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Child Soldiers
Lessons from the Civil War in Sierra Leone (1991–2002)

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Introduction

The exploitation of children in armed conflicts represents one of the six violations of international law recognized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[①] Although the United Nations (UN) and the international community have officially condemned the recruitment of "child soldiers,"[②] hundreds of thousands of minors are still being assassinated, sexually assaulted, and maimed in ongoing conflicts across the globe today.[③]

The recruitment of minors represents a serious problem, which has gained momentum over time and encouraged international cooperation. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has raised concerns about the possibility of former child soldiers becoming a "lost generation,"[④] that is too traumatized to function properly in a post-conflict context.[⑤] On behalf of UNICEF, this report is addressed to the international community, revealing key lessons drawn from the ongoing debates in the existing literature across disciplines on child soldiering. Accordingly, the question that this policy paper aims to investigate is:

What can the international community do to stop the recruitment of children in armed conflicts?

In order to better understand this phenomenon, the case of the Civil War in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) is introduced to understand the dynamics that lead to child soldiering. In fact, Sierra Leone represents an emblematic case for two main reasons: (1) for the first time, individuals involved in the forced recruitment of children in armed forces were tried and found guilty by an international court; (2) many leading scholars

① Ferguson, Sarah. "UNICEF Is Working to Free Child Soldiers Around the World." *UNICEF USA*, June 9, 2020. https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/unicef-working-free-child-soldiers-around-world/35474 (accessed December 11, 2021).
② In order to address the contested interpretations on the conceptualization of 'child soldiers,' in 2007, UNICEF announced its standard definition: "a 'child soldier' is any child – boy or girl- under 18 years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family members." Roos Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," *Third World Quarterly* 40, no.1 (2019): 85.
③ Ferguson, "UNICEF Is Working to Free Child Soldiers Around the World."
④ UNICEF, *Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict* (New York, NY: UNICEF, 2003).
⑤ Roos Haer and Tobias Böhmelt, "Child soldiers as time bombs? Adolescents' participation in rebel groups and the recurrence of armed conflict," *European Journal of International Relations* 22, no.2 (2016): 409.

in conflict resolution have analyzed the causes and the consequences of child soldiering through ethnographic studies and interviews with former child soldiers who fought during the Civil War in Sierra Leone.

The paper is structured in the following way. First, the historical background of the Civil War in Sierra Leone is briefly summarized. Second, the current situation with a focus on *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (DDR) programs is explained. Third, the current interdisciplinary debates on the reasons behind child soldiering are illustrated. Fourth, an analysis of the shortcomings of existing explanations is proposed and some policy suggestions are put forward. Finally, some conclusions are drawn from the case of Sierra Leone to shed light on the larger debate on child soldiers, discussing how the international community can continue to prevent this problem from happening around the world.

Executive Summary

Since 1999, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has labelled the exploitation of child soldiers as one of the "predefined worst forms of child labor."[①] According to the current estimates, almost 300,000 children are conscripted worldwide, with the majority being recruited in developing countries, especially in the sub-Saharan region in Africa.[②]

Precisely, the recruitment of children into armed forces indicates the forced, mandatory or voluntary enlistment of children in any sort of armed group.[③] In particular, the tasks and roles for girls and boys can differ greatly, including serving as combatants, cooks, spies, messengers or sex slaves.[④] Regardless of a "near-universal condemnation from the international community,"[⑤] soaring numbers of youth are continuously being enlisted into governmental military organizations, militias and rebel groups, and the phenomenon has become especially acute over the past few decades.[⑥]

In this regard, the historical case of child soldiers during Sierra Leone's Civil War (1991-2002) can shed light on this intricate issue. Some valuable lessons can be drawn from the eleven-year intrastate conflict in Sierra Leone: first, perpetrators can be held accountable for their actions and be punished by law; second, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like UNICEF, have to continue to cooperate with local authorities to jointly create programs to reintegrate former child soldiers back into society.

The issue of children recruited as soldiers has gained increasing attention over time, leading to the creation of new international regulations to protect minors from forced conscription. For instance, "the

① Alexandre J. Vautravers, "Why child soldiers are such a complex issue," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 27, no.4 (2009): 97.
② Ibid., 96.
③ UNICEF, "Six grave violations against children in times of war," *UNICEF*, August 26, 2021. https://www.unicef.org/stories/children-under-attack-six-grave-violations-against-children-times-war (accessed December 3, 2021).
④ Ibid.
⑤ UNICEF, *Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict*.
⑥ Haer and Böhmelt, "Child soldiers as time bombs?" 409.

protection and welfare of child soldiers also is now being included in the international community's peace and security agenda through several UN Security Council resolutions."[①] While the existing literature acknowledges the gradual progress at the international level, much more work has to be done at the local level. Hence, this policy paper suggests the following key messages: it is important to (1) understand the causes to find a common narrative to child soldiering as a global phenomenon; (2) implement recovery and reintegration strategies for former child soldiers; (3) prevent child soldiering as a by-product of deeper structural problems by monitoring ongoing disputes and post-conflict stability in failed states; (4) have a more targeted and locally-focused international response.

Historical Background

The decade-long Civil War of Sierra Leone officially started in 1991, but already in the decades preceding to 1991, a series of triggering events led to the escalation to armed conflict.[②] After being a former colony under British rule for over a century, Sierra Leone gained its national independence in 1961.[③] During the post-colonial period, the political and economic powers were concentrated in the hands of a kleptocratic governing elite: corruption and mismanagement steadily led to long-term economic stagnation, high rates of unemployment, the gradual decline of civil society[④] and the collapse of the educational system.[⑤]

In brief, due to a vicious cycle of institutional failure and gradual impoverishment, the civic institutions of Sierra Leone had been replaced by militarized entities, who performed aberrant acts of violence.[⑥] Hence, it is commonly argued that the Civil War in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) stemmed from deeply rooted institutional problems accumulated since its colonial past under British rule, followed by its strenuous post-colonial integration process in the modern international system.[⑦]

Afterwards, the tensions in the country were further exacerbated in March 1991, when the conflict in neighboring Liberia spread to Sierra Leone.[⑧] As a reaction to state corruption and repression, together with the widespread resentment due to high levels of youth unemployment, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) came into being, which was a militarized resistance movement considered the main rebel group that

① Neil Boothby, "What happens when child soldiers grow up? The Mozambique case study," *Intervention* 4, no.3 (2006): 244.
② Amber Pariona, "Civil War In Sierra Leone And The Role Of 'Blood Diamonds,'" *World Atlas*, April 25, 2017. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/civil-war-in-sierra-leone-the-role-of-sierra-leone-s-blood-diamonds.html (accessed December 11, 2021).
③ Ibid.
④ Myriam Denov and Richard Maclure, "Turnings and Epiphanies: Militarization, Life Histories, and the Making and Unmaking of Two Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone," *Journal of Youth Studies* 10, no.2 (2007): 245.
⑤ Pariona, "Civil War In Sierra Leone And The Role Of 'Blood Diamonds.'"
⑥ Denov and Maclure, "Turnings and Epiphanies: Militarization, Life Histories, and the Making and Unmaking of Two Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone," 245.
⑦ Ibid., 245.
⑧ Christopher Fyfe, "Sierra Leone: Civil War and Post-Civil War," *Brittanica*, March 10, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone/Civil-war (accessed December 3, 2021).

triggered the civil war.[①] In this regard, the conflict officially broke out on March 23, 1991, once the RUF troops invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia.[②]

The RUF was led by a former Sierra Leonean army corporal, Foday Sankoh, and Liberian warlord Charles Taylor. The initial goal of the RUF was to be a movement to promote freedom and democracy in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, Sankoh's vision did not receive much public support and the RUF's mission soon incorporated "the goals of wealth, power and control of the country's diamond mines."[③] Interestingly, some scholars argue for "resource curse" being the cause of the civil war:[④] while the existing scholarship has contrasting views whether this was the case, it is commonly acknowledged that "blood diamonds" were highly indispensable during the conflict, as "an invaluable funding source to sustain the RUF's warfare."[⑤] To sum up, what started as a dispersed group of dissatisfied youth rapidly turned into "an increasingly militarist and rapacious organization that embarked on a decade-long campaign of terror and indiscriminate brutality" targeting civilians.[⑥]

The Civil War was officially declared over in January 2002, with an estimated toll reaching up to at least 50,000 casualties, hundreds of thousands of individuals suffering from the widespread violence and another 2,000,000 displaced people.[⑦] In the aftermath, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was jointly established by the UN and the local government, with the mission of trying "those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law during the conflict in Sierra Leone."[⑧]

In June 2007, the Special Court for Sierra Leone started the trial of former Liberian president Charles Taylor. He was accused of "crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law committed in Sierra Leone, including the recruitment and use in hostilities of child soldiers under the age of fifteen."[⑨] Former President Taylor went on trial in the Dutch city of The Hague by a trial chamber of the Special Court, in order to avoid the possible insurgence of local disruptions in case he was tried in West Africa.[⑩] In April 2012, Taylor was sentenced to fifty years in prison for committing war

① Se Young Jang, "The Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War," *E-International Relations*, October 25, 2012. https://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/25/the-causes-of-the-sierra-leone-civil-war-underlying-grievances-and-the-role-of-the-revolutionary-united-front/ (accessed December 3, 2021), 2.
② Ibid., 8.
③ Denov and Maclure, "Turnings and Epiphanies: Militarization, Life Histories, and the Making and Unmaking of Two Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone," 246.
④ Pariona, "Civil War In Sierra Leone And The Role Of 'Blood Diamonds.'"
⑤ Jang, "The Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War," 3.
⑥ Denov and Maclure, "Turnings and Epiphanies: Militarization, Life Histories, and the Making and Unmaking of Two Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone," 246.
⑦ Fyfe, "Sierra Leone: Civil War and Post-Civil War."
⑧ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, London. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/67012B7F8EB991888525744F0069863A-Child%20Soldiers%20Global%20Report%202008.pdf (accessed November 25, 2021), 300.
⑨ Ibid., 297.
⑩ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, 214.

crimes and crimes against humanity, since he was found guilty for providing support to the rebel forces behind those crimes.①

More importantly, the Special Court of Sierra Leone had sentenced another three former commanders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) to between forty-five and fifty years of imprisonment as a punishment for their crimes, including the use of child soldiers.② This represented a historic milestone, as it was the first time that an international criminal tribunal punished individuals for recruiting children in armed combats.③ Remarkably, children had explicitly been ruled out from being tried, as the Court considered children both as the perpetrators and victims of political violence: as such, single individuals could not bear sole responsibility.④

In conclusion, the militarization and prolonged fighting in Sierra Leone had significantly affected the local youth, as many children were forcefully recruited to be part of paramilitary forces or the RUF.⑤ Since 2002, joint efforts from the government and the international community have annihilated the RUF, launching an operation of demilitarization⑥ and engaging in post-conflict stability projects.

Current Situation

Regarding the case of the Civil War in Sierra Leone, much of the scholarly attention has been devoted to the forced recruitment of child soldiers by the RUF and their extremely aggressive actions targeting civilians.⑦ Thousands of minors had to forcibly participate in violent acts, many times after being coerced, abducted or threatening their families.⑧ The child soldiers were then groomed in extremely violent conditions, for instance, having to "perform violent raids against their own villages in order to prove their loyalty to the movement"⑨ and being forced to "carry mass mutilations,"⑩ among others. However, there is no consensus on the precise number of enlisted children in the war and the current estimated figures change based on the agencies.[11] For example, UNICEF estimated 6,000 children conscripted into the conflict, while the data from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) rounded up to 10,000 minors.[12]

① Fyfe, "Sierra Leone: Civil War and Post-Civil War."
② Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Child Soldiers: Global Report* 2008, 300.
③ Ibid., 300.
④ Ibid., 300.
⑤ Arthur Abraham, "Dancing with the chameleon: Sierra Leone and the elusive quest for peace," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 19, no.2 (2001): 205-28.
⑥ Denov and Maclure, "Turnings and Epiphanies: Militarization, Life Histories, and the Making and Unmaking of Two Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone," 246.
⑦ Jang, "The Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War," 1.
⑧ Pariona, "Civil War In Sierra Leone And The Role Of 'Blood Diamonds.'"
⑨ Ibid.
⑩ Pariona, "Civil War In Sierra Leone And The Role Of 'Blood Diamonds.'"
11 Jang, "The Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War," 1.
12 Ibid., 1.

Despite the war ending almost two decades ago, many minds of Sierra Leoneans are still deeply scarred. After the war, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration* (DDR) programs were introduced to help the reintegration of former combatants into their communities. The DDR programs are divided into three phases to assist the removal of combatants from military contexts and their reintegration into society.

