatants signal to their new peers that they are part of the unit and are willing to take risks to remain in the group.^①

What Cohen calls “a group of hostile strangers” often kidnaps/abducts civilians. If a rebel group resorts to abduction, which is an “[e]xtreme forms of forced recruitment,”^② then it is more likely for the rebel group to commit sexual violence.^③

Deducting from Cohen’s argument, I create a hypothesis that could possibly explain the ideological degradation of both the FAR and the ELN. Perhaps, these groups faced the urgent need to resort to more forceful recruitment processes around 2010. Their group cohesion was low, leading to the rise of sexual violence committed by these rebel groups to improve it (this paper names it “coercive recruitment hypothesis”). This scenario sounds plausible, as the United Nations reported that the armed groups including the FARC and the ELN committed “sexual violence against women and girls who have been forcibly recruited.”^④ The main target of sexual violence appears to be “girls who are recruited or associated with [illegal armed groups].”^⑤ “The girls are required to have sexual relations with adults at an early age and are forced to abort if they become pregnant,”^⑥ the UN report adds.

Meanwhile, the FARC and the ELN are also known for their propensity for ransom kidnapping as their tactic. Danielle Gilbert demonstrates that kidnapping enabled these groups to levy “taxes” effectively from the local population. The logic proposed by Gilbert is that, by kidnapping people who refuse to financially contribute to the rebel group, the rebel group can punish “tax-sharking” locals. This also serves to deter future shirking. Therefore, this tactic is cost-effective in that only “limited, admonitory violence” is needed to deliver a message to the wide range of audience.^⑦

The main targets of kidnapping are, as one of the interviewees of Gilbert’s study revealed, “businessmen, ranchers, merchants, companies from abroad, all industries...and their kids, wives, and moms.”^⑧ Ideology

① Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),” 465.

② *Ibid.*, 466.

③ Cohen’s statistical analysis shows that abduction makes it 2 times, 3.2 times, and 5.5 times more likely to commit sexual violence at the level of 1, 2, 3, respectively. See Cohen, 472.

④ “Conflict-related sexual violence: report of the Secretary-General,” UN Secretary-General (UNSG), 5-6.

⑤ *Ibid.*, 6.

⑥ *Ibid.*, 6.

⑦ Danielle Gilbert, “The Logic of Kidnapping in Civil War: Evidence from Colombia (conditional acceptance, *American Political Science Review*),” *Danielle Gilbert* (2021), 12.

⑧ *Ibid.*, 24.

certainly plays a role in selecting whom to kidnap. Those who are deemed “class enemies” and “oligarchs” are targeted, although they sometimes overestimate the wealth of their potential targets and kidnap the wrong people.^①

This seemingly faultless rebel tactic has a huge detrimental effect that Gilbert calls “the long-term legitimacy cost.” The relationship between the locals and the rebel groups deteriorated.^② It ultimately led to the rise of a social movement against kidnapping in Colombia, highlighting the transition that the popularity of the leftist rebel groups had turned to be a thing of the past.^③

While kidnapping had been a common practice of both the FARC and the ELN, they often tended to prey on different groups of people. The FARC, of which political base was in the rural southern section of Colombia,^④ often kidnapped businesspeople and ranchers; the ELN, based in the resource-rich northern part of Colombia,^⑤ tended to kidnap industrial workers.^⑥ It is not only lucrative but also ideologically conforming, as it is supposed to be a way to threaten their class enemy. Nevertheless, Gilbert contends that in reality, “[t]he FARC and ELN targeted not only ideologically sanctioned enemies but also the agricultural workers of their base.”^⑦ Citing a report in Spanish, Gilbert shows that hostages often suffer both physical and psychological abuse. This includes rape.^⑧ This leads to the second hypothesis that the increased need for money led to the increase in the frequency of kidnapping carried out by these leftist rebels, which subsequently increased the occasions of sexual violence committed by rebel groups (this paper names it “kidnapping-related sexual exploitation hypothesis”).

These cases demonstrate that there are two possible patterns of sexual violence committed by the FARC and the ELN. One is exploiting the newly recruited (be it forcible or voluntary) soldiers; the other is abusing the hostages of kidnappings. In the next section, this paper tests the two hypotheses presented in this section. It also evaluates “the coercive recruitment hypothesis” and “kidnapping-related sexual exploitation hypothesis” in relation to the actual cases of conflict during 2010 and 2014.

Empirical Analysis: 2010-2013

In the early 2010s, the tide had already turned against the leftist rebel groups in Colombia. In 2014, the number of rebels’ crimes had significantly declined in comparison to 2002. According to a US embassy’s

① Gilbert, “The Logic of Kidnapping in Civil War,” 25.

② Ibid., 27.

③ Ibid., 2.

④ Ron Buikema and Matt Burger, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)” In *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, ed. Chuck Crossett, (United States Army Special Operations Command and The Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics Laboratory National Security Analysis Department: 2012), 48.

⑤ Ibid., 57.

⑥ Gilbert, “The Logic of Kidnapping in Civil War,” 29-30.

⑦ Ibid., 32.

⑧ Ibid., 6.

report, murder was reduced by 45 percent, political assassinations by 87 percent, terrorist attacks by 91 percent, and most importantly, kidnapping by 91 percent.^① Given that most kidnappings are conducted by rebel groups,^② the significant decline in the number of reported kidnappings should indicate the shifting balance of power between the Colombian government and the two leftist rebel groups.

One important event was in 2012, when the FARC renounced kidnapping “in preparations for peace talks with the Colombian government.”^③ Kidnapping was a common practice of both the FARC and the ELN (and the ELN still continues kidnapping). According to the article published by Human Rights Watch in 2005, “20 to 30 percent of all FARC combatants are under 18 years old,” and besides those children who had no choice but to join in order to feed themselves, “[s]ome are coerced to join at gunpoint, or join out of fear.”^④ About 80 percent of children are said to have joined at will; however, it was nearly impossible to leave the organization once joined.^⑤ It is also said that the internal FARC policy prohibited sexual assault, but it was often ignored, leaving young female rebels vulnerable to sexual assault of their colleagues. Even after the pledge not to recruit children was made by the FARC in 2012, the FARC continued recruiting young children.^⑥

Still, the fact that the FARC ostensibly relinquished kidnapping and recruitment of child soldiers is attributable to the decline in the ability of the FARC to fight against the Colombian government. President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010)’s hardline stance on the leftist rebel groups, backed by the US military assistance,^⑦ led to the weakening of these rebel groups. The FARC membership diminished from 16,000 members in 2001 to 7,000 in 2013. Their territories were also reduced. The ELN had about 1,400 members in 2013, which was “far fewer than it had in the late 1990s.”^⑧ The government crackdown on these rebel groups received public support despite some criticism from human rights groups for collaborating with right-wing paramilitaries.^⑨

As a result, the FARC opted for a negotiated settlement. As Danielle Renwick and Stephanie Hanson describe, “[t]he groups have been sufficiently weakened that they are now willing to negotiate with the

① Christopher Razo, “Including the ELN in Peace Negotiations,” *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, March 31, 2016, <https://www.coha.org/including-the-eln-in-peace-negotiations/>. The US Embassy’s report referred to by Razo could not be found.

② Out of 27,000 kidnapping cases, 24,482 (about 90 percent) were carried out by the “guerrillas.” See “Colombia: Women, Conflict- Related Sexual Violence and the Peace Process,” 6.

③ Danielle Renwick and Stephanie Hanson, “FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Leftist Guerrillas,” *Council on Foreign Relations* 1 (2014): 2.

④ “Colombia: Armed Groups Send Children to War,” *Human Rights Watch*, February 22, 2005, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/02/21/colombia-armed-groups-send-children-war> (accessed January 8, 2022).

⑤ Anna-Cat Brigida, “Will Colombia’s Child Soldier Recruiters Face Justice?,” *Aljazeera*, March 23, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2016/3/23/will-colombias-child-soldier-recruiters-face-justice> (accessed January 8, 2022).

⑥ Ibid.

⑦ Renwick and Hanson, “FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Leftist Guerrillas,” 2-3.

⑧ Ibid., 2.