First, the disarmament stage aims to downsize the armed forces, by gathering information on their profile and the quantity, location, and type of weaponry at their disposal. At a later stage, the ex-combatants are reunited and transferred to disarmament locations, where their arms are voluntarily surrendered and either stored, moved elsewhere or completely destroyed.[①] Second, the combatants are separated from their "command and control structures."[②] After a screening procedure, the combatants get official discharge papers as a proof of their past military activity, their current approval for demobilization and their follow-up reintegration process. For instance, they can be provided with monetary support by means of cash to pay for their immediate basic needs.[③] Third, the most delicate phase is the reintegration stage, where former combatants undergo a series of activities to gradually readjust to a civilian lifestyle. In particular, the final stage of the DDR program encompasses support activities such as "counseling, health check-ups, 'catch-up' education, microcredits, and public works projects."[④]

For former child soldiers who are still minors when they enter the DDR program, the procedure is similar to the one for former adult combatants. However, they receive special attention on educational and recreational activities, counseling and psychological services and different types of life-skills training.[⑤] Indeed, much attention is dedicated to the treatment of trauma following war and disaster, where youth post-conflict programs focus on psychosocial care.[⑥] Their reintegration stage begins at the Interim Care Centers, which are temporary facilities to assist NGOs to have enough time to prepare their families and communities to welcome back the children.[⑦] All in all, much emphasis is put into raising awareness on this problem, so to fight the stigma surrounding former child soldiers. Accordingly, local communities also receive targeted assistance to empower them to look after the youth.[⑧]

① Roos Haer, "The Study of Child Soldiering: Issues and Consequences for DDR Implementation," *Third World Quarterly* 38, no.2 (2017): 451.
② Ibid., 451.
③ World Bank, "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," *Social Development Department. Conflict, Crime & Violence*, February 2009.
https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/776831468324547527/pdf/514150NWP0DDR0no01190Box342027B01PUBLIC1.pdf (accessed December 11, 2021).
④ Haer, "The Study of Child Soldiering: Issues and Consequences for DDR Implementation," 451-52.
⑤ Ibid., 452.
⑥ Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, "The consequences of child soldiering," Review of Economics and Statistics 92, no.4 (2010): 883.
⑦ Haer, "The Study of Child Soldiering: Issues and Consequences for DDR Implementation," 452.
⑧ Inter-Agency Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Working Group (IDDRWG), "Children and DDR," *Better Care Network*, October 4, 2005. https://bettercarenetwork.org/sites/default/files/Children%20and%20DDR.pdf (accessed December 3, 2021).

Debates

The unsolved dilemma of child soldiering has aroused the curiosity of both scholars and policy analysts alike, opening a heated debate regarding the causes behind this phenomenon that still affects numerous communities in developing regions around the world. Among the literature on child soldiers, this section presents a key publication titled *the Machel Report*, and the debate around the notion of agency. Subsequently, the supply and demand sides of child soldiering are mentioned to explain the main causes leading to the forced recruitment of minors in armed conflicts: first from the perspective of children (5.2.), then from the perspective of recruiters (5.3.).

The Machel Report and the Notion of Agency

In 1996 Graça Machel, Mozambique's first post-independence Minister for Education and a women and children's advocate,[①] published the pivotal UN report, *The Impact of Armed Conflict upon Children* (also known as *the Machel Report*).[②] *The Machel Report* represented a milestone publication and is considered today as "a template for virtually all human reporting on child soldiers."[③] In detail, the report revealed the reality of modern warfare in postcolonial societies, which is characterized by the breaking of all common standards and the creation of a feeling of chaos and disruption.[④] According to Machel (1996), this was the reason behind the formation of blurred lines between civilians and combatants, leading to extremely high rates of violence – e.g., ethnic cleansing, forced recruitment of children into armed forces and the use of systematic rape.[⑤]

One key debate in the child soldier literature is around the question of agency – i.e., whether children are mere victims or also perpetrators of violence. On one side, one view highlights the forced recruitment, therefore depicting child soldiers as victims. For instance, Boothby (2006) discussed how "children see the protective fabric around them collapse as homes are destroyed, families are uprooted, schools and health services are ransacked, and communities become consumed by violence."[⑥] On the other side, Haer (2019) argued how children are not only passive victims of armed conflicts, as once they join armed forces they will steadily take on "both ancillary and more active combat roles."[⑦]

① UN Children and Armed Conflict, "Graça Machel and the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children," *UN Children and Armed Conflict*. https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/about/the-mandate/mandate/the-machel-reports/ (accessed December 11, 2021).
② Graça Machel, *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* (London: Hurst & Co., 2001).
③ David M. Rosen, "Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the Globalization of Childhood," *American Anthropologist* 109, no.2 (2007): 298.
④ Rosen, "Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the Globalization of Childhood," 298.
⑤ Machel, *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, 9-10.
⑥ Boothby, "What happens when child soldiers grow up? The Mozambique case study," 244.
⑦ Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 74.

Put differently, earlier assumptions about the passivity of children have been contested by the narrative[①] that the minor is "a subject of rights who is able to form and express opinions, to participate in decision-making processes and influence solutions."[②] Overall, arguments that children engage voluntarily and actively in the practice of political violence are frequently dismissed by citing *the Machel Report* (1996): "rather than exercising free choice, these children are responding more often to a variety of pressures – economic, cultural, social and political."[③]

Supply Side of Child Soldiering: Lack of Educational/Employment Opportunities, Promises of Money and Security

In order to understand the reasons behind the conscription of children in armed conflicts, it is crucial to differentiate the supply side and the demand side of this phenomenon. On the supply side of child soldiering, both push and pull factors are largely discussed in the literature. Precisely, push factors are the negative reasons that "push" children to join armed warfare, while pull factors are the positive incentives that motivate them.[④]

According to a 2006 report by the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA),[⑤] high rates of unemployment, especially among the youth, put the stability of the western African region at risk.[⑥] For instance, in the case of Sierra Leone, Jang (2012) emphasized how in the aftermath of the degradation of social welfare, the marginalized youth with no proper education nor employment was an easy target for the recruitment by rebel forces.[⑦] Indeed, social factors like precarious living conditions of poverty due to ongoing disruption or dislocation pose the highest risk among children. For example, children without guardians and children living in refugee camps are the most vulnerable to forced conscription.[⑧]

Among the pull factors, some positive rewards include the promises of security and money.[⑨] According to a 2005 study by Human Rights Watch,[⑩] the majority of former child soldiers in West Africa was incentivized by the promise of financial gains and many were not able to express the political aims of the groups they were associated with.[11] Yet, some studies show that children are motivated by the "'adventure',

① Jason Hart, "Displaced children's participation in political violence: Towards greater understanding of mobilisation," *Conflict, Security & Development* 8, no.3 (2008): 279.
② M. Santos Pais, "Child Participation and the Convention on the Rights of the Child," in *The Political Participation of Children*, ed. R. Ranjani. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, Harvard University, 2000), 3.
③ Machel, *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, 11.
④ Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 76.
⑤ UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), *Youth Unemployment and Regional Insecurity in West Africa* (2nd ed. August 2006).
⑥ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, 211-12.
⑦ Jang, "The Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War," 8-9.
⑧ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, 26.
⑨ Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 76.
⑩ Human Rights Watch (HRW). *Youth, Poverty and Blood: The Lethal Legacy of West Africa's Regional Warriors*. March 2005.
11 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008*, 211.

'the sheer fun of belonging', a desire to become 'famous and admired' or simply because they believe in what they are fighting for or want to take revenge."[①]

Demand Side of Child Soldiering: Troop Shortages, Universal Cause of Fighting and Children's "Docile" Nature

As discussed by Tynes (2015), rebel groups usually resort to the recruitment of minors for practical reasons: to simply fill in ranks[②] and replace their adult combatants, when the latter decrease in number during conflicts.[③] In a similar fashion, governments also follow this logic, in order to take this human resource away from rebel groups.[④] Accordingly, both rebel groups and governments are more incentivized to recruit child soldiers, the more intense a conflict gets.[⑤] Namely, as a conflict escalates, both warring sides may be encouraged to adopt tactics that were initially and commonly considered too unethical or costly,[⑥] like the exploitation of child soldiers.[⑦] Additionally, Gutiérrez-Sanín (2010) further explained that the inclusion of children in warfare has a political and moral connotation:[⑧] some rebel groups view child soldiering as a proof of the group's ability to include different social classes, showing the universal reach of their mission.[⑨]

Additionally, some scholars also believe that children are generally more submissive, therefore making them more easily indoctrinated compared to their adult counterparts.[⑩] An example is the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), who purposefully engaged child soldiers, as they were seen as more obedient and easily manipulated from moral beliefs.[11] Another common instance across various testimonies of former child soldiers is the moment of forced recruitment: new recruits are forced to kill their family members and friends, in order to separate and alienate them forever from their communities.[12] Similarly, during their times with the armed forces, many former child soldiers recall episodes of sexual slavery, forced labor and abuse of drugs,[13] which left severe and long-term physical and mental trauma.

① Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 76.
② Ibid., 77.
③ Robert Tynes and Bryan R. Early, "Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Global Analysis, 1987–2007," *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter* 21, no.1 (2015): 88.
④ Ibid., 88.
⑤ Ibid., 88.
⑥ Alexander Downes, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War," *International Security* 30, no.4 (2006): 152–95.
⑦ Tynes and Early, "Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Global Analysis, 1987–2007," 88.
⑧ Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín, "Organizing Minors: The Case of Colombia," in *Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States*, ed. Scott Gates, and Simon Reich. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 9.
⑨ Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 77.
⑩ Gutiérrez-Sanín, "Organizing Minors: The Case of Colombia," 121-40.
11 Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 77.
12 Rosen, "Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the Globalization of Childhood," 298.
13 Ibid., 298.

To sum up, the ongoing debates on the notion of agency, the motivations of children to join armed forces and the reasons for recruiters to enlist underage combatants show how the reality is more complicated and nuanced than on paper.

Analysis

After illustrating the case of Sierra Leone and the overview of the ongoing debates, this section discusses some limitations identified in the existing scholarship on child soldiering. Precisely, the main arguments of this paper are: (1) child soldiering is a reflection of deeper structural problems, therefore it is important to identify them by monitoring the precarious situations in failed states; (2) international NGOs should continue to facilitate the recovery, reintegration and fight the stigma around former child soldiers through DDR programs; (3) it is essential to implement a more targeted response from the international community to tackle the issues that may differ from location to location.

Child Soldiering: A Reflection of Deeper Structural Problems

As shown in the case of Sierra Leone, the collapse of the educational system was listed as one of the systemic causes leading to the conflict escalation. Namely, as argued by Haer (2019), child soldiers spend "their formative years immersed in systems of violence and constructing their values and identities under the guidance of these armed groups, they can become vehicles of violence rather than citizens who can build peace."[①] Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that children grow up in a safe environment and are possibly enrolled in schools during their formative years. Overall, it is important to recognize and address the looming economic and political institutional problems before they spiral down in a vicious cycle.

As described in the previous section, the existing scholarship has contested opinions regarding whether child soldiers are to be considered victims or perpetrators of violence. As discussed by Haer (2019), in contexts of war, the boundaries are often blurred, therefore it is difficult to determine whether a recruitment was forced or voluntary.[②] Instead, this paper argues that this assessment differs on a case-to-case basis depending on personal circumstances and motivations as well. Yet, regardless of whether the recruitment was voluntary or not, the mere fact that minors are still actively engaged in warfare today is a violation of child rights and international humanitarian law.[③]

More alarmingly, child soldiering is related to other problems like drug abuse and illegal trafficking. In this regard, children recruited by armed groups are often held under the influence of drugs, alcohol, and

① Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 74.
② Ibid., 81.
③ UNICEF, "Children recruited by armed forces or armed groups," *UNICEF*, December 22, 2021. https://www.unicef.org/protection/children-recruited-by-armed-forces (accessed November 25, 2021).

other substances.[①] In this way, regulating drug smuggling and illegal arms trafficking can also contribute to tackling the issue of child soldiering around the world.

As explained in the section above, the majority of the literature on child soldiers discusses how children are allegedly considered more obedient than their adult counterparts. Yet, more recent studies reveal how child combatants may be less disciplined and therefore have little to no tactical value.[②] Relatively speaking, this represents a small body of literature and future research can further explore in this direction to prove the shortcomings of having combat units formed by minors, which would in turn dissuade recruiters and decision-makers from hiring them.[③]

Recovery, Reintegration and Fighting Stigma Through DDR Programs

Boothby (2006) conducted a study showing the lives of former child soldiers in post-war Mozambique.[④] While some could conduct a relatively normal life, some still continued with a life of violence. Nevertheless, all of them were haunted by their past. Hence, DDR programs are fundamental for the recovery and reintegration of former child soldiers back into society. As identified by Boothby (2006), activities that reinforce the individual's coping skills for trauma and highlight regular life cycle milestones are proved to be the most helpful ones. This is especially relevant, if we take into account that former child soldiers lived at irregular life paces and in constant fear and insecurity. Unsurprisingly, activities that encourage self-regulation and instill a sense of social responsibility also assist in the reintegration process.[⑤] Yet, first and foremost, the former child soldiers have to be accepted by their communities, as some ex-underage combatants frequently struggled to be reintegrated back into their communities due to their troublesome past.[⑥] Therefore, it is fundamental to fight the stigma against former child soldiers, by preparing the communities to welcome them back through DDR programs.