⑨ Ibid., 2.

government.”^① Still, it is important to note that massive sexual violence began once Uribe, who was hostile to the leftist rebels, left office and Juan Manuel Santo succeeded Uribe in 2010. Citing J.E. Delago’s analysis, Zachary Toll argues that Santos abandoned Uribe’s aggressive counterinsurgency strategy in 2012 and had adopted a new strategy “to injure the organization enough to make negotiations appear as the better avenue to resolution, rather than encountering the FARC on the battlefield.”^②

Table 1 Note: This table is reprinted from Zachary Toll, “Terrorism in Colombia: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN),” *Journal of Mason Graduate Research* 4, no. 1 (2017): 30, <https://doi.org/10.13021/G8jmgr.v4i1.1722>.

FARC and ELN average, standard deviation, and range of attack intensity values before, during, and after Uribe’s presidency

FARC			
Avg.	7.22	6.89	8.03
Std. Dev.	2.90	6.67	3.30
Range	4.57-12.20	0.0-38.67	3.38-12.73
Years	2000-2001	2002-2010	2011-2014
ELN			
Avg.	13.49	2.96	3.53
Std. Dev.	19.71	5.78	3.88
Range	1.50-60.50	0.0-28.0	0.0-11.0
Years	2000-2001	2002-2010	2011-2014

Note: A table reprinted from Toll, “Terrorism in Colombia: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN),” 30. It shows average attack intensity values of the FARC and the ELN before (the first column), during (the second column), and after (the third column) Uribe’s presidency.

Toll’s study demonstrates the impact of this change quantitatively. As Toll’s table shows, average attack intensity values^③ of both the FARC and the ELN decreased once Uribe came into power. However, the intensity of the FARC and the ELN’s offensives (or terrorist attacks) increased after the arrival of the moderate President Santos, who was more willing to negotiate than his predecessor. One possible reason for more attacks under the new president could be that the rebel groups tried to negotiate a favorable settlement by showing its strength.^④ Citing a report of the Conflict Analysis Resource Centre, Hastings bolsters her claim by showing evidence for “a steady rise in ELN hostilities since 2010, as well as an increase in military offensives against the ELN.”^⑤

① *Ibid.*, 3.

② Zachary Toll, “Terrorism in Colombia: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN),” *Journal of Mason Graduate Research* 4, no.1 (2017): 17.

③ It is the sum of the following three values (fatalities per quarter, injuries per quarter, and the hostages taken per quarter) divided by the total number of terrorist attacks per quarter. See Toll, 20.

④ Emily Hastings, “ELN Negotiations: One step forward, two steps back,” *The Bogotá Post*, March 17, 2017, <https://thebogotapost.com/eln-negotiations-one-step-forward-two-steps-back/20439/> (accessed January 8, 2022).

⑤ *Ibid.*

In sum, sexual violence perpetrated by rebel groups intensified after the government started seeking a negotiated settlement with the FARC and the ELN. The fact that the number of kidnappings dropped from 2002 to 2013 can call into question the “kidnapping-related sexual exploitation hypothesis.” This hypothesis posits that the increased need for ransom kidnapping inadvertently increased the reported cases of sexual violence. The coercive recruitment hypothesis may hold better, as the increased need to show its strength would create a greater incentive to recruit more soldiers including children. These new recruits often fall prey to the sexual predators inside the groups, which could have possibly amplified the frequency of sexual violence committed by these two rebel groups.

This suggests one possible way to extend Cohen’s argument. Cohen contends that rebels commit sexual violence to appeal to other members that they are willing to take risks. Doing so can lead to group acceptance (combatant socialization), which would enhance the rebels’ ability to fight. Cohen focuses on the recruiting method of a rebel group that determines whether the rebel group would need to resort to sexual violence, and Cohen found that rebel groups that rely on abduction to recruit new soldiers are more likely to commit sexual violence.^① Cohen, however, does not discuss the timing when a rebel group would seek greater group cohesion. This case study suggests that when a rebel group is in the domain of losses, the group would be forced to sacrifice its ideological ideals in order not to lose the battle against the government.

Hoover Green’s study in 2016 provides readers with some insight into why the need for Colombian rebels to compete better with the government led to the rise of sexual violence. Hoover Green claims that rebel commanders face “the Commander’s Dilemma.” Namely, to win a fight, commanders have to make their soldiers willing to commit unrestrained. Nevertheless, commanders also want to keep their soldiers from committing violence against civilians, including sexual violence. Communist rebels are said to have stronger incentive to avoid sexual violence, and indeed, Hoover Green finds that communist rebels are less likely to commit it.^② Hoover Green’s theory suggests that, thanks to communist rebels’ propensity for intensive political education (and what Hoover Green calls “political education for restraint”), communist rebels are more likely to create institutions that control rebel’s behaviors and deter their wrongdoing against civilians.^③

The concept of the Commander’s Dilemma can also be developed further as follows. If a rebel group gets into an unfavorable situation, it would choose to prioritize improving the rebel’s ability to fight. This implies, in accordance with Cohen’s argument, that rebel groups under threat may feel compelled to enhance their group cohesion. In other words, leftist/communist rebels that uphold a noble cause may no

① Dara Kay Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),” *American Political Science Review* 107, no.3 (2013): 472.

② Amelia Hoover Green, “The Commander’s Dilemma,” *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no.5 (2016): 627.

③ *Ibid.*, 623-25.

longer be willing to enforce rules inside their organization. Even though commanders rarely order their soldiers to commit “opportunistic forms of violence,^① they would acquiesce to opportunistic behaviors of soldiers as a necessary evil to strengthen their combative capabilities. If that is the case, ideology is merely a luxury item that functions only when a rebel group fares well. In order to win some concessions from the government, the rebel group may have chosen to boost their soldiers’ morale and enhance their military effectiveness. This comes at the cost of children in their group, the hostages of kidnappings, and their ideological ideal.

To summarize this section, a number of evidence shows that the FARC and the ELN were in decline when they started committing sexual violence. They still had to perform aggressively in order to win favorable terms from the government upon their possible negotiated settlement. Still, because of their declining organizational capacity, the number of kidnappings had been relatively low in the 2010s.

The coercive recruitment hypothesis is more plausible. Yet, one challenge to this hypothesis is that while the FARC and the ELN are said to have abused young female soldiers of their own, at least the majority of those joined at their will. Cohen’s appendix puts Colombia as one of the 19 countries where there were “ever reports of abduction by any insurgent group,” as well as one of the 39 countries where there were “ever reports of forced recruitment by any insurgent group.”^② Given that the SVAC dataset does not have the abduction variable, it is only possible to speculate that Cohen assigned 1 (i.e., abduction perpetrated) to Colombia’s cases. The limitation of this study is the difficulty in asserting whether sexual violence against recruits can be considered a form of violence against local populations. If they were fully abducted or forcibly recruited, it would be easy to give an affirmative answer. News reports cited above suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that rebel groups who intimidate and coerce children to fight^③ do not enjoy high morale and group cohesion. Future research would need to evaluate the combative ability of the FARC, and the ELN, which would require further in-depth qualitative analysis by area specialists.

Discussion and Conclusion

In 2016, the FARC reached a final peace agreement with the Colombian government, which led to demobilization of the FARC. Meanwhile, negotiations with the ELN are under way, but the ELN’s prospect of winning a favorable peace agreement with the government is diminishing. As Herbolzheimer argues, military victory against the government is unlikely, if not impossible. The ELN has become aware that

① Ibid., 620, 625.

② Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War,” 14.

③ Brigida, “Will Colombia’s Child Soldier Recruiters Face Justice?”

continued violence would not increase their bargaining power. Consequently, the ELN rebels “have limited expectations for change with the peace talks.”^①

Figure 1 and Figure 2 in this paper showed that, toward reaching the agreement in 2016, the FARC committed fewer cases of sexual violence. This possibly indicates that the good chance of reaching an agreement motivates the rebel group to behave nicer. The FARC’s public renunciation of kidnapping and the use of child soldiers in 2012 could be the sign of their willingness to negotiate. In contrast, if the prospect to win favorable terms is dim, rebel groups would have little incentive to enforce discipline.

Recall that leftist rebel groups that receive support from foreign leftist actors should be less likely to commit sexual violence.^② With regards to Colombia, this is a notable point to discuss. This is because the ties between the FARC/ENL and other communist countries were considered limited.^③ Because of FARC leaders’ concern of increased external political influence, it is said that the rebel groups had never asked for or received Soviet and Cuban material support. Meanwhile, their connection to Venezuela, known for its Anti-American leftist disposition, is disputed.^④ FARC, while originally founded as a Marxist-Leninist organization, has adopted a system of “Bolivarian,” which Buikema and Burger describe as “a combination of nationalist and leftist ideals.”^⑤ That is possibly one of the reasons that these rebel groups did not have any sponsor that could prevent their committing sexual violence. The absence of external support also led to their dependence on illicit drug production. This would diminish rebels’ commitment to their ideological cause. Jeremy M. Weinstein shows that the CRD, one of the regional branches of the Shining Path (or Sendero Luminoso, referred to in Table 1) in Peru, refused to comply with the code of conduct imposed by their central authority. The CRD was the branch responsible for coca production, and “the leaders of the CRH did not seek to protect the status of Senderistas as political and ideological revolutionaries”^⑥ because nearly all the CRH members profited by embezzling the group’s money earned from drug production.^⑦ Also, Whitaker, Walsh, and Conrad statistically demonstrate that groups that extort money from natural resource production are more likely to commit sexual violence.^⑧ Drug trafficking has been “the principal

① Kristian Herbolzheimer, “Nowhere to Turn for the ELN in Colombia?” *Conciliation Resources*, February 2018, <https://www.c-r.org/news-and-insight/nowhere-turn-eln-colombia> (accessed January 8, 2022).

② Sarwari, “Impact of Rebel Group Ideology on Wartime Sexual Violence,” 15.

③ Buikema and Burger, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),” 58.

④ *Ibid.*, 58.

⑤ *Ibid.*, 49. It is important to note that, as Sarwari argues, being a nationalist could well coincide with being a leftist. See footnote 4 on page 4 of Sarwari’s paper. Furthermore, Wood and Thomas categorize these rebel groups as “nonnationalist” groups. See Wood, Reed M., and Jakana L. Thomas, “Replication data for “Women on the Frontline: Rebel Group Ideology and Women’s Participation in Violent Rebellion,” *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (2017), <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/O35OX4> (January 8, 2022).

⑥ Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Control,” in *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 157.

⑦ *Ibid.*, 157.

⑧ The ELN is known for extorting money from oil companies. See Beth Elise Whitaker, James Igoe Walsh, and Justin Conrad, “Natural Resource Exploitation and Sexual Violence by Rebel Groups,” *The Journal of Politics* 81, no.2 (2019): 703.

economic engine” in Colombia; the FARC was the primary beneficiary of the coca industry in the country before it was disbanded. Again, the FARC often imposed “taxes” on farmers and drug dealers.^①

An ominous sign is that the ELN seems to have taken over the role of the FARC. According to Christopher Razo, the ELN viewed drug trafficking as “antirevolutionary”, and stayed away from it. However, it appears that as of 2016, the ELN was “reconsidering.” Indeed, several large-scale drug laboratories run by the ELN have been detected.^②

What this case study suggests is that leftist ideology can fail to prevent a rebel group from committing sexual violence. Leftist ideology is a good but not perfect brake of sexual violence. When the rebel groups are desperate to fight, they would opt for compromising their ideological ideal. Doing so may temporarily improve combative capabilities, but the long-term cost certainly exists. People whom these leftist rebel groups sought to “liberate” turned against them. Consequently, the FARC, besides small dissent groups, disappeared. The ELN still exists, and we must keep an eye on the group so it would not repeat massive sexual violence. The ELN’s propensity for ransom kidnapping and natural resource extortion (including drug production) is a worrisome factor that can increase the likelihood of the group committing massive sexual violence.

Appendix I: Rebel groups categorized as “leftist” by Wood and Thomas in 2017

Country	Rebel Group Name
Cambodia	KR
Colombia	FARC
Colombia	ELN
Colombia	M-19
El Salvador	FMLN
Ethiopia	EPRDF
Ethiopia	EPRP
Ethiopia	EPLF
Ethiopia	TPLF
Guatemala	UNRG
India	PLA
India	NSCN-K, NSCN-IM
India	CPI-M
India	PWG
India	MCC
India	KCP

① Buikema and Burger, “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC),” 67.

② Razo, “Including the ELN in Peace Negotiations,” 3-4.

India	ULFA
Iran	PJAK
Iran	MEK
Israel	Fatah
Israel	PFLP
Israel	Rejectionist Front
Lebanon	NUF
Lebanon	LNM/Socialist Party/Communist Party
Malaysia	CPM
Mexico	EZLN
Myanmar	CPB
Nepal	CPN-M
Nicaragua	FSLN (Sandanistas)
Peru	MRTA
Peru	Sendero Luminoso
Philippines	CPP
Spain	ETA
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	JVP
Thailand	CPT
Turkey	PKK
Turkey	Devrimci Sol

Appendix II: Rebel groups in the SVAC database (version 3) that were said to have committed massive sexual violence (i.e., assigned the value of 3) in accordance with one of the three sources

Rebel Group Name	Country	Year	Source
AFRC	Sierra Leone	1997	US State Dept.
AFRC	Sierra Leone	1998	US State Dept.
AFRC	Sierra Leone	1999	US State Dept.
AFRC	Sierra Leone	1998	Amnesty
AFRC	Sierra Leone	1999	Amnesty
AFRC	Sierra Leone	1998	HRW
AFRC	Sierra Leone	1999	HRW
CMA	Mali	2012	US State Dept.
CNDD-FDD	Burundi	2003	Amnesty
CNDD-FDD	Burundi	2003	HRW
CNDP	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	2006	Amnesty
CPJP	Central African Republic	2010	US State Dept.
CPJP	Central African Republic	2011	US State Dept.
ELN	Colombia	2010	US State Dept.
ELN	Colombia	2013	US State Dept.

FARC	Colombia	2010	US State Dept.
FARC	Colombia	2011	US State Dept.
FARC	Colombia	2012	US State Dept.
FARC	Colombia	2013	US State Dept.
Forces of Muammar Gaddafi	Libya	2011	US State Dept.
IS	Syria	2014	US State Dept.
IS	Iraq	2014	Amnesty
IS	Iraq	2015	HRW
IS	Iraq	2016	HRW
IS	Iraq	2018	HRW
IS	Syria	2015	HRW
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	Nigeria	2014	Amnesty
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Boko Haram)	Nigeria	2015	Amnesty
KR	Cambodia	1994	HRW
LTTE	Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	1995	US State Dept.
M23	DR Congo (Zaire)	2012	HRW
MLC	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	2003	Amnesty
Palipehutu-FNL	Burundi	2003	HRW
RUF	Sierra Leone	1997	US State Dept.
RUF	Sierra Leone	1998	US State Dept.
RUF	Sierra Leone	1999	US State Dept.
RUF	Sierra Leone	2000	US State Dept.
RUF	Sierra Leone	1998	Amnesty
RUF	Sierra Leone	1999	Amnesty
RUF	Sierra Leone	1998	HRW
RUF	Sierra Leone	1999	HRW
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992	HRW
SPLM/A In Opposition	South Sudan	2016	US State Dept.
SPLM/A In Opposition	South Sudan	2017	US State Dept.
SPLM/A In Opposition	South Sudan	2018	US State Dept.
SPLM/A In Opposition	South Sudan	2014	Amnesty
SPLM/A In Opposition	South Sudan	2018	HRW
UCK	Serbia (Yugoslavia)	1999	US State Dept.
West Side Boys	Sierra Leone	2000	Amnesty

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Whose Responsibility?

What the Report Leaked by Ellsberg Tells Us about the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis

Hiroki Watanabe

Abstract: In August 1958, the People's Republic of China (PRC) bombarded the Jinmen (Quemoy) islands, where Nationalist troops were stationed. Leaders of the PRC, including Mao Zedong, expected that the United States would not intervene. It was, however, a miscalculation; the United States quickly amassed its air and naval forces in the area and assisted the Nationalists to defend the islands. Why did the US response, then, go beyond the Chinese expectation? A recently disclosed, unabridged report regarding the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis made for the US Department of Defense shows that US policymakers were quick enough to make up their mind to assist the Nationalists rather than force them to abandon the islands. The problem was, however, their failure to agree on how to deliver a warning message to the Chinese until the eve of the crisis, for which Secretary of State Dulles's untimely vacation was partly responsible. Based on the new findings from the unabridged report, this paper proposes two additional arguments. First, if Mao Zedong had approved the PRC's landing on the islands, US nuclear attacks on the mainland would have been not only possible, but also probable. Second, the report shows the persistence of US concerns regarding objections to the US intervention from its allies, most notably Japan, throughout the crisis. US-Japan relations were, thus, unstable during the crisis, given that China could have possibly enticed Japan away from the United States by hinting at the resumption of the Fourth Japan-China Nongovernmental Trade Agreement, which was ratified in March 1958 but called off by China in protest of the Nagasaki National Flag Incident in May 1958.