Put briefly, the international community can help warring parties to reach a settlement, by acting as an external party and including some arrangements for former child soldiers in post-conflict negotiations – i.e., assisting in their reintegration into society with professional training.

More Targeted International Response

It is undeniable that the international community has successfully created a common set of international conventions against the use of child soldiers.[⑦] As seen in the case of Sierra Leone, for the first time in

① Vautravers, "Why child soldiers are such a complex issue," 106.
② Ibid., 105.
③ Vautravers, "Why child soldiers are such a complex issue," 105.
④ Boothby, "What happens when child soldiers grow up? The Mozambique case study," 244-59.
⑤ Ibid., 245.
⑥ Ibid., 254.
⑦ Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 84.

history individuals have been accused by an international court and tried for committing crimes against humanity due to their involvement in the active use of children in armed conflicts – i.e., effectively criminalizing child recruitment. While this historical moment represented a major step forward, more than a decade has passed by and much more has to be done to ensure that the same international legal protocols are respected elsewhere and with a more targeted local focus.

More importantly, this paper argues that to fundamentally resolve this issue, the international community should intervene in conflict-prone contexts from their origins, otherwise child soldiering will always be a by-product. In this regard, international NGOs should continue to negotiate with rebel groups and local authorities, in both ongoing disputes and post-conflict settlements. Accordingly, "the most effective way to protect children is by preventing and resolving conflict and sustaining peace."[①]

As most of the existing analyses focus on single case or small-N comparative studies of child soldiering, it is difficult to generalize the results and trace universal patterns.[②] Namely, identifying common traits would help to solve the problem and introduce preventive measures before the conflict escalates elsewhere. Remarkably, many present studies may be subject to selection bias, since they choose extreme cases that limit the possibility to detect shared commonalities to a broader context.[③] But even taking on a general perspective is problematic: the main flaw in the response from the international community to the problem of child soldiers is that it often overlooks the local contexts, focusing instead on legal solutions on a global scale.[④]

In other words, as further argued by Vautravers (2009), it is widely acknowledged that the international community has successfully created international legal standards over the past three decades, yet "progress is slow and uneven."[⑤] The main challenge in applying these standards is that most cases involve failed states, civil conflicts, organized crimes and displaced populations.[⑥] Indeed, Tynes (2015) observed how casualty-intensive and prolonged conflicts are linked with higher rates of the use of child soldiers.[⑦] In this regard, this paper suggests that the international community should monitor closely these conflict-prone contexts[⑧] and reinforce its presence and cooperation with local agencies to safeguard the rights of the

① Stephanie Tremblay, "Ending the Use of Child Soldiers," *UN Children and Armed Conflict*, February 12, 2017. https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2017/02/ending-the-use-of-child-soldiers/ (accessed December 11, 2021).
② Haer, "Children and Armed Conflict: Looking at the Future and Learning from the Past," 78.
③ Ibid., 78.
④ Rosen, "Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the Globalization of Childhood," 300.
⑤ Vautravers, "Why child soldiers are such a complex issue," 97.
⑥ Ibid., 97.
⑦ Tynes and Early, "Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Global Analysis, 1987–2007," 108.
⑧ Ibid., 108.

children. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the external interventions can be costly and dangerous for the members of the international community, which is why they hesitate to be involved in the first place.[①]

Overall, although universal standards should be rightfully implemented, local tactics need to be applied as well, which may differ from case to case. Hence, it is argued that it is important for the international community to continue to advocate for children's rights and learn from the past to guarantee a safer future for all children around the world.

Conclusion

Although more scholarly attention has focused on the study of child soldiers, the current statistics are still alarming. Previous studies have estimated that approximately 300,000 child soldiers are being recruited by both governmental military organizations and rebel groups in 86 countries around the world today.[②] While the estimated data may vary from agency to agency, the pressing problem is still there and needs to be addressed in a timely manner. Above all, it is an issue that fuels conflict recurrence[③] and negatively impacts the economy of the involved societies,[④] as it has long-term consequences both for the psychological well-being of children and the local communities.

This paper illustrated the case of the Civil War in Sierra Leone and the forced recruitment of child soldiers as one of the most tragic by-products of the conflict. From there, the paper introduced the main debates regarding the causes of child soldiering as a global phenomenon. While the militarization of children has become an increasingly popular research topic across various disciplines and gained attention from the international community over time, the analysis claims that the progress is still uneven. Regardless of the improvement at the international level, it is important to continue to monitor displaced communities at the local level, where children are exposed to higher risks of recruitment.

At the same time, in cases where child soldiers are already present, international agencies should continue to introduce recovery programs, like the DDR programs, to help the transition of former child soldiers back into society. While the studies on Sierra Leone show that there is hope and redemption for former child soldiers, the reality is undoubtedly more nuanced and can vary from a case-to-case basis. However, the international community should still join forces and prevent child soldiering from happening by eradicating the problem from its root. More importantly, learning from previous case studies, international NGOs should continue to identify and intervene in critical contexts of failed states to avoid the issue of child soldiering as a by-product of deeper structural problems.

① Tynes and Early, "Governments, Rebels, and the Use of Child Soldiers in Internal Armed Conflicts: A Global Analysis, 1987–2007," 108.
② Haer, "The Study of Child Soldiering: Issues and Consequences for DDR Implementation," 450.
③ Haer and Böhmelt, "Child soldiers as time bombs?" 408-36.
④ Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin, *Children: The Invisible Soldiers* (Stockholm: Rädda Barnen, 1998), 26.

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Italy and the Chemical Weapons Convention

Stefania Jiang

Introduction

This paper suggests that the Italian government should continue to support the mandate of the *Chemical Weapons Convention* (CWC). After a brief introduction on the Convention, I discuss the legal and historical reasons why the Italian government should support the promotion of the Convention. Subsequently, I propose an amendment to the CWC that Rome should work for. I argue that the Italian government should not only apply the CWC's regulations to its own territory but assist other countries in implementing and spreading the Convention's regulations as well. Furthermore, this paper addresses some past instances showing Italy's commitment to the mission of the CWC.

Background

The *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction*, commonly known as *Chemical Weapons Convention*, constitutes the first multilateral framework designed for the elimination of chemical weapons, categorized under weapons of mass destruction.[①] Precisely, the Convention seeks to ban "the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by States Parties."[②] Accordingly, the objectives of the CWC include (1) setting a transparent system to check the abolition of chemical weapons, (2) preventing its recovery, (3) offering protection, and (4) promoting peaceful cooperation on the use of chemistry.[③]

The negotiations for the CWC began in 1980 at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.[④] The initiative started collecting signatures on January 13, 1993[⑤] and entered into force on April 29, 1997, with the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the *Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical*

① Arms Control Association, "Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)," *Arms Control Association*, https://www.armscontrol.org/treaties/chemical-weapons-convention (accessed April 28, 2021).
② Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Chemical Weapons Convention," *OPCW*, https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention (accessed April 28, 2021).
③ Arms Control Association, "Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)."
④ Daryl G. Kimball, "The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance," *Arms Control Association*, April 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcglance (accessed April 28, 2021).
⑤ Arms Control Association, "Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)."

Weapons (OPCW). The OPCW administers the implementation of the CWC and has its headquarters in The Hague, The Netherlands.[①]

In order to guarantee compliance, on one side, the OPCW monitors the members' chemical facilities and activities.[②] On the other side, states-parties are obliged to declare the presence of "chemical industry facilities, which produce or use chemicals of concern to the convention."[③] Additionally, states-parties are legally bound to chemically disarm, by eliminating all stockpiles of chemical weapons that they possess and the facilities responsible of their production, together with any chemical weapons left on other states-parties' territories.[④]

According to the Convention, the chemicals are categorized into three schedules, arranged in order of their degree of risk. Schedule 1 includes chemicals posing a "high risk" (e.g., VX and sarin), which states-parties are prohibited from keeping unless they are used in limited quantities "for research, medical, pharmaceutical, or defensive"[⑤] purposes. Schedule 2 comprises chemicals posing a "significant risk" (e.g., phosgene), which are produced in limited quantities for commercial or similar peaceful uses. Schedule 3 encompasses chemicals "produced in large quantities for purposes not prohibited by the CWC, but still pose a risk to the convention."[⑥]

Today, the CWC is ratified by 193 states and "open to all nations."[⑦] Some special cases include Israel, who signed but has not ratified the Convention yet. Egypt, South Sudan, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are some examples of countries which have neither signed nor ratified the Convention.[⑧] Moreover, 98% of the chemical weapons stockpiles owned by states-parties have been destroyed and 98% of the global population is protected under the Convention.[⑨]

To conclude, the case of the CWC represents a successful implementation of a treaty, which includes all the core principles of disarmament treaties: non-discrimination, universality, and verifiability. To sum up, the CWC should be considered as a reference model for other disarmament and arms control agreements (i.e., nuclear and biological weapons).[⑩]

Rational Analysis: Benefits and Costs of the CWC for Italy

① Kimball, "The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance."
② Ibid.
③ Ibid.
④ Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Chemical Weapons Convention."
⑤ Kimball, "The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at a Glance."
⑥ Ibid.
⑦ Ibid.
⑧ Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "OPCW by the Numbers," *OPCW*, https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/opcw-numbers (accessed April 28, 2021).
⑨ Ibid.
⑩ Giovanni Gasparini and Natalino Ronzitti, *The Tenth Anniversary of the CWC's Entry Into Force: Achievements and Problems* (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2007), 5.

On one side, Italy can benefit greatly from being a member of the CWC for two main reasons: (1) contribute to the ban of chemical weapons for a safer world and (2) have the OPCW as a supervising entity. On the other side, Italy may encounter some costs while being part of the CWC: (1) financial costs and (2) ecological costs.

First, the most important benefit is also the top priority for the CWC: the elimination of chemical weapons. Until 2012, Italy still had some chemical remnants from World War II scattered across the country.[①] Therefore, having an international legal framework like the CWC helps the tracking and elimination of abandoned chemical waste on its national territory.

Second, an additional benefit is the presence of the OPCW acting as an impartial and regulatory authority. A special trait of the CWC is the inclusion of a "challenge inspection." Namely, whenever a state-party suspects transgressions from another member, it can ask for an inspection. Following this procedure, any state-party can be subject to mandatory inspections, which are rightfully conducted regardless of time and place.[②] In addition, the OPCW is entitled to suggest "collective punitive measures" to states-parties, in case these are "found to have engaged in prohibited actions that could result in serious damage to the convention."[③] In more severe cases, the OPCW can report the case to the UN Security Council and General Assembly. On their side, the states-parties are obliged to address the issues related to their compliance with the CWC raised by the OPCW. Otherwise, the OPCW can limit or suspend their benefits within the CWC (i.e., trade and voting rights).[④] Put briefly, the Italian membership in the CWC guarantees the presence of an objective apparatus for monitoring, ensuring that every state-party is legally bound to follow its regulations.

Third, as mentioned in the previous section, being a member of the CWC comes with responsibilities. Some of these include tracking and reporting chemical facilities and activities, which could be costly especially in the late 1990s-early 2000s when technology was not as advanced as it is today. Yet, regardless of the economic costs, it is acknowledged that following the protocols of the CWC had to be done as soon as possible, to limit further collateral damages.

Fourth, ecological costs are attached to the elimination of chemical weapons. One symbolic example of this case took place in January 2014. Following a sarin gas attack on August 21, 2013, which caused hundreds of fatalities in the outskirt of Damascus, an international agreement was proposed to transfer some deadly nerve agent components from Syria's chemical weapons arsenal (including sarin and VX nerve

① Giorgio Zampetti and Stefano Ciafani, "Armi chimiche: un'eredita' ancora pericolosa," *Legambiente*, February 21, 2012. https://www.legambiente.it/sites/default/files/docs/dossier_armichimiche_1.pdf (accessed June 18, 2021).
② Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Chemical Weapons Convention."
③ Ibid.
④ Ibid.

agent, which are part of Schedule 1) to the port of Gioia Tauro in Southern Italy.[①] While the Italian government reassured that this port regularly dealt with the elimination of thousands of tons of dangerous chemicals each year, the operation met opposition from local residents who were concerned about environmental and health risks.[②] Finally, while some costs do exist, benefits of the CWC's membership outweigh the potential downsides.