Keywords: *Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, John Foster Dulles, US-Japan Relations*

Introduction

On August 23, 1958, the People's Liberation Army started shelling the Jinmen (Quemoy) Islands. They were islands just off the coast of Fujian Province but were under the control of the Nationalists. The bombardment, which was the second attack carried out by Communist forces since 1954, instigated an international crisis, bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war.

Before the outbreak of the crisis, however, the possible ramifications of the bombing of these islands appear to be poorly discussed within the PRC. Removing the Nationalist troops there, in hope that the

United States would press Jiang Jieshi to abandon the islands, was the primary motive behind Mao Zedong's decision to bombard the Jinmen islands.^① Nevertheless, as shown by scholars, doing so drove the United States to quickly amass its forces in the region. On August 26, three days after the bombardment, Eisenhower directed US convoy ships to escort Nationalist supply ships; on August 29, this convoy escort plan was executed. The United States even directed two aircraft carriers that were originally assigned to the Mediterranean Sea to the Taiwan Strait. As a result, the region quickly became host to "the largest concentration of nuclear support forces in history"^② by mid-September. Furthermore, the United States went even so far as to announce the possible entry of US ships into the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s internal waters.^③

According to Lorenz M. Lüthi, "[t]he announcement astonished the PRC."^④ Lüthi refers to a Russian archival record showing Zhou Enlai's optimistic assessment made in April 1958 that "the United States would not commit itself to the defense of Jinmen."^⑤ Hence, Lüthi contends, "American reactions changed the nature of the crisis once more."^⑥

Why did the US response, then, go beyond the Chinese expectation? Yasuhiro Izumikawa raises a similar research question of "why China chose to conduct such military activities despite risks of direct military engagement with the United States."^⑦ To Izumikawa, the Chinese decision was puzzling "because it was fairly predictable that China's use of force would prompt the United States to respond militarily."^⑧ This study differs from Izumikawa's study that focuses on China's decision-making process at that moment, as it is centered more on the US decision-making process that defied China's expectation. By analyzing a newly leaked unabridged internal report of the US Department of Defense, this study assesses the Chinese and US assumptions behind the Chinese optimism as well as the US hardline but non-nuclear response. Afterwards, it demonstrates the persistent fear of the United States for the possible defection of its allies, most notably Japan, throughout the crisis, which could have been diplomatically exploited by China.

Literature Review

① He Di, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the Offshore Islands," in *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-60*, eds. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 235.; See also, Madoka Fukuda, *China's Diplomacy and Taiwan: The Origin of the "One China" Policy* (Keio University Press, 2013), 174-183.

② *Ibid.*, 235.

③ For the flow of events in the initial phase of the crisis, see He, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the Offshore Islands" 235 and Lüthi, "The Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1966," 100.

④ Lüthi, "The Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1966," 100.

⑤ *Ibid.*, 100.

⑥ *Ibid.*, 100.

⑦ Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Re-examined: Chinese Diplomacy between the Two Superpowers," *International Relations* 134 (2003). The original article and its abstract translated into English are available at https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/kokusaiseiji1957/2003/134/2003_134_26/_article.

⑧ *Ibid.*

The scholarly work most closely related to this study is Izumikawa's article mentioned above. Izumikawa primarily focuses on external factors surrounding China at that moment, demonstrating that external factors led to domestic radicalization, rather than that domestic ideological zealotry leading to an aggressive foreign policy. This is a stern rebuke to what Izumikawa calls the "domestic mobilization" school, which argues that Mao Zedong chose to shell Jinmen and Mazu in order to mobilize his people to implement his political agenda, the Great Leap Forward.^① Arguing that the proponents of this idea tend to take Mao Zedong's aggressive remarks at the face value, Izumikawa criticizes the Chinese domestic mobilization argument as an overstatement. Rather, Izumikawa points out that the US containment policy against China and the Soviet rapprochement with the United States, reflected by the Soviet advocacy of "peaceful coexistence," motivated the Chinese to launch the attack "out of its security concern."^② Disappointed by the two superpowers giving the cold shoulder, Chinese leaders resorted to a limited military strike (avoiding direct exchange of fire with US forces)^③ to check the US involvement in Taiwan and impede the US-Soviet rapprochement.^④

Madoka Fukuda also points out that the domestic mobilization school overemphasizes the significance of the PRC's mobilization of the Chinese population. Given that the mass mobilization in China took place only after the September 9 statement made by Zhou Enlai that called for a mass mobilization "to oppose US imperialism," Fukuda contends that this mobilization campaign merely aimed to unite their people against the Nationalists, rather than to promote their domestic policy. Namely, the Great Leap Forward itself was not a cause of the crisis, although it did coincide with the crisis.^⑤

Lüthi's study, while admitting that the shelling of Jinmen in 1958 and the onset of the Great Leap Forward had different origins, is more congruent to the domestic mobilization school. According to Lüthi, "[t]he timing of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis—late August—was a function of the Great Leap Forward."^⑥ Highlighting that China's domestic radicalization accelerated in the spring and summer of 1958, Lüthi suggests that the Great Leap Forward opened up the way for the Chinese to adopt more confrontational foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States and the Soviet Union, leading up to the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.^⑦ Therefore, referring to Mao's remark at the Beidaihe Conference on August 17, 1958, Lüthi concludes that the shelling of Jinmen was carried out as a way "to whip up popular enthusiasm for his grand vision of domestic transformation."^⑧

① Izumikawa lists William Taubman, Vladislav Zubok, and Chen Jian as the notable scholars who represent his school of thought. See Izumikawa, 26.

② Izumikawa, "The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Re-Examined," 27.

③ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

④ *Ibid.*, 27, 36.

⑤ Fukuda, *China's Diplomacy and Taiwan*, 159-160.

⑥ Lüthi, "The Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1966," 81.

⑦ *Ibid.*, 80-81.

⑧ Lüthi, "The Sino-Soviet Split, 1956-1966," 99.

Izumikawa and Fukuda, in contrast to Lüthi, put an emphasis on the security concerns of the Chinese leaders, rather than their domestic policy; nevertheless, Izumikawa and Fukuda differ in that Izumikawa claims that the primary objective of the Chinese was rather political from the beginning. Besides, Fukuda disputes that Chinese leaders created the plan because it was needed for China's national defense; winning the control of the air over the coastal areas near Fujian and the seizure of Jinmen and Mazu was essential to stymie Nationalists' anti-Communist propaganda activities and reconnaissance missions on the mainland.^① Uncertainty regarding the possibility of US intervention made the Chinese cautious right before the execution of the plan, however, and they canceled the proposed landing on the islands to reduce the risk of direct engagement with US forces.^② Nevertheless, Mao Zedong eventually sided with optimists like Peng Dehuai, who continuously dismissed the possibility of US intervention, and ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to carry out the shelling of Jinmen.^③ By analyzing at length the internal discussion of the PRC, Fukuda reveals that the political meaning of the shelling was later added during the process of moderating its war plan.

Besides these analyses on Chinese deliberation, a detailed analysis on US deliberation, especially within the Defense Department, in the initial stage of the crisis is lacking, which makes it difficult to understand why the United States took a specific course of action. Furthermore, existing literature also tends to give an exclusive focus on the highest-profile government officials, notably President Eisenhower, who is believed to have fended off aggressive policies proposed by his hawkish Air Force generals,^④ and Secretary of State Dulles. According to Nancy B. Tucker, Dulles's dismay at the Nationalists led him to distance himself from the pro-Jiang Jieshi China Lobby.^⑤ Particularly, after the first shelling of Jinmen in 1954, Dulles began seeking the implicit adoption of the "two Chinas policy." If adopted, such policy would have allowed the United States to acquiesce to the existence of the Communist regime on the mainland while ensuring the survival of the Nationalist regime in Taiwan.^⑥ By doing so, while remaining rhetorically confrontational, Dulles tried to pursue a "rational American policy toward East Asia,"^⑦ which would help the United States avoid getting "entangled into a world war over a handful of islands barely off China's coast."^⑧

① Fukuda, *China's Diplomacy and Taiwan*, 146-147.

② *Ibid.*, 147.

③ *Ibid.*, 144-150.

④ Junichi Fukuda, "A Lesson Learned from the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958): The Risk of Nuclear Escalation in Case of Remote Island Defense," *Sasakawa Peace Foundation*, June 16, 2021, https://www.spf.org/iina/articles/fukuda_04.html; and Savage, "Risk of Nuclear War Over Taiwan in 1958 Said to Be Greater Than Publicly Known."