Further Suggestions

For over four decades, Italy has been supporting the mission of the CWC and the OPCW. For instance, in September 2020 the Italian government reiterated its position, condemning the use of chemical weapons in Syria.[③] The analysis of costs and benefits indicates that Italy should stay a member of the CWC. Furthermore, I argue that Italy should continue to support the CWC, not only for legal reasons but also for ethical ones. Namely, Italy has had a history of engaging in chemical warfare. In 1928, phosgene gas was used to repress local rebel groups in Libya.[④] In 1935, mustard gas was used in Ethiopia.[⑤] Interestingly, Italy officially admitted its engagement in chemical warfare in Ethiopia only in 1996.[⑥] Hence, the OPCW has a meaningful mission to hold states accountable not only for their current chemical facilities but also for their past conduct.

In addition, while the CWC guarantees compliance among states-parties considering their national situation, the Italian government should revise its position and make sure that the CWC is also implemented abroad following humanitarian crises. One example, in recent years, is the use of chemical weapons against civilians during the civil war in Syria. In this regard, Italy has already joined the *International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons*.[⑦] All things considered, the Italian government should further contribute to preventing these tragic events from ever happening again.

① Naomi O'Leary, "Italy seeks to calm fears over Syrian chemical weapons transfer," *Reuters*, January 21, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-italy-chemicals/italy-seeks-to-calm-fears-over-syrian-chemical-weapons-transfer-idUKBREA0K19W20140121 (accessed June 18, 2021).
② Ibid.
③ ONU Italia, "Syria: Italy, supports the OPCW work, technical expertise," *Onu Italia*, September 29, 2020. https://www.onuitalia.com/syria-italy-supports-opcw-work-technical-expertise/ (accessed June 18, 2021).
④ Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, "Vietate da sempre, usate da sempre. Storia delle armi chimiche," Agenzia *Giornalistica Italia*. May 4, 2017. https://www.agi.it/estero/vietate_da_sempre_usate_da_sempre_storia_delle_armi_chimiche-1655546/news/2017-04-05/ (accessed June 18, 2021).
⑤ Ibid.
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Joining the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
A Right Decision and a Long Way to Go for Vietnam

Phan Nhat Tra My

Abstract: This paper suggests that the Vietnamese government should take proactive measures to ensure that the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty) and its Protocol are fully implemented. Efforts have been made to prepare the path for better implementation, but in the rapidly changing strategic environment, Vietnam and other state parties have faced some obstacles. Recently, the rise of regional complexities and the general political context surrounding the SEANWFZ Treaty, notably by the US–China strategic confrontation, ASEAN countries have urged the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—the P5—to sign the Protocol. Upon general examination of the costs and benefits of the SEANWFZ Treaty in Vietnam's case, some suggestions could be raised for obtaining the signature of said states

Keywords: *SEANWFZ Treaty, Vietnam, nuclear weapons*

Introduction

As the first nuclear security framework launched by all ASEAN countries, the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, or the Bangkok Treaty, was signed by ten member countries in 1995. The concept of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) was initially introduced in the 1971 Declaration of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) by five ASEAN members.① It was due to security concerns, intra-ASEAN differences, and strong resistance by the United States that the realization of the ASEAN nuclear-free-zone concept was concluded only after the end of Cold War. As a result, the Bangkok Treaty was praised as "One Southeast Asia"② for overcoming the aforementioned obstacles and conveying a message of peace at both the regional and global scale.

The Treaty entered into force in 1997 and consists of 22 articles, an annex, and a Protocol intended for declared nuclear weapons states (NWS) to respect the Treaty and abstain from violating it and the Protocol.

① Namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
② Amitav Acharya and J.D. Kenneth Boutin, "The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty," *Security Dialogue* 29, no.2 (1998): 219-30.

The Treaty promotes nuclear non-proliferation principles, protects Southeast Asia's right to use nuclear energy peacefully, and seeks to establish a secure regional environment.① It demonstrates a strong commitment to the three core pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The pressing objective of the SEANWFZ Treaty lies in the provisions of Articles 2 and 3, which regulate the territorial scope and stipulate obligations. Accordingly, States Parties agree not to "develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons; station or transport nuclear weapons by any means; test or use nuclear weapons."② They are also obligated not to allow other states to do so within their respective territories.

The Protocol is open for signature by the P5: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 2012 was the most promising year in terms of the P-5's readiness to sign the Protocol. However, the signing was postponed at the last minute when four NWS (France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) had introduced the text on reservation and position reservation to the SEANWFZ Commission. While China shows supportive moves for the signing,③ the other four NWS continue to question the merits of including the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in the zone.④ The negative security assurance principle is also a concern that makes them circumspect in pursuing commitment. Nonetheless, their opposition to the SEANWFZ Treaty appears to be more technical-legal in nature than political-strategic.⑤ To that extent, there is optimism that the disparities between SEANWFZ nations and the NWS may be minimized and adjusted to the point where nuclear weapons could be completely absent from Southeast Asia and even the Southern Hemisphere.⑥

① Acharya and Boutin, "The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty," 219–30.

② "The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," opened for signature on December 15, 1995, Article 2 and Article 3.

③ China was scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with ASEAN on the Protocol and Treaty to the SEANWFZ on 10 July 2012, but ASEAN decided to delay any NWS signings until the issue was resolved. The willingness to sign also demonstrated in the latest National Report on the People's Republic of China's Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2021. The report says at the meeting of the five nuclear-weapon nations held in Beijing on January 30, 2019, all parties agreed that China should take the lead in communicating with ASEAN countries, resuming talks on the issue of the protocol, and attempting to sign the agreement as soon as possible. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "关于中华人民共和国履行《不扩散核武器条约》情况的国家报告," December 28, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/jks_674633/fywj_674643/202112/t20211228_10476386.shtml (accessed July 23, 2022).

④ Nuclear weapon states connect this issue to the ongoing arguments over interpretations of several fundamental provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, such as innocent passage, freedom of navigation, transit of ships, and other maritime behavior.

⑤ Bilveer Singh, *ASEAN, The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and The Challenge of Denuclearisation in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects* (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2000), 48.

⑥ Currently, excluding the South Asian region, the Southern Hemisphere is nearly entirely covered by four nuclear-free zone treaties: the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco – Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga – South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba – African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok – Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

Benefits of the SEANWFZ Treaty for Vietnam

An enormous achievement for regional security

First and foremost, the Treaty contributes to a more stable regional environment for the growth of member nations, including Vietnam. In the spirit of ZOPFAN, the SEANWFZ Treaty maintains the regional effort to consolidate and strengthen ASEAN's solidarity, cohesion, and harmony by strengthening national and regional resilience through enhanced cooperation and mutual assistance to further promoting Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.① For ASEAN, remaining neutral does not exclude any national interests; the goals of ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ do not include the termination of security cooperation② with non-regional states.③

The nuclear issue is not an academic matter for Southeast Asia, but a practical one. Vietnam does not have the intent to develop nuclear weapons and there was no evidence that Vietnam has the ambition to do so. However, Myanmar, currently engulfed in chaos, has been accused of pursuing a nuclear program for several years. The nuclear intentions of Burma's secretive military dictatorship have also raised suspicion. Technically, by signing the NPT, all ASEAN member-states have abandoned their nuclear weapons programs, but some have pursued underground development of nuclear weapons programs. Therefore, the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) is essential for shutting down such rekindled programs.

Additionally, ASEAN regards the SEANWFZ Treaty as a vehicle for promoting nuclear non-proliferation within the broader Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, North Korea continues to be a flashpoint in this regard.④ Similarly, the buildup of nuclear capability in South Asian nations, namely India and Pakistan, also raise concerns for ASEAN: in a worst-case scenario, such ambitions could influence countries in Southeast Asia to rethink their non-nuclear-weapon programs. In this regard, the SEANWFZ is a key regional confidence-building initiative among Southeast Asian countries as well as between them and neighboring states.

Vietnam's national security at the core

① Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar, *The 2nd ASEAN Reader* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2003), 534.
② In actuality, the Philippines and Thailand have maintained their alliances with the United States, and Malaysia and Singapore have maintained their participation in the Five Power Defense Arrangement, which also includes the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.
③ M. C. Abad, "A Nuclear Weapon-Free Southeast Asia and its Continuing Strategic Significance," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, no.2 (2005): 179
④ Even though ASEAN desires a comfortable relationship with North Korea economically and socio-culturally, it has been adamant in preserving its stance on nuclear weapons, whereas North Korea is now widely recognized as a *de facto* nuclear state. At the 51st ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting, ASEAN reaffirmed its demand for North Korea's denuclearization in a Joint Communique.

Vietnam's decision to completely forgo nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction is unquestionably a wise one. Not every country can afford the nuclear route, either economically or politically.① Vietnam does not own nuclear weapons, but in order to assure national security, could be drawn into a conventional arms race. This is where the SEANWFZ Treaty might assist Vietnam in ensuring security without having to enter into an arms race.② With a consensus on the disarmament of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, Vietnam and other regional governments may feel safer and more secure.③

Subsequently, by achieving denuclearization, Vietnam could avoid the smuggling of nuclear technology and the illegal acquisition of fissile materials. The dispersal of nuclear technology to other states and non-state actors is a serious concern for almost all nations, both the haves and the have nots. If nuclear technology and energy were to fall into the hands of terrorists, the impact on national security would be immeasurable.④

Nothing in the SEANWFZ Treaty hindered the right of the States Parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose, especially for socioeconomic development. Vietnam can benefit from the mechanism that supports the development of nuclear energy and considerably reduce the risk of nuclear accidents by complying with inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM). Initially, the Treaty subjects a member state to potential inspections and requires it to conclude a comprehensive safeguard agreement with the IAEA after entering into the SEANWFZ.⑤ In 2013, ASEAN established ASEANTOM, as an institutional mechanism for assisting member states to further implement and adhere to IAEA standards and guidelines at the regional level, especially regarding cross-border transfer of nuclear and radioactive materials and related activities. These mechanisms helped Vietnam exchange and adopt optimal practices and experiences in regulating nuclear and radioactive materials; promote capacity building by focusing on human resource development through training courses and technical collaboration, and guide emergency responses to potential nuclear or radioactive incidents.

① Marie Isabelle Chevrier, *Arms control policy: A guide to the issues* (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2012), 49. Schelling and Halperin's research clarifies that the goal of arms control in general is "reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs; and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it."

② Some researchers suppose the possibility of a nuclear arms race is back while some already suggest solution to stem it. If a member state became a nuclear power, the other states would be motivated to develop nuclear weapons, thereby causing a nuclear arms race in Southeast Asia. For instance, many researchers claim that an arms race is already underway in Asia: Asian countries were racing to buy submarines before AUKUS (trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) was formed. As the ace asymmetrical weapon, submarines allow smaller navies to stand up to the most powerful. This reason and national security concerns may drive a Southeast Asian country to enter the race.

③ A supportive argument for this view is that countries that are sure their regional adversaries do not possess nuclear weapons may be less eager to develop such weapons themselves.

④ Terrorism isn't a new issue in Southeast Asia. While Western countries try to counter the influence of the Islamic State, counterterrorism is also a major concern for countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

⑤ "The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," opened for signature on December 15, 1995, Article 5.

Last but not least, the SEANWFZ Treaty contributes to confidence-building processes between Vietnam and other countries in resolving regional disputes. The creation of a regional verification system to assure compliance with the SEANWFZ Treaty would not only improve nuclear transparency but also set a precedent for other defense and security-related measures and cooperation.① Thanks to the Treaty, Vietnam and other nations in the region, including the P5, are required to engage in more discussions and exchange a greater deal of information, thereby fostering confidence and expeditiously resolving security difficulties. The fact that ten countries have agreed to include regulations on EEZ indicates that they have a "common voice" both implicitly and explicitly and that they respect the provisions of The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—a convention that plays a crucial role in Vietnamese political discourse. Considering the fact that China is the most supportive country among the P5 that demonstrates apparent effort with ASEAN countries to overcome "remaining concerns" with the Protocol, Vietnam should consider this point as the springboard for more in-depth progress in the confidence-building process in South China Sea disputes.②

Costs of the SEANWFZ Treaty for Vietnam

The SEANWFZ Treaty mandates that members establish an interactive relationship with regional states, and therefore could make national security dependent to some degree on the cooperation of prospective adversaries.③ In the implementation process outlined in Articles 13 and 14, Vietnam could potentially expose sensitive national security information to undesirable agencies.

In a broader sense, NWFZs have been previously regarded as a weak nuclear disarmament approach since they shift the duty of verification from NWS to NNWS.④ The nuclear disarmament process of declared NWS is usually sophisticated, ineffective and in fact, NWS lacks the political will to disarm. However, like the NPT, the SEANWFZ Treaty contains three important pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. These are equally important missions, and non-proliferation plays the role of the top track towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. From this point of view, those missions reconcile with each other and turn a cost into a benefit.

① Singh, *ASEAN, The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and The Challenge of Denuclearisation in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects*, 37.

② In the 2021 National Report on the People's Republic of China's Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China's Government pointed out that China and ASEAN have made joint effort to resolve the remaining issues of the Protocol. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "关于中华人民共和国履行《不扩散核武器条约》情况的国家报告," https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/jks_674633/fywj_674643/202112/t20211228_10476386.shtml (accessed July 23, 2022).

③ Jeffrey A. Larsen and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Arms Control and Cooperative Security* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 5.

④ Abad, "A Nuclear Weapon-Free Southeast Asia and its Continuing Strategic Significance," 175.

Including the EEZ and continental shelf could be a double-edged sword. The zone's precise geographical boundaries are ambiguous, which may have serious implications for national sovereignty.[①] There are four ASEAN nations that have unresolved maritime territorial disputes with mainland China and Taiwan: the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei.[②] This may provide challenges to dispute settlement in terms of conformity with the conditions of the Treaty and the Protocol.

Costs and Benefits of the Protocol

Once the P5 sign the Protocol, Vietnam will receive some benefits. Most significantly, Vietnam will be guaranteed by the negative security assurance from NWS. The Protocol would also obligate the P5 not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty. However, the potential implementation of this principle raises the question of whether Vietnam would face any undesirable circumstances.

The answer is yes. All NWS would issue negative assurances to State Parties and to de facto nuclear-armed states outside the NPT framework. Additionally, Article 2 of the Protocol stipulates that each State Party agrees "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone."[③] Therefore, if a non-ASEAN nuclear-armed country, such as India or North Korea, deploys nuclear weapons within the zone, the P5 will not be allowed to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. The United States undoubtedly has no intention of offering a negative security assurance to a country like North Korea, and it can be assumed that the Biden administration will not make such a commitment in the foreseeable future. While a scenario in which North Korea deploys nuclear weapons to Vietnamese territory is highly improbable, it is worth considering the disadvantages of the negative security assurance principle for both Vietnam and the P5.

Recommendations

Overall, the SEANWFZ Treaty is of immense value to Vietnam and Southeast Asia, where all states pledge to take concrete action to obtain general and complete nuclear weapons disarmament and promote international peace and security. Compared to the accords of the nuclear weapons-free zone, this Treaty has a number of innovative and unprecedented provisions: (i) the zone of application includes the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of the contracting parties, and (ii) the negative security assurance

① Zhao Tong, "Nuclear Weapon States And The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone," *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, February 10, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/10/nuclear-weapon-states-and-southeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-pub-67965 (accessed May 7, 2022).

② Indonesia does not claim sovereignty over any geographical features in the South China Sea, but its claimed EEZ overlaps with the claims of several of the above-mentioned nations.

③ "The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone," opened for signature on December 15, 1995, Article 2.

which a commitment by NWS not to use nuclear weapons against any participating state or Protocol Party within the zone of application.

In addition to including the EEZ in the scope of the Treaty, the Protocol has novel methods and a high degree of flexibility. For instance, in the event of a breach of the Protocol, the Executive Committee may convene a special meeting of the Commission to decide on appropriate measures to be taken. No previous denuclearization treaty contains such a provision. The rules pertaining to zonal procedures are stricter even than those in the NPT, so as to ensure nonproliferation obligations are being followed.①

All of the aforementioned factors explain Vietnam's consistent support of the Treaty. Regardless of the geopolitical environment, Vietnam understands that national security is best ensured by becoming party to the Treaty. There are, however, obstacles that members must overcome, such as bringing the P5 on board. Vietnam should join hands with its ASEAN neighbors in calling on the P5 to sign the Protocol.

Undoubtedly, the ongoing delimitation process in the South China Sea is the elephant in the room; any efforts to promote ASEAN regional security should be connected with this major concern. It is feasible that the Treaty's parties will change the Protocol's text to make it acceptable to NWS, and to reduce the P5's concerns over interpretations of several fundamental provisions of the UNCLOS. These include the principles of innocent passage, freedom of navigation, transit of ships, and other maritime behavior. Tong Zhao (2017) elaborates on many of the NWS' concerns related to international transport. For example, the Treaty's definition of "innocent passage" may pose a problem for the NWS' free movement of nuclear-armed vessels. To reduce this concern, ASEAN Senior Officials should clarify or notice the NWS that nothing in the Treaty or Protocol would impact existing rights and territory boundaries under the provisions of UNCLOS.

Given the rise of regional complexities and the general political context surrounding the SEANWFZ Treaty, ASEAN (Vietnam in particular) should adopt a new dispute resolution mechanism to be included in the Treaty, rather than the simplistic approach of "disputes between signatories should be resolved through "peaceful means."

In brief, achieving the signing of P-5 will not be done overnight. In this challenging journey, Vietnam must put more effort into assisting ASEAN in obtaining the consensus of nuclear weapon states.

① Jozef Goldblat, "Nuclear-weapon-free zones: A history and assessment," *Nonproliferation Review* 4, no.3 (1997): 28.

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[3] Chevrier, Marie Isabelle. *Arms Control Policy: A Guide to the Issues*. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012.

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[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. "关于中华人民共和国履行《不扩散核武器条约》情况的国家报告." December 28, 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_673183/jks_674633/fywj_674643/202112/t20211228_10476386.shtml (accessed July 23, 2022).

[7] Siddique, Sharon and Sree Kumar. *The 2nd ASEAN Reader.* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2003.

[8] Singh, Bilveer. *ASEAN, the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the Challenge of Denuclearisation in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects*. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2000.

[9] "The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone." Opened for signature on December 15, 1995.

[10] Tong, Zhao. "Nuclear Weapon States and The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, February 10, 2017. https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/10/nuclear-weapon-states-and-southeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-pub-67965 (accessed May 7, 2022).

Why Do States Pursue an Independent, Dependent, Reliant, or Integrational Nuclear Weapons Policy vis-à-vis Available Alliances?

Jan Quosdorf

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, European defense policy has become a complicated matter. Whether Western European dependence or reliance on NATO security guarantees, independent efforts or integration into alliance structures, no common development can be distinguished. While some European nations have used NATO guarantees to supplement their defenses, others have used it to supplant them and have become dependent on NATO. This diversity is found in the policy of the major powers of the continent—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—it is quite noticeable with regards to their choices of nuclear weapons strategy. How can we explain the choices made by these three states vis-à-vis the alliance structures? How do their behaviors differ? Which factors influence their decision-making process? Answering these questions will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of states' nuclear weapons policy and the reasons behind closer commitments, or divergence.

Despite the voluminous literature on nuclear weapons and alliances, studies are often concentrated on particular issues. As a result of Cold War bipolarity, attention has been primarily directed to the US and the Soviet Union. This literature has evaluated NATO nuclear policy through the lens of US objectives[①] rather than European prerogatives. However, a shift towards regional powers' nuclear postures and their differing logic compared to superpower nuclear competition has been noticeable.

Recent studies emphasize the nuances of nuclear weapons states' behavior based on multiple levels of analysis and non-military utilization,[②] rather than structurally determined consistency.[③] Moreover, some focus on the strategic side of developing and deploying nuclear arsenals,[④] while others embed their work within the context of broader political and economic considerations additionally[⑤] or approach the matter

① David S. Yost, "The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence," *International Affairs* 87, no.6 (2011); Gerald Garvey, *Strategy and the Defense Dilemma* (Toronto: LexingtonBooks, 1984).
② Mark S. Bell, *Nuclear Reactions*: *How Nuclear-Armed States Behave* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2021); Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*: *Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014).
③ Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century*: *China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).
④ Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century*; Paul Buteux, *Strategy, Doctrine, and the Politics of Alliance*: *Theatre Nuclear Force Modernisation in NATO* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983).
⑤ David J. Gill, *Britain and the Bomb*: *Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964-1970* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).

based on psychological analysis.[①] The overall proliferation literature, on the other hand, has produced mostly tentative results, and although "some variables perform better than others, most fail to offer strong explanations for existing patterns of proliferation" that would enable us to predict future developments.[②]

A gap persists between the interplay of nuclear weapons and alliances. Often, alliances are already incorporated as variables into these models, for example, in the form of existing senior allies[③] or a third-party patron.[④] This availability of alliance protection can result in coercion,[⑤] reciprocal strengthening, as well as voluntary withdrawal. The current research does not adequately reflect this diversity.[⑥] The following essay therefore attempts to fill this gap by identifying decisive factors influencing nuclear weapons policy vis-à-vis alliances.

This study will provide and develop its argument in three steps. First, it will outline a model explaining the choices amid dependent, independent, reliant, and integrational nuclear strategies. Second, it will apply the model to the three cases of France, Germany, and the UK. Not only are all of them regional powers with similar means to proliferate, but they also face a comparable geopolitical environment and have developed similar strategic identities, i.e., their abstract sense of belonging to a Western community, in contrast to more ambiguous cases of alignment, i.e., Turkey. Utilizing a comparative case study approach, using most similar cases thus allows for the isolation of the deciding factors of alliance relationships. Third, a discussion of alternative explanations and implications will conclude the essay.

Theoretical Model



① Beatrice Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG* (London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998).
② Mark S. Bell, "Examining Explanations for Nuclear Proliferation: Research Note," *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no.3 (2016): 526; Scott D. Sagan, "The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," *The Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (2011).
③ Bell, *Nuclear Reactions*.
④ Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*.
⑤ Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," *International Security* 39, no.4 (2015).
⑥ Qualitative works like Kristan Stoddart, *The Sword and the Shield*: *Britain, America, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons, 1970-1976* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) are tied to specific cases and hard to generalize, while existing theoretical accounts like Bell, *Nuclear Reactions* remain too broad, labelling the UK and France both independent and missing crucial nuances.

States are first and foremost restricted by potential alliance coercion. Such restrictions are only possible under two conditions. First, the state is militarily dependent upon its allies. Second, these allies make their security assurances conditional upon the nuclear weapons policy choices of the state.[①] Hence, alliance coercion acts as an inhibitor to internal balancing or expansionist ambitions. A state will not be able to afford upsetting its allies under such conditions, as it needs to rally every support it can get. Coerced states are therefore exhibiting dependent behavior, resulting to adherence to allies' requirements in spite of national motives or preferences for change. Second, states evaluate the trade-offs in gains and costs of staying within the alliance. Crucially, this does not mean that states are able to significantly influence and control the alliance strategy if it enjoys free-riding or buck-passing. However, if the costs of the membership will become unbearable and the alliance patrons cannot coerce member nations to adhere to its preferences, states will use nuclear weapons policies to facilitate their foreign policy objectives independently of the alliance. Such behavior can be described as conducting foreign policy despite of allies opposing or not supporting it.

Third, national mentalities will shape the state's conduct of alliance politics. Importantly, antimilitarism does not equate to pacifism but instead to rejection of unnecessary military expansion, because of national identities or international norms. Antimilitarism acts as a stopping mechanism, leaving states content with relying on alliance military forces, instead of seeking to enhance military prowess in reaching foreign policy objectives. In the absence of such restrictions, states will seek to integrate their forces with the alliance to strengthen it as an extension of itself and reach foreign policy objectives more easily.

Empirical Evidence

Germany

NATO's nuclear sharing coordination is crucial to explain Germany's lack of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability, which separates it from France and the UK. During the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany remained dependent upon NATO in the face of the Soviet threat on its border. After this strategic concern disappeared and more possibilities opened up, the reunified Germany opted to voluntarily remain reliant on NATO. It is important to distinguish these two outcomes, due to the different motives underlying each strategy. Hence, the first section will examine the Cold War era, while the second will explain why German behavior has not changed significantly in the subsequent period continuing to this day.

Germany 1945–1990

① Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 91–105.

Although Germany promised to not produce nuclear weapons during NATO entry negotiations in 1954, it continuously displayed nuclear ambitions. Therefore, the outcome cannot be dismissed as mere adherence to formal institutionalization. Moreover, even in such a case, leaving NATO and pursuing an independent policy would have been a possibility as demonstrated by France. What then, is the expectation according to the model?