⑤ Nancy Berinkopf Tucker, "John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the 'Two China Policy'" in *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1990), 262.

⑥ *Ibid.*, 262.

⑦ *Ibid.*, 261.

⑧ *Ibid.*, 241.

The seemingly irrational US policy to mobilize a large force to protect the islands of marginal strategic importance is a puzzle. Put otherwise, defying Mao's expectation that "the American government really wanted to abandon the islands and the public opinion in the United States also favored evacuation,"^① why did the United States use its forces to protect the Nationalist forces on the islands? Scholars contend that losing the islands was equivalent to the United States losing its face; credibility of the US nuclear umbrella was at stake.^② Similarly, despite their traditional portrayal as warmongers, men in uniform appeared to be aware of the danger of nuclear weapons in the time of crisis. Joseph Ambrose Sestak cites the oral history of Admiral Harry D. Felt, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command during the crisis, who describes as follows:

It's true that at that time we had plans for use of tactical nuclear weapons. Most of us believed in those days that the use of tactical nuclear weapons wouldn't key off the big war, and we didn't have any plan to do it any other way. But when it became possible, or when the Joint Chiefs could see, "Gee, this might break out into a full-scale war here, with the United States right in the middle of it, we can't use those weapons," and they directed me to draw up a plan for use of conventional ones. And it was done.^③

Furthermore, Sestak finds that Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Burke directed a carrier group to Jinmen after observing increased Chinese troop activity in Fujian; once the shelling started, he sent the entire Seventh Fleet to the islands without prior approval of his civilian superiors. Using these cases, Sestak contends that Washington's control over the navy was weak, which allowed the naval forces in the Pacific to pursue its own initiatives "either in anticipation of or independent of Administration policy."^④

These findings highlight the importance of focusing on US military officials, particularly in the Navy, and their relations with their civilian superiors. As discussed, however, existing works do not tell us much about the role of military officials during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. By analyzing the recently leaked Department of Defense unabridged report conducted by Morton Halperin, who was then a RAND civilian contractor,^⑤ this study fills the academic gap as a history paper. The results show that Dulles's physical

① See He, "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the Offshore Islands," 237; and Fukuda, *China's Diplomacy and Taiwan*, 155.

② H.W. Brands, Jr., "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," *International Security* 12, no.4 (1988), 150; Tucker, "John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the 'Two China Policy,'" 252-253. The same argument was made and supported by military officials who worried about the "far reaching consequences" of losing face. See Brands, 127.

③ Joseph Ambrose Sestak, "The Seventh Fleet: A Study of Variance between Policy Directives and Military Force Postures" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1984), 21.

④ *Ibid.*, 68-71.

⑤ The abridged version has already been made public since 1975, but this time, Daniel Ellsberg, a former Defense Department insider, disclosed the report without any parts redacted. In this study, reference from the part redacted in the abridged version is denoted as "Redacted part" in the footnote. The unabridged version referred to by Savage and Junichi Fukuda are available from this link: <https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/1958-taiwan-straits-crisis-rand-halperin-ellsberg-unredacted/5a0106bdaea6ad38/full.pdf>. The abridged version is also available from the following link: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM4900.pdf.

absence from Washington while he was on vacation possibly impeded Washington's ability to determine how to inform the Chinese of their resolve to defend the islands even though both civilian and military leaders had made up their mind to protect the islands. The case demonstrates a deterrence failure, which could have been prevented had civilian officials, most importantly Dulles, perceived the sense of urgency much earlier.

Analysis

Dulles's Dullness and Chinese Miscalculation

Chinese optimists, notably Peng Dehuai, could be faulted for underestimating the US resolve to defend Jinmen; they incorrectly believed that the United States would not intervene and instead would force Nationalist forces to retreat from those islands. This time, it was impossible for the United States to repeat what they did during the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. In particular, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) felt compelled to resist Communist pressure. One of their concerns was the demoralizing effect on Nationalist forces; the JCS concluded that, although militarily of limited importance, the islands were politically and psychologically so important for Nationalists that their hope to return to the mainland hinged on their holding of the islands.^① Another concern, more importantly, was that the fall of these islands to the Communist hands would tarnish not only Nationalists but also the US reputation in East Asia. In contrast, the Communists were to "gain considerable prestige."^② Namely, US policymakers did not want to set an embarrassing precedent that the United States had yielded to military pressure from a communist force, which would amount to the loss of the US face not only in East Asia but also around the globe. Particularly, unilateral withdrawal was out of the question as far as the US prestige was concerned.

Indeed, on August 25, two days after the shelling had started, "no one," including Eisenhower, "disputed that the United States should assist the GRC [Government of the Republic of China] in its attempt to break the blockade of the Offshore Island."^③ Even Secretary Dulles, who often turned a cold shoulder to the Nationalists, seemed "to have been affected by the feeling that the United States had at least an implicit commitment to the Nationalists to defend the Offshore Islands."^④ The United States had assisted the Nationalists to defend the islands since the National Security Council paper (NSC 5723) approved in October 1957 stipulated that the United States should "[s]eek to preserve, through United Nations action if appropriate, the status quo of the GRC-held off-shore islands."^⑤ This created a sense of moral obligation

① M. H. Halperin, "The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History," *Rand Corporation*, (Washington D.C., 1966), 53.

② *Ibid.*, 53.

③ *Ibid.*, 119.

④ *Ibid.*, 119.

⑤ *Ibid.*, 45; See also "288. National Security Council Report," *Foreign Relations of The United States, 1955-1957, China 3*, U.S. Office of the Historian (1957).

to help the Nationalists defend the islands, particularly among military officials, which, according to Halperin, influenced Dulles as well.^①

The United States was quick to conclude that the Chinese intention was “to test American intentions.”^② Even before the crisis erupted, on August 8, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson argued that the Chinese buildup of air power in Fujian Province could be “the first of a series of probing actions designed to test GRC and American reactions.”^③ The military was even quicker to call for reinforcement. On August 1, the Commander of the Pacific Command Felt learned about the Chinese occupation of the airfield in Fujian Province. Then, on August 3, six F-100s were deployed to Taiwan; on August 5, the Chief of Naval Operations Burke directed an aircraft carrier strike group to the Taiwan Strait.^④ The JCS kept strengthening both US and Nationalist forces in the area prior to the outbreak of the crisis. Following the Navy, the Air Force went on alert for a possible Chinese attack on the islands; F-86s modified for Nationalist use were delivered to Taiwan by August 20.^⑤

An interesting fact is that the JCS advised the Defense Secretary, its civilian superior, of the steps already taken by the military on August 6.^⑥ The JCS also asked the Defense Secretary to “secure from the Secretary of State policy guidance”^⑦ in order to be better prepared for the Chinese attacks on the islands. The problem was, however, that Secretary Dulles went on a vacation (from August 13 to 22) before giving any clear policy guidance, and he had not attended any meetings held between August 9 to 21.^⑧ According to Halperin, this partially contributed to the mishaps that an NSC meeting held at the Pentagon on August 14, which turned to be the “last formal National Security Council meeting held to consider the crisis,”^⑨ was unable to provide any firm guidance to the involved parties. “The absence of Secretary of State Dulles from the meeting and from Washington,” Halperin concludes, “made it even more difficult to make any firm decisions.”^⑩

① Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History,” 199.

② Ibid., 52.

③ Ibid., 68.

④ It seemed that the JCS did approve the move, which implies that the Navy did not act on its own, fully independent of the JCS directives. Still, given Sestak’s argument, it appears reasonable to believe that the move was conducted without any directives given by civilian superiors.

⑤ Ibid., 63-64.

⑥ Ibid., 64.

⑦ Ibid., 66.

⑧ Ibid., 67, 75. The part on page 75 describing Dulles’s absence from Washington and its possible negative impact due to his vacation had been redacted in its entirety. Still, it is also important to note that the 91st page of the abridged version did briefly refer to the fact that Dulles had been on vacation and had not attended any meetings held between August 9 and 21. After attending the August 22 meeting, Dulles quickly returned taking a vacation and again had not returned to Washington until September 1. This is also mentioned on the page 104 of the abridged version of the report. Still, it is stunning to see that Halperin’s assessment of the possible negative impact of Dulles’s untimely vacation on the effectiveness of the U.S. decision-making process, which could be considered an embarrassment to Dulles, was hidden from public view.

⑨ Ibid., 74. On this page, only the footnote containing this quoted part was available in the abridged version.