During the Cold War, German alliance politics were the outcome of answering the threat posed by the Soviet Union on one hand, and the preferences by NATO—particularly by the US and UK—on the other. The strong and superior military presence of the Soviet Union was a major concern to German politicians, who acknowledged the need to take balancing efforts.[①] Moreover, their presence was backed up by threats and a belligerent foreign policy of the USSR. Reconciliation or redrawing alliances was unlikely to occur. Simultaneously, the UK and US were strongly opposed to any Western German nuclear ambitions. Hence, the prediction would be successful NATO alliance coercion towards the FRG, which should translate into a dependent nuclear weapons policy. Does this hold true?

Germany's ambitions to develop nuclear weapons were indeed halted continuously by the US. Adenauer in particular was rather adamant about German nuclear weapons,[②] or at least cooperation with France on the matter.[③] His successors Erhard, Kiesinger, and Brandt similarly expressed these ambitions.[④] Often times, these statements came as results of lacking German confidence in the credibility of NATO's security guarantees. For example, the 1956 Radford plan's proposal to partially replace conventional forces by means of a nuclear deterrence,[⑤] US détente policy vis-à-vis the Soviets[⑥] or unsatisfying nuclear sharing proposals[⑦] all decreased German trust in the alliance. In response, Germany pursued parallel plans with France to fulfil its nuclear ambitions, encouraged by French President Charles de Gaulle.[⑧]

However, the US eventually pressured the FRG to relinquish these efforts. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations sought to re-centralize control and reverse more liberal tendencies of the Eisenhower presidency. Kennedy supported German domestic pressure against Adenauer's rule to end Franco–German cooperation and exploited the FRG's dependency to get it to sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Later, Johnson coerced Germany into signing the Nonproliferation Treaty. These German concessions were traded for coordination on nuclear weapons strategy via German participation in the Multilateral Force and

① Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 107.
② Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*: *A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution, and Reconstruction* Vol. 2 (Providence: Berghahn, 1997), 239–40.
③ Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 111–14; Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*: *Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966* (New York: Berghahn, 2004), 199; Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 596-598, 693, 718.
④ Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 119, 122.
⑤ Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 236.
⑥ Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*, 179–80.
⑦ Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 118.
⑧ Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 111–14.

Nuclear Planning Group, as well as US promises to keep a certain number of troops in Europe. Such conditional security assurances consequently pushed the FRG into renouncing its own nuclear ambitions.[①]

Germany 1991–Present

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, alliance coercion was no longer a possibility.[②] Instead, Germany's policy became informed by its evaluation of alliance membership perks and national identity. Although Germany was not a nuclear power itself, it strongly identified itself with NATO and was simultaneously constrained by increasingly antimilitaristic norms domestically. In turn, the expectation for this second period would be a reliant strategy.

Due to alignment of national interests with continual NATO membership, German reunification, and the extinction of the Warsaw Pact along its borders did not translate into an independent nuclear weapons policy. Calls for a withdrawal from NATO although appeared occasionally, specifically on the left of the domestic political spectrum, government leaders and majority of the public supported the alliance.[③] This support came in opposition to continuous French efforts to establish a European pendant without US influence. This highlights the voluntary dimension by which this behavior was informed. Along positive perceptions of multilateralism,[④] Germany accepted US leadership and remained content with its degree of influence on alliance strategy under nuclear sharing coordination.[⑤]

Moreover, Germany independently developed a strong antimilitarist strategic culture. Even in facing the Warsaw Pact, Germany only conceded to military means as a way of deterrence and national defense. After the disintegration of the Communist Bloc and generational change towards advocators of the anti-nuclear movement, antimilitarist sentiments became even more pronounced.[⑥] Thus, Germany developed a policy of entrusting its allies with military matters and heavily restraining itself. It was simultaneously limiting its ability to gain influence within the alliance like the UK's expansion.

France

France poses an example of independent nuclear weapons policy. First, France should have not been restricted by alliance coercion. Second, France was apparently not content with the state of the alliance and

① Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint."
② John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no.1 (1990): 6. argues precisely that "Germany is likely to reject the continued maintenance of NATO as we know it."
③ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, 218–29.
④ John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism," *International Organization* 53, no.4 (1999).
⑤ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, 216–19; Moira Fagan and Jacob Poushter, "NATO Seen Favorably Across Member States" (Pew Research Center, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/ Statista, "Ist die NATO für die Sicherheit Deutschlands wichtig?" (2022), https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1317911/umfrage/relevanz-der-nato-fuer-deutschland/.
⑥ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, 201–12.

Anglo–American hegemony. Therefore, as the model would predict, it displayed independence-seeking behavior, based on its nuclear weapons policy.①

France did not face the same coercive pressure by alliance partners like Germany. Regarding military dependence, a case could potentially be made for insufficient German buffering of Soviet conventional superiority, and questionable FRG rearmament. While Bell believes France to be sufficiently removed from Warsaw Pact troops,② Narang posits that the World War II experience of UK and US abandonment and lack of an English Channel triggered significant security fears among the French.③ Nonetheless, US leaders apparently were not willing or able to assert sufficient pressure on the French and merely discouraged its nuclear ambitions by refusing cooperation and only offering negative guidance.④

Under the conditions of this two-tier relationship with the US and UK dominating the alliance, France did not believe its national interests aligned properly with NATO. France was a junior ally to the "Anglo-Saxons"⑤ and possibly Germany too. The lack of NATO support for French interests at Dien Bien Phu 1954 and in the 1956 Suez Crisis further affirmed French negative suspicions.⑥ The Mendès, Mollet, and de Gaulle administrations consequently stressed the need for a completely independent nuclear force, institutionalized by withdrawing from NATO's command structure in 1966 and acquiring effective delivery capabilities by 1967.⑦

Interestingly, French discussions on compatibility with NATO display similarities with the UK's nuclear weapons policy. Theorists debated the contribution French nuclear weapons posed for Europe's defense early on.⑧ Even de Gaulle was initially attracted to and a driving factor behind NATO and French disillusionment. This was primarily revolved around American hegemony within the alliance.⑨ It thus continuously advocated for the separation of the "twin-pillars." In the absence of European support for this idea, France often lost itself in uncertainty of where to limit French interests.⑩ Thus, the 1994 White Paper drew a red line for potential employment in defense of allied countries,[11] which, although not specifically

① Wolf Mendl, *Deterrence and Persuasion*: *French Nuclear Armament in the Context of National Policy, 1945-1969* (London: Faber & Faber, 1970), 19; Wilfrid L. Kohl, *French Nuclear Diplomacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 9; Pierre Gallois, "French Defense Planning: The Future in the Past," *International Security* 1, no.2 (1976): 17.
② Bell, *Nuclear Reactions*, 153–56.
③ Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, 154–56.
④ Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, 155Although France was very suspicious of American infringements on its sovereignty regarding assistance anyway (Gallois, "French Defense Planning," 17.)
⑤ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, 116.
⑥ Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, 155–56.
⑦ Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, 158 However, Bell, *Nuclear Reactions*, 153–54 attributes this to year 1964, while Benoît Pelopidas and Sébastien Philippe, "Unfit for Purpose: Reassessing the Development and Deployment of French Nuclear Weapons (1956–1974)," *Cold War History* 21, no.3 (2021) assess this to be the case only in 1974.
⑧ Bruno Tertrais, "Destruction Assuree: The Origins and Development of French Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1981," in *Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice*, ed. Henry D. Sokolski (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 73.
⑨ Frank Costigliola, "The Failed Design: Kennedy, De Gaulle, and the Struggle for Europe," *Diplomatic History* 8, no.3 (1984): 235–37.
⑩ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, 138.
11 Bruno Tertrais, "The Last to Disarm? The Future of France's Nuclear Weapons," *Nonproliferation Review* 14, no.2 (2007): 252.

aimed at Europe, hinted at the vision of alliances bolstered by the integration of sovereign French nuclear forces.[①]

United Kingdom

Finally, the United Kingdom is an example of integrational nuclear weapons policy. Its conventional military power, particularly its naval forces, and isolated geographical position negated the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Challenges for independence by its colonies similarly remained limited to the respective country, offsetting any military dependence on NATO. Second, the UK was contented with NATO as a means of influencing the US and continental European balance of power. Third, were nuclear weapons-related decisions not constricted by an antimilitarist strategic culture. Hence, one would expect the integration of its nuclear weapons policy with the alliance.[②]

Indeed, the British acquisition of nuclear weapons served to lessen dependence on US forces and to ensure its weight within NATO. The UK cooperated with the US on the development of nuclear weapons to avoid falling behind amidst concerns about US defense commitments to Europe like those in Germany.[③] However, unlike French instrumentalization of nuclear weapons to facilitate independence, the UK strove towards establishing closer ties with the US. This culminated in the 1962 Nassau Agreement on procuring Polaris, and later Trident systems. While necessitating the question of dependence on US supply, UK elites nonetheless remained convinced that its nuclear weapons policy primarily allowed for extensive influence on American nuclear targeting plans and NATO's nuclear strategy by granting it an independent use or eventual exit option from the alliance.[④]

Crucial at that point, the UK pursued a policy of integration with NATO, rather than relying on US means. The US aimed to make NATO reliant upon its nuclear umbrella, including NATO coordination plans and sales agreements. Indeed, some politicians favored British disarmament plans and leaving nuclear responsibilities to the US. However, the majority supported the continuation of a more proactive policy in the absence of antimilitarist constraints.[⑤] This meant comfortability with conventional and nuclear escalation against the Soviet Union and embracing NATO as "core value in British policy."[⑥] The UK thus

① For a discussion of France's post-Cold War nuclear doctrine see David S. Yost, "France's New Nuclear Doctrine," *International Affairs* 82, no.4 (2006).
② See also Matthew Jones, *The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent*: *From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945-1964* Vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2017a); Matthew Jones, *The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent*: *The Labour Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964-1970* Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 2017b); Kristan Stoddart, *Losing an Empire and Finding a Role*: *Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964-70* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Stoddart, *The Sword and the Shield*.
③ Bell, *Nuclear Reactions*, 43–46.
④ Ibid., 45-46, 55-73.
⑤ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, 39–41; See also John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, *The British Nuclear Experience*: *The Role of Beliefs, Culture, and Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
⑥ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, 36.

pursued a dual policy of committing and coordinating its nuclear forces with NATO while avoiding specialization and dependence. It was thus retaining national operational control with large parliamentary support for maintaining its own nuclear forces.

Implications

The current state of the art undervalues the interplay of military alliances and states' strategic choices regarding nuclear weapons. I believe that improving our knowledge in this area has greater implications for understanding subsequent phenomena and can strengthen the performance of existing approaches. Particularly, this relates to nuclear posture optimization theory[①] and the theory of nuclear opportunism.[②] It provides an explanation when states seek independence or bolster existing alliances and consequent adaptions of their nuclear posturing. In turn, the model should be applicable to cases outside Europe.[③]

However, some potential objections to this approach may be debated. First, that nuclear weapons policies were results of domestic coalitional politics or changes in leadership. Yet, international stimuli were a much more powerful driver in the first place. Germany in particular demonstrates that domestic factors like antinuclear sentiments of Erhard or the emergence of the antinuclear movement in the 1980s did not overwrite coercive influences of NATO. Another example would be the changes of UK prime ministers not leading to significant nuclear policy alterations. Therefore, domestic factors are only secondary to alliance coercion. Only then can domestic interests and values be decisive.

Second, a counterargument may be that economic factors and resource constraints are a more powerful explanation. First, although a case can be made that such factors influenced the UK's nuclear posture change towards assured retaliation while France was able to sustain asymmetric escalation,[④] such adaptions are primarily efficiency improvements. The cases of the People's Republic of China as well as India demonstrate that assured retaliation is sufficient for sustaining an independent policy. Second, economic considerations cannot explain why the UK chose to only partially adapt its nuclear weapons posture rather than rely on US forces like Germany in the post-Cold War period. Third, while economic reasons can explain the substitution of conventional forces for nuclear ones, it requires additional analysis to explain when such moves are accepted by other alliance members.[⑤] Therefore, these factors offer little additional explanatory power, while negatively affecting the model's parsimony.

① Bell, *Nuclear Reactions*.
② Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*.
③ For example, Japan bears particularly strong resemblance to the German development, while Israel's catalytic nuclear posture sought to bring in the US in case of a conflict, hinting at an integrational approach. North Korea offers an interesting case, since coercive influences and alignment of interests are not as clear cut in the Sino-Korean relationship. This offers an avenue for further research.
④ Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*, 169.
⑤ Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 117 Germany was repeatedly anxious about American conventional forces reductions or withdrawals.