⑩ Ibid., 75.

Therefore, it was August 22, the eve of the crisis, that high ranking US officials, including Dulles finally decided upon how the United States should send a signal to the Chinese.^① Ultimately, they chose to issue an oblique warning by sending a letter to the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Thomas Morgan and having Eisenhower publicly refer to the letter. The letter, which Morgan received on August 23, was essentially “very far towards satisfying the GRC request that he make a public statement that the United States would defend the Offshore Islands.”^② Even worse, the bombardment started before the letter had reached the Chinese, while Halperin concedes that “[i]t is impossible to say days earlier it have [sic] prevented the Chinese Communist attack.”^③

These records indicate that the center of the debate was not over whether the United States would defend the islands, but how they should warn the Chinese. While Dulles kept disliking the Nationalists,^④ in the August 22 meeting, he correctly argued that “the Chinese Communists would not start anything except by miscalculation.”^⑤ However, the same conclusion was already reached by his subordinate Marshall Green (Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern Affairs) on August 13, which called for “a strong stand in defense of the Offshore Islands”^⑥ The delay in deciding how to deliver a warning message to the Chinese was responsible for the outbreak of the crisis. Indeed, it was when Chinese military leaders and Mao discussed their upcoming war plans and chose to go to war.^⑦ In the meetings from August 21 to 22, Peng Dehuai remained optimistic that the attacks would not invite US intervention if their targets were confined to the coastal islands and eventually won Mao’s final approval.^⑧

Still, Mao was adamant about avoiding any direct exchange of fire with the US forces, as he even insisted on how the PLA would be able to avoid hurting US military advisors in Jinmen.^⑨ Indeed, before authorizing the attack on the islands on August 23, on August 18, Mao sent a letter to Peng, saying that China would be “dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and the Americans indirectly.”^⑩ Also, according to Wu Lengxi (a CCP Central Committee member), on August 25, Mao lectured Wu about the ongoing war plan, which is summarized by Wu as follows:

① Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History,” 91-94.

② Dulles in the letter just stated that “I think it would be highly hazardous for anyone to assume that if the Chinese were to attempt to change this situation by force and now to attack and seek to conquer these lands, that could be a limited operation. It would, I fear, constitute a threat to the peace of the area. Therefore, I hope and believe that it will not happen.” See Halperin, 95.

③ Ibid., 96.

④ Dulles doubted the willingness and the ability of the Nationalists to hold the islands by themselves and even went so far as to say that “he did not want to help the GRC if they would not fight to the death.” Ibid., 91.

⑤ Ibid., 92.

⑥ One of the options the memorandum considered was making “a clear declaration of intent to defend the Offshore Islands”. See Halperin, 71.

⑦ Madoka Fukuda says it was August 23 when Mao Zedong made the final decision and gave his generals a green light. See Fukuda, *China’s Diplomacy and Taiwan*, 146.

⑧ Ibid., 145.

⑨ Ibid., 145.

⑩ Instructions, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai,” *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Formation of the PRC)* 7 (1992); See also Fukuda, *China’s Diplomacy and Taiwan*, 145.

We were acting as circumstances dictated. We had to be doubly cautious, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was not a small matter because it had a bearing on much more important international issues. The problem was not the 95,000 Nationalist troops stationed there—this was easy to handle. The problem was how to assess the attitude of the American government. Washington had signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, however, did not clearly indicate whether the US defense perimeter included Jinmen and Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the Americans wanted to carry these two burdens on their backs.^①

Washington could have just told the Chinese what they wanted to know by simply sending a note directly or indirectly to indicate the US will to defend the islands. This idea was, however, turned down in the August 22 meeting, where participants concluded that doing so “might be taken by the Chinese Communists as a desire to negotiate and therefore as a sign of weakness.”^② Furthermore, they worried that doing so could invite intense criticism from US allies and the general public, given that the US policymakers believed that the US commitment to the islands would be unpopular.^③ It is hard to judge whether this particular US decision was appropriate, yet there is no doubt that US policymakers wasted considerable time and squandered many chances to warn the Chinese even after witnessing Chinese military buildup, which tempted the Chinese to test the US resolve.

China Barely Avoiding Nuclear Strikes

This section demonstrates the gap between the Navy and the Air Force during the initial stage of the crisis, in which the Navy plan ultimately prevailed, and the United States chose not to go nuclear. While it was correct that the Navy was not as eager as the Air Force to use nuclear weapons, it did not mean that Air Force generals were simply more reckless than their Navy counterparts. The reality was more nuanced; the admirals were more optimistic that conventional weapons would suffice to achieve their duty to break the Chinese blockade even without nuclear weapons, while the Air Force generals were more pessimistic that they thought it impossible to carry out their own mission without nuclear weapons.

It was Nathan F. Twining, an Air Force general and the chairman of the JCS, who concluded on August 12 that “U.S air and sea cover would be sufficient to break the blockade.”^④ Still, Twining considered nuclear weapons necessary to “defeat an invasion attempt.”^⑤ Heightened tension in the area led the Navy to draft a paper on August 24, which was soon approved by the JCS and brought up to the President. It

① “Memoir by Wu Lengxi, ‘Inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen.’” History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, *Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature)*, no.1 (1994): 3.

② Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History,” 92.

③ *Ibid.*, 122.

④ *Ibid.*, 87.

⑤ *Ibid.*, 87.

stated, “attacks on the mainland may have to be initially conventional for political reasons.”^① In response to the August 24 Navy paper, in the August 25 meeting, the President and the JCS concluded that “[i]t is probable that initially only conventional weapons will be authorized, but prepare to use atomic weapons to extend deeper into Chinese Communist territory if necessary.”^②

The August 25 meeting’s decision to not go nuclear in the initial stage dismayed certain segments of the Pacific Command, notably General Laurence S. Kuter, Commander of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).^③ After this meeting, both the Commander of the Pacific Command (CINCPAC) and PACAF demonstrated their different understanding over the “possible role of a conventional defense.”^④ According to Kuter, Admiral Felt did oppose the President’s order not to go nuclear unless told to do so, yet Kuter criticized that Felt’s opposition lacked “vehemence.” The report notes, this difference plagued “relations between Admiral Felt and General Kuter”^⑤ throughout the crisis. Kuter, “in no uncertain terms,” claimed that it is impossible to protect the islands from “a massive invasion by conventional means.”^⑥ Felt, on the other hand, was not completely dismissive of their conventional capability to defend the islands.^⑦

This indicates that a Chinese landing on the islands was likely to invite US nuclear attacks if Eisenhower had made up his mind to defend the islands at any cost. It is important to note that on August 14, Twining concluded that “the United States would have to use nuclear weapons against Chinese air bases to prevent a successful air interdiction by the Chinese campaign,”^⑧ which would have been started off with “low-yield ten to fifteen kiloton” tactical nuclear attacks on the Chinese airfields in the Amoy area.^⑨ If Chinese attacks had continued, Twining argued, there would have been “no alternative but to conduct nuclear strikes deep into China as far north as Shanghai.”^⑩ Given these assessments, it was highly likely that the Air Force would have asked for the President’s permission for nuclear strikes had the conflict escalated by Chinese invasion on the islands or even an air combat of Chinese and US planes. Mao could be credited for avoiding this, although it should also be noted that such a risky political maneuver vis-a-vis the United States was probably not the only option available to China.

① Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History,” 109.

② Ibid., 113.

③ Ibid., 127.

④ Ibid., 139.

⑤ Ibid., 139.

⑥ Ibid., 141.

⑦ Ibid., 141.

⑧ Ibid., 77.

⑨ Ibid., 77.

⑩ Ibid., 77. Still, Kuter called for limiting nuclear attacks to Chinese air bases. See Halperin, 85; and Savage, “Risk of Nuclear War Over Taiwan in 1958 Said to Be Greater Than Publicly Known.”