Third, one may object to the influential role played by norms for nuclear weapons policy choices. Particularly, the reconciliation of German antimilitarism and early nuclear weapons ambitions may be difficult here. However, although both pronuclear proponents like Adenauer, and antinuclear leaders like Erhard sought nuclear acquisition, both addressed the issue within the alliance context. Even the more proactive Adenauer only sought to pursue nuclear weapons through investing into the French nuclear weapons program, and because he, correctly, mistrusted the US MLF proposal.[①] Erhard also saw acquisition as only secondary option to a satisfying nuclear sharing agreement within NATO.[②] Thus, even such advocations remained limited on reliance to nuclear partners. This further explains the lack of German nuclear ambitions in the remaining Cold War period, because of sufficient NATO assurances and nuclear consultations.

Therefore, this essay provides a working, parsimonious model of the interplay between states' alliance politics and its nuclear weapons policy. Unless states are limited by alliance coercion, they utilize their nuclear weapons policy to enable an independent behavior or rather seek to strengthen a valuable alliance. However, a state may also decide to voluntarily rely on its partners if antimilitaristic norms inhibit military expansionist options. Hence, only after Germany switched from a dependent to a reliant policy after the Cold War did the UK integrate its forces with NATO and France became more independence oriented.

① Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 111; Schwarz, *Konrad Adenauer*, 663–65.
② Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint," 119.

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Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and Its Amendment

Policy Recommendation for Pakistan

Farhan Sheikh

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment serves as the structural base in the area of nuclear security. This paper suggests that the Pakistani government should continue supporting the CPPNM and its Amendment, take a more favorable position on the treaty, and clarify its cooperative stance.

Background

In the early 1970s, there were concerns in the international community regarding nuclear terrorism.① Eventually, in 1974, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger appeared at the UN and proposed establishing a convention that defined international regulations for the physical protection of nuclear materials.②

With the help of IAEA's "Information Circular 225 (INFCIRC/225) – The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,"③a draft materialized into a final agreement, "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material."④The CPPNM was adopted on 26 October 1979, signed on 3 March 1980, and entered into force on 8 February 1987.⑤

Post-9/11, however, there was a global concern to update the existing measures that evolved with the rapidly changing international security scenario.⑥Eventually, the State Parties to the CPPNM adopted by consensus an "Amendment" to the original agreement on 8 July 2005.⑦

The "Amendment" strengthened the CPPNM and expanded the scope of obligations set out in the original treaty which eventually came into force on 8 May 2016. To this date, the CPPNM and its

① Wyn Bowen et al., *Nuclear Security Briefing Book*, (London: Centre for Science & Security Studies, 2020), 31.
② Mason Willrich, "Terrorist Keep Out! The problem of safeguarding nuclear materials in a world of malfunctioning people," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 31, no.5 (1975): 16.
③ International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material - INFCIRC/225," *IAEA*, September 1975. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1975/infcirc225.pdf (accessed June 20, 2022).
④ Bowen et al., *Nuclear Security Briefing Book*, 33.
⑤ International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material - INFCIRC/274/Rev.1," IAEA, 1980. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc274r1.pdf (accessed June 20, 2022).
⑥ Bowen et al., *Nuclear Security Briefing Book*, 40.
⑦ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," *IAEA*, 2005. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1979/infcirc274r1m1c.pdf (accessed June 20, 2022).

Amendment are the only legally binding international instrument for the physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials.

Content

Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (1979)

The CPPNM obligates State Parties to meet the defined standards for international transport of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. The treaty also criminalizes offenses related to theft, robbery, threats, or unlawful taking of nuclear materials.

Levels of Physical Protection Categorized

Physical protection for nuclear material in storage incidental to international transport	
Category III	Controlled access
Category II	Constant surveillance by guards or electronic devices Physical barrier with limited entry points
Category I	As defined for Category II. Access for trustworthy personnel only Surveillance by guards in communication with response forces
Physical protection for nuclear material during international transport	
Category III	Prior arrangement among sender, receiver, and carrier Prior agreement between natural or legal persons specifying the time, place, and procedures
Category II	
Category I	As defined for Category III and II Constant surveillance by escorts Communication with response forces

Table 1. Physical Protections for Different Categories

Categorization of Nuclear Material

Material	Form	Category		
		I	II	III
Plutonium①	Unirradiated	2 kg or more	Less than 2kg but more than 500 g	500 g or less but more than 15 g
Uranium-235	Unirradiated Uranium enriched to 20% 235U or more Uranium enriched to 10% 235U but less than 20% Uranium enriched above natural but less than 10% 235U	5 kg or more	Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg 10 kg or more	1 kg or less but more than 15 g Less than 10 kg but more than 1 kg 10 kg or more
Uranium-233	Unirradiated	2 kg or more	Less than 2 kg but more than 500 g	500 g or less but more than 15 g
Irradiated fuel			Depleted or natural uranium, thorium, or low-enriched fuel (less than 10% fissile content)	

Table 2. Categorization of Nuclear Material

Amendment to CPPNM

The Amendment broadens the scope of the CPPNM in several ways.

- It broadens the scope of the original treaty to cover the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in domestic use, storage, and transport via Article 2.
- It provides for strengthened international cooperation to recover nuclear materials by the addition of Article 2A.

① All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.

- The Amendment further criminalizes offenses related to illicit trafficking and sabotage of nuclear material or nuclear facilities by revising Article 5 and Article 7.①

Status

CPPNM 1979

The Convention was opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 1987.

- The total number of Parties to the CPPNM is 164, with 44 signatories.②
- 41 Parties declared their reservations on being bound by the provisions of Article 17 paragraph 2 regarding international arbitration in case of a dispute.③
- 17 Parties expressed their objections to the declaration of Pakistan of not being bound by Article 2 paragraph 2.④

Amendment to CPPNM 2005

The Amendment was adopted on 8 July 2005 and entered into force on 8 May 2016.

- The total number of Parties to the Amendment is 129.⑤
- 13 Parties made declarations/reservations and objections thereto after accepting, acceding, or ratifying the Amendment.⑥

CPPNM and Amendment Benefits for Pakistan

In this liberal world order, international treaties and conventions act as the foundation for establishing the global norms for modern international relations. The CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment are no different. It is a binding agreement that aims to bring the world closer to global nuclear security issues. Together, the Convention and its Amendment allow countries to collaborate and build mutual trust.⑦

① Article 5 and Article 7 primarily deal with the nuclear protection framework and criminal definitions related to nuclear materials. The Amendment expanded the scope of these Articles to include illicit trafficking and sabotage of nuclear materials and facilities with an increased cooperative framework.
② International Atomic Energy Agency, "CPPNM Status," *IAEA*, September 20, 2021. http://www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf (accessed May 8, 2022).
③ International Atomic Energy Agency, "CPPNM - Declaration/Reservations and Objections Thereto," IAEA, http://www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_reserv.pdf (accessed June 20, 2022).
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⑥ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Amendment to CPPNM - Declarations/Reservations and Objections Thereto." *IAEA*, http://www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_reserv.pdf (accessed June 20, 2022).
⑦ Kathryn Crummitt, "A Treaty That Helps Protect Nuclear Material," *United States Department of State*, March 24, 2022. https://www.state.gov/a-treaty-that-helps-protect-nuclear-material/ (accessed June 20, 2022).

Pakistan has remained under global scrutiny for potential risks to nuclear security and its associated challenges since the inception of its clandestine nuclear program.[①] Although it has a clean record of operating its civil nuclear facilities safely, Pakistan's nuclear plants are still considered a potential proliferation risk.[②] By acceding and ratifying the CPPNM and its Amendment, Pakistan takes a necessary step towards building global trust in its status as a responsible nuclear state.

The Convention and its Amendment recognize that nuclear security within a state remains a sovereign national responsibility implemented through that country's laws. Without any intrusive verification mechanism, Pakistan stands to gain immensely in terms of trust with the global community without compromising its nuclear deterrence.

The Convention also provides a basic framework for Pakistan to ensure internal nuclear security. It has helped Pakistan establish the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), an independent, autonomous oversight body that ensures internal nuclear regulations.[③] It is significant since the regulatory body was established in 2001, well ahead of other advanced states such as India and Japan, meaning that the Convention has directly helped Pakistan develop faster than its peers.

Pakistan's borders are one of the most unstable in the world. As a nuclear-armed state operating seven commercial nuclear plants and several related facilities, Pakistan must prioritize nuclear security above other concerns. From global trust to internal security and development, Pakistan stands to gain immense benefits by acceding and ratifying the Convention and its Amendment.

CPPNM and Amendment Costs for Pakistan

The original CPPNM was carefully drafted under legitimate nuclear security concerns. After two years of careful deliberations with the Member States, the IAEA drafted an agreement to minimize most states' objections.[④] However, some costs are still attached, particularly to a state like Pakistan.

Even though Pakistan ratified the Amendment in 2016, the Convention holds the potential to slow down any rapid nuclear arsenal build-up by regulating domestic nuclear transport. This concern was evident when Pakistan objected to paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the original CPPNM in 2000.[⑤]

The Convention also tends to favor the International Court of Justice instead of bilateral settlement in cases of dispute arising from the agreement, according to paragraph 2 of Article 17. Nuclear cases settling

① Sitara Noor, "Strengthening Pakistan's Nuclear Security Regime," *Pakistan Politico*, August 7, 2018. https://pakistanpolitico.com/strengthening-pakistans-nuclear-security-regime/ (accessed June 20, 2022).
② Irfan Haider, "IAEA praises Pakistan's nuclear security record," *Dawn*, September 27, 2015. https://www.dawn.com/news/1209311/iaea-praises-pakistans-nuclear-security-record (accessed June 20, 2022).
③ Waseem Qutab, "Pakistan's nuclear security resolve," *The Express Tribune*, March 15, 2016. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1066164/pakistans-nuclear-security-resolve (accessed June 20, 2022).
④ Bowen et al., *Nuclear Security Briefing Book*, 33.
⑤ IAEA, "CPPNM – Reservations."

outside its borders holds the prospects for Pakistan losing its nuclear sovereignty. Pakistan shared its reservation regarding this provision with 41 other Parties when acceding to the Convention.①

Policy Recommendations

Pakistan's conflicting relations amplified by its nuclear weapons program have the possibility of alienating itself from a world with liberal, democratic norms. It has managed to stay just shy of being declared a rogue state.②The CPPNM and its Amendment offer a chance for Pakistan to reintegrate into the world order. Through careful consideration, this paper recommends three actions.

First, for any future Amendments to the Convention, Pakistan should support a clause that enables ratifying Parties to host an obligatory International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. While the mission helps the host country strengthen its nuclear security measures, supporting such a clause would help Pakistan stand out as a responsible and trustworthy nuclear state.

Second, Pakistan should withdraw its declaration that "It does not consider Article 11 of the Convention to be the legal basis for extradition." While this declaration can be easily misunderstood as an attempt by the state to protect AQ Khan's past proliferation network,③Pakistan must take steps to elevate itself above any suspicions of possible proliferation risks.

Finally, Pakistan should send a formal letter to the IAEA to remove its former objection to paragraph 2 of Article 2. At the time of accession to the CPPNM in 2000, 17 Parties voiced their objections to Pakistan's reservations.④Although that reservation becomes null and void after ratifying the Amendment,⑤Pakistan should clear the record as a symbol of support.

Pakistan must understand that nuclear security is not a goal, but a process, and must be ready for future related treaties. The CPPNM and its Amendment is a path for Pakistan to show its sincerity towards nuclear security and close its trust gaps with the world.

① Ibid.
② Jovito Katigbak and Don Gill, "Pakistan and the Rogue State Narrative," *RUSI Newsbrief* 40, no.5 (2020) https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/pakistan-and-rogue-state-narrative (accessed June 20, 2022).
③ Aaron Arnold and Darya Dolzikova, "AQ Khan is Dead - Long Live the Proliferation Network," *Royal United Services Institute*, October 15, 2021. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/aq-khan-dead-long-live-proliferation-network (accessed June 20, 2022).
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The New Taliban
Insurgent Evolution

Farhan Sheikh

Abstract: Since the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in August 2021, there has been intense retrospection in literature on how the insurgent group managed to hold out against the US war machine. While most views center on the US failure in insurgency management, this paper suggests four fundamental changes in the Taliban as the key to its triumph: embracing technology, ethnic diversity, increased pragmatism, and recognition of good governance.

Keywords: *Taliban, Afghanistan, insurgency management*

Introduction

On August 5, 2021, the city of Zaranj in the Nimruz province of Afghanistan fell to the Taliban. The first provincial capital captured by the Taliban in a blistering summer offensive saw the US-backed government completely disintegrate within nine days, leading to a return to Taliban rule after more than twenty years. The fall of the western-backed Ghani administration (2014-2021) was extensive and sweeping. The insurgents entered Kabul with little bloodshed and immediately filled the power vacuum.