China's Missed Opportunity to Challenge US-Japan Relations

The unabridged report also shows that while the US military leaders did not think the use of bases in Japan was necessary at the early phase of nuclear attacks on Chinese bases, they did not rule out the possibility that bases in Japan would be needed for “a long drawn-out conventional operation.”^① This idea was prescribed in Operations Plan 25-28 (hereafter OPS PLAN 25-28), which was released on May 16, 1958 as a new guideline for the subordinate commands of CINCPAC in the event of attacks in the Taiwan Strait. One of the key assumptions of OPS PLAN 25-28 was that Japan would oppose the US use of bases and facilities in Japan “unless Japan itself were directly threatened.”^②

Still, US military leaders were careful not to alienate its allies. The paper drafted by Navy OP-61, a branch dedicated to political military affairs within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,^③ states that “[t]he Chinese must be recognized as aggressive by world opinion lest allies (Japan, Philippines) may not support the United States and may deny the use of bases.”^④ Furthermore, the US Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II reported on August 18 that a certain segment of the Japanese government started raising concerns over the mounting tension in the Taiwan Strait. Then, Ambassador MacArthur II cautioned Washington that it would be possible to have “a Japanese request not to use US bases in Japan for military operations.”^⑤ Once the crisis erupted, the State Department instructed MacArthur II to let Prime Minister Kishi know that the US forces would use materials stored in Japan; additionally, MacArthur II was also instructed “not to convey the impression that the United States felt that Japan had any control over the disposition of military equipment or its removal from Japan.”^⑥ Based on his observations, Halperin concludes that “[t]hroughout the crisis the United States was to be sensitive to Japanese opposition to a defense of Quemoy and to move cautiously in the use of equipment from Japan.”^⑦

What these US behaviors imply is that, in retrospect, the Chinese could have exploited the potential schism between the United States and Japan. China, however, had not taken this path. Indeed, China's door for dialogue with Kishi's administration had been shut since the “flag issue” arose on May 2, 1958. The backdrop of this was the ratification of the Fourth Japan-China Nongovernmental Trade Agreement, which took place in March 1958. This event infuriated Jiang Jieshi and nearly ended the relationship between Japan and the Nationalist government. To mollify Jiang's anger, Kishi chose to send a letter to Jiang that

① Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History,” 86. One of the significant facts known to us by the disclosure of the unabridged report is that all the parts referred to in this paper pertaining to U.S. policy toward Japan had been previously redacted.

② Ibid., 50.

③ Ibid., vi, 109.

④ Ibid., 109. It is important to note that the only part redacted on page 109 was paragraph (3), the quoted part dedicated to the U.S. concern regarding the reactions of Japan and the Philippines.

⑤ Ibid., 86.

⑥ Ibid., 126.

⑦ Ibid., 126.

would assure him of “Japan’s continued non-recognition of the PRC” and of “Japan’s refusal to grant the China’s representative office’s right to fly the national flag.”^① This, in return, infuriated the Communists. What followed in May 1958 was the so-called Nagasaki Flag Incident, in which the red Chinese flag flown at a postage stamp exhibition event was taken down by right wing activists, who were soon to be released by the police.^② The seemingly mild Japanese response was interpreted as Japan’s utter dismissal of the PRC as a sovereign state.^③ China retaliated by renegeing on the newly made trade agreement with Japan, stopping trade with Japan altogether, and refusing any further talks with Kishi’s government.^④

This was China’s strategy, according to Yasuyuki Sugiura, to temporarily freeze Sino-Japanese relations in the hope of encouraging the Japanese public and pro-Chinese segments to pressure Kishi’s government. It was not successful, however, as Kishi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) kept majority in the lower house election on May 22.^⑤

China could have re-adjusted its Japan policy after the Japanese election. Even inside the conservative LDP leadership, there existed some politicians supporting the Nongovernmental Trade Agreement, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Aichi and LDP Party Secretary Kawashima.^⑥ China missed the opportunity to revive the Agreement as a “carrot” to induce Japan’s refusal to support the US defense of Jinmen or even opposition to it. Had China won the Japanese opposition to US intervention (even though it was unlikely given Kishi was, as Caster Wits puts, “the most pro-Taiwan of all Japanese Prime Ministers to date”),^⑦ it would have been a political blow to the US policymakers and military planners, possibly impairing their freedom of action in the time of crisis.

Conclusion

Halperin’s unabridged report leaked by Daniel Ellsberg is a highly comprehensive, rich collection of US internal documents throughout the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The unprecedentedly detailed report on the US deliberation process provides us with an answer to the question of why China launched attacks on the islands. It was essentially US clumsiness that constrained their ability to promptly warn China not to attack the islands. The military should not be blamed for “being autonomous”—civilian leaders, particularly Dulles, can be faulted for not giving generals clear instructions earlier. Consequently, while Mao’s gambit

① “‘We Won’t Recognize China,’ Prime Minister to Send Letter to President Jiang,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 15, 1958.

② Yasuyuki Sugiura, “China’s ‘Policy of Neutralizing Japan and View on Japan’s Situation with a Focus on the Negotiating Process over the Fourth Sino-Japanese Private Trade Agreement and the Nagasaki National Flag Incident,” *Asian Studies* 54, no.4 (2008): 78; Casper Wits, “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958: Steps Toward Reconciliation,” *Doshisha Global Studies* 5 (2014): 121-122.

③ Wits, “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958: Steps Toward Reconciliation,” 122.

④ *Ibid.*, 122; Sugiura, “China’s ‘Policy of Neutralizing Japan’ and View on Japan’s Situation,” 80-81.

⑤ Sugiura, “China’s ‘Policy of Neutralizing Japan and View on Japan’s Situation,” 79-81.

⑥ “Negotiation with the Nationalist Government in Stalemate,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 20, 1958.

⑦ Wits, “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Year 1958: Steps Toward Reconciliation,” 127.

did not lead to a nuclear war, it does not mean the decision was a safe option. A more strongly worded letter from Dulles could have deterred cautious Mao from siding with Peng Dehuai, possibly discouraging China from launching attacks on the Jinmen Islands.

Even if it was inevitable for China to proceed with their limited war plan on the islands, China could have utilized diplomatic means to isolate Washington from its allies, Japan most notably. There was a great economic incentive for Japan to resume trade with China, on which China could have capitalized. Even though it is impossible to prove such a counterfactual argument, it was worth trying for the Chinese to drive a wedge between the United States and Japan. If they had succeeded, there would have been a substantially different political landscape in East Asia.

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China-Kenya Cooperation on Sustainable Growth in the Post-Pandemic Era

A Case Study on the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR

Anqing Zhao

Introduction

China and Kenya have had a long history of beneficial relations. China-Kenya diplomatic relations were established in 1963 and signed bilateral trade agreements in 1978. In the 1980s, China built the Moi International Sports Center in Kenya, which cost 200 million RMB. China's aid and investment in Kenya has further increased in the past two decades. Kenya adopted the "Look East" foreign policy around 2006, making it possible for Chinese players to enter the Kenyan market. As China put forward the Belt and Road Initiative and expanded it into Africa, Kenya became an essential pivot for China in East Africa.

Nowadays, China is the largest trading partner of Kenya, the largest source country of contracted project companies in Kenya, and the country that provides most concessional loans to Kenya. As more and more infrastructure projects were undertaken in the framework of the BRI, speculation and criticism arose concerning China's construction projects in Kenya, especially towards those with strategic significance. The most frequently mentioned is Kenya's debt burden brought by the Chinese aids and loans. In 2018, China was Kenya's largest lender and 72% of Kenyan bilateral debts were owned by China. The massive amount of debt is not China's intention but is a result of the characteristics of Chinese infrastructure projects in Kenya. Compared with other sectors, such as manufacturing, infrastructure needs a longer term to make a profit. However, the debt generated by China's projects has become a major obstacle to the China-Kenya relationship, as well as China's reputation inside and outside Africa. Meanwhile, the outbreak of COVID-19 and its impact on China's profile in the international arena has made it more necessary for China to find a way out of this situation.

Mombasa-Nairobi SGR and Chinese-Owed Debt in Kenya

In 2011, Kenya signed a memorandum of understanding with the China Road & Bridge Corporation (CRBC) to build a standard-gauge railway between Mombasa and Nairobi. The US \$3.6 billion railway was the largest infrastructure project in Kenya since independence. Financing was finalized in May 2014, with the Exim Bank of China, extending a loan for 90 percent of the project cost and the remaining 10 percent coming from the Kenyan government. For the total US \$3.2 billion loan, the Exim advanced the loan amount in two loans of equal amount. One of the loans was a foreign aid loan on a concessional basis,

and the other was a below-market rate preferential export buyer's credit. Tracklaying was completed in December 2016. Passenger service was officially inaugurated on 31 May 2017. The Kenyan government rejected a planned international tender on the railway operation and contracted the mother company of CRBC to operate the line for its first five years, because of the loan condition by Exim Bank that the railway should be operated by an operator acceptable to the bank for the initial phase of operations.

The standard-gauge railway (SGR) operates both passenger and cargo services. In July 2021, the Mombasa–Nairobi SGR celebrated its 1,500 days since the operations. The modern train service has been at the forefront of Kenya's socio-economic transformation in the last four years. A total of 5,415,000 passengers have been ferried between Nairobi and Mombasa in the last 1,500 days since the SGR commenced operations, and the operator estimates 1.8 million commuters could use the service this year. While passengers embrace it for reducing travel time compared to buses, cargo owners shun it for reasons including higher fees and tariffs, additional time clearing goods, and a lack of last-mile delivery, when compared to trucks. Since the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR has been in operation in 2017, its operator Africa Star Railway Operation's expenditure has always exceeded revenue, and Kenyan taxpayer money has had to fill the gap to sustain the company's operations.^①

In 2018, documents tabled by Kenyan Transport Ministry revealed that the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR averaged a monthly loss of Sh750.7 million in its first six-month operation, mainly due to low cargo business.^② With no extra profits to repay the debt, the SGR became one of several avatars for Chinese-owed debt in Africa. In May 2020, three years since the railway officially operated, the railway netted Sh25.03 billion in revenue over the period against operational costs totaling Sh46.71 billion, posting a combined operating loss of Sh21.68 billion. The Kenya Railways Company (KRC) was faced with a default on an estimated Sh40 billion payout to China's Africa Star Railway Operation Company, which runs both passenger and cargo services on the SGR, due to the operating loss.^③ In December 2019, China was Kenya's largest bilateral lender, with loans of \$6.37 billion generated by a range of different agreements.

Impact of COVID-19 on the China–Kenya Debt Problem

The COVID-19 pandemic has hit Kenya's government revenue and limited its access to the commercial loan market. In 2020, there was a slight contraction of 0.1% in the Kenyan economy, but it has been picking

① Carlos Mureithi, "Kenya's expensive Chinese-built railway is racking up losses even as loans come due," *Quartz Africa*, October 9, 2020, <https://qz.com/africa/1915399/kenyas-chinese-built-sgr-railway-racks-up-losses-as-loans-due/> (accessed December 16, 2021).

② Lee Mwiti, "SGR makes Sh10 billion loss in first year," *The Saturday Standard*, July 18, 2018, <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/business/article/2001288487/sgr-makes-sh10-billion-loss-in-first-year#> (accessed December 16, 2021).

③ John Mutua, "SGR reveals Sh21bn loss as China firm debt rises," *Business Daily*, September 9, 2020, <https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/sgr-reveals-sh21bn-loss-as-china-firm-debt-rises-2300880> (accessed December 16, 2021).

up since then. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast an economic growth of 7.6% in 2021 and 5.7% in 2022, but said Kenya continued to face challenges on durable growth, as its past gains in poverty reduction had been reversed. This pressure forced Kenya to turn to the World Bank and the IMF for direct budgetary financing, which it had kept away from during the administration of former President Mwai Kibaki, who preferred project support. Now, the cash flow situation, which is marked by flat revenues and worsening debt service obligations, has forced the country to return to these loans with conditions attached to them. In May 2020, the IMF raised the country's risk of debt distress to "high" from "moderate" due to the impact of the pandemic, "which exacerbated existing vulnerabilities."^① According to the IMF, Kenya's debt was 65.7% of its GDP by the end of June 2020.^②

Kenya's economic difficulties during the pandemic further raised the tension between China and Kenya in terms of the operation of the Chinese-built SGR and related debts. The Kenyan officials have been recommending the government renegotiate the SGR operation agreement. In October 2020, the Kenyan Departmental Committee on transport, public works and housing tabled a report in parliament regarding the operation of the SGR. The Committee proposed that the government should set up an open, nondiscriminatory policy that allows private investors to provide rail transport services through private trains and locomotives, in order to increase competitiveness and promote a stopover economy along the railway line. The Committee also proposed that private sectors should be involved to solve the last-distance connectivity, and that they should be allowed to extend the railway line to their respective yards. For the operation of the railway, the Committee suggested that the government renegotiate the current operation agreement by reducing the operations costs by at least 50%, and the terms of the Chinese loan for the SGR "due to the prevailing economic distress occasioned by the effects of Covid 19."^③ Ethiopia, another recipient of Chinese infrastructure loans, has also renegotiated its Chinese railway loans due to its economic struggle during the pandemic.

Kenya's potential incapacity to repay the China-owned loans caused further suspicion that China would take the Mombasa Port as compensation. Mombasa Port is among the most strategic assets in Kenya, and it generated \$480 million in revenues and \$125 million in profits in 2019. Back in November 2018, there had been reports on how Kenya is at high risk of losing strategic assets over huge Chinese debt. This anxiety came from former cases that the Sri Lankan government transformed the 99-year lease period of the

① Jackson Okoth, "IMF Raises Kenya's Risk of Debt Distress to High from Moderate," *The Kenyan Wall Street*, May 16, 2020, <https://kenyanwallstreet.com/imf-raises-kenyas-risk-of-debt-distress-to-high-from-moderate/> (accessed December 16, 2021).

② David Herbling, "Kenya Faces External-Debt Distress on Lower Export Receipts," *Bloomberg*, September 11, 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-11/kenya-sees-external-debt-distress-risk-on-lower-export-receipts> (accessed December 16, 2021).

③ Departmental Committee on Transport, Public Works and Housing, *Report on the Inquiry into the use of the Standard Gauge Railway*, Report to the National Assembly, September 22, 2020 (Nairobi: Departmental Committee on Transport, Public Works and Housing, 2020).

Hambantota Port to China because it failed to show commitment in the payment of billions of dollars in loans in December 2017, as well as the case of Zambia Kaunda International Airport in 2018. The loss of the SGR in its first year of operation intensified this anxiety.

The worries around claims that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is nothing more than Chinese debt diplomacy to secure strategic assets reached a crescendo at the end of 2019. The central claim is that China engages in "debt for asset" swaps to ensure control of strategic assets along the BRI. The African Stand reported that Kenya might lose the lucrative Mombasa Port and the Inland Container Depot in Nairobi should Kenya fail to repay Chinese loans, and that thousands of port workers "would be forced to work under Chinese lenders."^① These arguments are reasonable to some extent, since some sources reported that Kenya has used Mombasa Port assets as security for the SGR directly linking debt repayments to assets. The loan agreement specifically waived Kenya's sovereign immunity on these ports' assets. However, in 2021, the Kenyan National Treasury cabinet secretary Ukur Yatani said that Kenya did not offer the strategic national asset as collateral for the Chinese loan, and that the port had no adverse exposure to any lender or category of lenders through existing loan agreements with the government.^② Though he maintained the government is servicing the SGR loans, the runaway public debt led to mounting concerns that Kenya might default on its loan obligations, a risk that could expose the port to seizure by China.

Outlook for China–Kenya Sustainable Cooperation in Infrastructure

The COVID-19 pandemic has created an unfavorable context for China-Kenya cooperation. The pandemic affected Kenyan economic growth and made it more vulnerable to public debt. More specifically, on the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR, the railway made even less profit during the pandemic because of decreasing passenger services and cargo demand. There is also obvious turbulence in the international arena, China has been faced with more hostility and rivals globally, which hurts China's reputation around the world. Therefore, China needs to be cautious to its next move in Kenya, for a breakthrough in China-Kenya relations and China's global reputation.

Further China-Kenya cooperation should be focused on Kenya's comprehensive and sustainable economic growth. Connectivity is essential but the goods, information, and people flow along the connectivity facilitates are equally important. Taking the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR as an example, it is now creating a loss because there is not enough cargo for railway transportation and insufficient manufacturing industry and supporting facilities along the way. The railway may solve Kenyan connectivity problem but

① "China to take over Kenya's main port over unpaid huge Chinese loan," *Hellenic Shipping News*, November 22, 2019, <https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/china-to-take-over-kenyas-main-port-over-unpaid-huge-chinese-loan/> (accessed December 16, 2021).

② Njiraini Muchira, "Kenya: China Cannot Seize Port of Mombasa if Debt Default Occurs," *The Maritime Executive*, March 16, 2021, <https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/kenya-china-cannot-seize-port-of-mombasa-if-debt-default-occurs> (accessed December 16, 2021).

did not solve its productivity challenge. Moreover, the debts may further hinder Kenya's investments in productivity. Therefore, in the case of Mombasa-Nairobi SGR, China should help Kenya to boost the economy along the railway and combine connectivity with productivity to generate maintainable profits. Also, China may help to solve the last-distance connectivity problem with Kenyans, in order to make its investments and loans more effective.

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