As Taliban leaders and fighters slowly transition from generals and soldiers to ministers and police chiefs, the question arises as to whether the repression of their previous regime will be repeated.[①] The last time the Taliban controlled Kabul, in 2001, its reign was clearly "medieval" for the West. Women were barred from working, studying, and participating in politics. Music, flying kites, and watching television were banned, and there were public executions. Even if there were any hint of understanding in the West, it was squashed by the September 11 attack. The subsequent overthrow of the Taliban government by the US war machine should have catalyzed the western-style development of a prosperous state. But after more than twenty long and bloody years, we now know that this was not the case.

① Steven Erlanger, "The Taliban Are Back. Now Will They Restrain or Support Al Qaeda?" *The New York Times*, August 17, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/17/world/asia/taliban-afghanistan-al-qaeda.html (accessed December 10, 2022).

There has been much academic discussion about how a rebel group with primitive, traditional values was able to hold out against a militarily superior adversary for more than twenty years.[1][2] However, these discussions mainly focus on the military tactics of the belligerents, the political errors of the incumbent administration, and the incorrect prioritization of war objectives. Few discussions revolve around the simple idea that the Taliban has displayed a high learning potential and have evolved throughout their insurgency following the overthrow of its regime in 2001.

The overarching purpose of this article is to determine the fundamental changes in the rebel-turned-governor group, providing insight into how they impacted the change in their policies during and after their insurgent days. The first section of this article gives a historical overview of the Taliban movement. The second section investigates the Taliban's decision-making approach and its organizational structure. The third section examines the key themes and uncompromising characteristics of the movement. The fourth section explores the evolution of the Taliban during its insurgency. The final section offers concluding remarks.

The Taliban: A Historical Overview

The key to understanding the Taliban is not just diving into Afghan history but appreciating the social norms surrounding the Afghan culture. After the Soviet forces retreated, Afghanistan saw its worst self during the power struggle between the former Mujahideen groups starting in 1992. Widespread acts of violence and sexual abuse occurred everywhere, and local warlords' grip on regional power became even tighter as the central government changed hands.[3]

It is important to note that the values and norms of the Taliban are deeply tied to its place of origin. The group originated in the Kandahar province as a vigilante militia in the summer of 1994. Deeply influenced by a strict interpretation of the Deobandi version of Islam and inspired by the Pashtun code of honor or "Pashtunwali," the Taliban emerged as a force that served to eliminate the chaotic and violent status quo.

Afghanistan is a highly diverse country in terms of population. Its land is dotted with people of varying ethnicities, each with unique values and norms. It is also tribal in nature, where an individual's loyalty to his tribe or clan supersedes his loyalty to any rational-legal authority present in Kabul. Upon its formation, the Taliban consisted solely of Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.[4]

① Raffaello Pantucci and Abdul Basit, "Post-Taliban Takeover: How the Global Jihadist Terror Threat May Evolve," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 13, no.4 (2021).
② Georgi Asatryan, "The Talibs or the Taliban in Afghanistan," *Iran and the Caucasus* 25, no.4 (2021).
③ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin Group, 2004).
④ William Maley, "The Foreign Policy of the Taliban," *Council of Foreign Relations,* February 15, 2000, https://www.cfr.org/report/foreign-policy-taliban (accessed December 10, 2022).

The Taliban initially received backing from local Afghan leaders and businesses, which helped it cement its legitimacy. Another crucial support that accelerated their campaign was the backing of the powerful Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).[①] With secure funding and local legitimacy, the Taliban eventually entered Kabul in 1996 and established its first government.

The "medieval" nature of the regime is well documented.[②] The policies promulgated by the Taliban leadership during its stint in power clearly reflect their religious, ethnic, and socio-economic background. Nevertheless, the on-the-ground reality of the social landscape is obscure. A journalist's account of late 1999 tells of kids flying kites and playing soccer in Kabul and Kandahar.[③] He observed criticism against the restrictive anti-girls educational policies, even among Taliban ranks. Some communities resisted Taliban measures against local traditions, even in the Pashtun countryside. Nevertheless, Western debates did not comprehend these cultural undertones, especially after 9/11.[④]

In retrospect, current US policymakers may regret their past decisions; the reality was that such decisions stemmed from myopic policies of neoconservative hawks in the Bush administration. Following the US invasion and the swift collapse of the Emirate, the Taliban offered to surrender unconditionally, which the US refused.[⑤⑥] Torn between the prospects of becoming prisoners or continuing to fight, Taliban leadership escaped through the porous Pakistani border.

The Taliban was not invited when the post-Taliban structure was being formed at the Bonn Conference (December 2001). Attempts to include individual members in political processes such as the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga were unsuccessful. The US and Karzai administrations also did not allow them to form a "moderate" Taliban political party.[⑦] The extreme marginalization of former rulers did not bode well for the Afghans, as it only prolonged the conflict. As Masoom Stanekzai, head of the Afghan negotiation team said, this was a "historic mistake."

The Taliban eventually mounted a military comeback from the rural, backward districts of their origins. Three factors legitimized its return: the extensive corruption of the warlords-turned-rulers, political exclusion of ethnic Pashtuns in the Northern Alliance-dominated Afghan government, and the hatred of the

① Maley, "The Foreign Policy of the Taliban."
② Rosemarie Skaine, *Women of Afghanistan in the Post-Taliban Era: How Lives Have Changed and Where They Stand Today*, (Johnson, NC: McFarland & Co. Publishers, 2008)
③ Thomas Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed?" *CTC Sentinel* 14, no.3 (2021): 3.
④ Ibid.
⑤ Alissa J. Rubin, "Did the War in Afghanistan Have to Happen?" *The New York Times*, September 2, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/23/world/middleeast/afghanistan-taliban-deal-united-states.html (accessed December 10, 2022).
⑥ "Text: Pentagon Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld," *The Washington Post*, November 19, 2001, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeldtext_111901.html (accessed December 10, 2022).
⑦ Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed?," 3.

foreign/US colonialist posture in their homeland. In 2003, the Taliban's founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar, formed a new Taliban Leadership Council to unite the fragmented Taliban groups. By 2005, the insurgency was a force to be reckoned with in southern Afghanistan.

In the years to come, the Taliban grew in strength, both in size and strategy. Instead of negotiating a truce, the US stubbornly tried to defeat it militarily. As President George W. Bush said, "You can't talk to them. You can't negotiate with them."[①] His words ran deep into his administration's neoconservative policymaking, which favored brute force over any possible negotiations.[②] When President Barack Obama's troop surge in 2009 failed to press the Taliban to the negotiating table, this approach had to be revised.

The subsequent policy revision made it possible for the Taliban to open a political office in Doha, Qatar in 2013. Further talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban took place in Pakistan, but none yielded credible results. Finally, caving under the pressure of an unpopular "endless" war, President Donald J. Trump directed the initiation of direct negotiations with Taliban leadership, notably excluding the government in Kabul. The direct talks made one thing evident: the Taliban had been diplomatically accepted as a critical party to the conflict. The discussions eventually culminated in the 2020 Doha Agreement concerning US troop withdrawal and included significant concessions to the Taliban.

As President Biden followed through on the agreement on troop withdrawal, the Taliban ramped up its summer offensive, rapidly capturing city after city. Given its long-standing endemic issues, such as bureaucratic corruption and low morale, and the loss of US air support, the beleaguered Afghan National Security Forces collapsed, in many cases giving up without a fight. After entering Kabul without any resistance on August 15, the Taliban proclaimed the war over.

The Taliban's Organizational Structure and Approach to Decision-Making

The Taliban today is not a group of people with a common background. Its ranks include people from different tribes and clans, bound together by a common Islamic ideology. Thus, this bond provides some insight into how the Taliban is structured and how it prioritizes its decisions.[③]

As the Taliban fill the ministries abandoned by the former administration, the world is left to wonder about the thought processes behind its domestic and foreign policies. But to understand this, one must first analyze the organizational structure of the Taliban's "shadow government" during the insurgency.

① "President Bush, Philippine President Arroyo Hold Joint Press Conference," *The White House,* May 19, 2003, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2003/20732.htm (accessed December 10, 2022).
② Harmonie Toros, "We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts," *Security Dialogue* 39, no.4 (2008).
③ Ashley Jackson and Rahmatullah Amiri, "Insurgent Bureaucracy: How the Taliban Make Policy," *Peaceworks* no.153 (2019).

According to Jackson and Amiri (2019), "the Taliban's policymaking is driven by military and political necessity,"[①] which can be interpreted simply as pragmatism. However, pragmatism can only get an organization so far. The Taliban is not a political party but rather a reactionary or a militaristic group. It seeks legitimacy through its interpretation of Islamic law, which is highly dependent on the ordinary people's perception of Islamic authority. This, in turn, reinforces its political entity—what they refer to as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the Taliban's structure is unique because it has both vertical and horizontal organizational features. The vertical chain of command is clear and hierarchical, with the "amir-ul-momineen" (lit., "commander of the faithful") at the top. The Rahbari Shura (Leadership Council), of which the leader is separate, functions under him and plays an advisory role. The Rahbari Shura comprises members who are the leader's deputies and ministers and are involved in day-to-day affairs, something from which the top leader is generally removed. This vertical control structure presents a seemingly transparent chain of command, but the on-the-ground reality is quite different.

The Taliban is also structured horizontally in the form of networks and fronts led by military commanders. The local fronts, or the Mahaz, obtain recognition as part of the movement from the Rahbari Shura. In return, they gain a substantial degree of autonomy, as long as they do not violate core policies. Many authors have cited this horizontal structure as key to the resilience of the Taliban movement;[②③] the absence of micromanaging effectively serves to avoid splits within the organization. The horizontal structure also allows tribes and clans other than the original Kandahari group to join the movement and rise within its ranks. One of the best examples of such extensions is the group led by the Haqqanis, popularly known as the "Haqqani Network." It has a different tribal base, it is older than the mainstream "Kandahari" Taliban, and during the Soviet War, it maintained close ties with the ISI. Its leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is now head of the powerful Ministry of Interior Affairs and wields considerable influence within the Taliban leadership.

The vertical structure of the Taliban provides a centralized command authority and provides religious legitimacy to the leader. This also keeps its members under one flag and ideology. The horizontal feature of its structure provides elasticity and adaptability. Such characteristics are useful in militaristic situations when guerilla warfare is essential for survival but showcase a particular flaw; policy and decision-making at the top might not fully translate at the bottom, which is the primary concern of international human rights

① Jackson and Amiri, "Insurgent Bureaucracy."
② Andrew Watkins, "Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction and Future," *Peaceworks* no.160 (2020).
③ Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed?"

organizations. Guarantees and promises made by the leadership may not be passed down to individual fighters, which may impede proper governance.

It took more than three weeks for the Taliban to announce an interim government after the fall of Kabul in August 2021. There have been reports of power struggles over the allotment of ministerial positions,[①] but the delay in forming a government can be logically attributed to the stunning nature of the Taliban takeover. The sudden collapse of the Republic's security and law enforcement agencies, coupled with Ashraf Ghani's flight, naturally made whatever preparation the insurgent group had made insufficient.

It can be argued that if President Ghani did not flee, it would not have made a difference whether the Taliban could have entered Kabul. A transition would have been imminent, albeit a thought-out one. However, the sudden vacuum created by the collapse of the former administration created a dilemma. Compromising with their foes in order to enter Kabul was one thing, but voluntarily sharing power after assuming an uncontested seat of power was another. Such a line of thinking explains the Taliban's decision to fill its interim cabinet with its entire senior leadership, ignoring domestic and international observers' calls for "inclusivity."

Nevertheless, during the initial months, the Taliban governance style was quite similar to the one it had employed in its "shadow government" during the insurgency days. For example, Acting Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqoub announced that his ministry would take responsibility for the delayed Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline.[②] Generally, these types of actions are handled by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, the scope of which has been claimed by Yaqoub. These overlapping scopes reflect the horizontal command-and-control style of the organization, which is still prevalent in the fledgling government. In some way, the Taliban's dependence on its insurgency-era governance style is necessary to transition from fighting to ruling. Even so, as long as this two-track authority system between the formal hierarchy and informal network continues to endure, it will eventually undermine domestic ministries and institutions and turn the state into a form of oligarchy.

Unyielding Characteristics of the Taliban

The oppressiveness of the Taliban during its first stint in power from 1996 to 2001 has been etched into every Afghan's memory. Drawing from the tribal codes and a strict interpretation of Islam, its rule gained no international recognition, except from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Pakistan.

① "IntelBrief: Taliban Infighting Poses Early Challenge to Governing Afghanistan," *The Soufan Center*, September 20, 2021, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-september-20/ (accessed December 10, 2022).

② "Taliban pledge mega gas pipeline project's security in Afghanistan," *The Anadolu Agency*, October 30, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/taliban-pledge-mega-gas-pipeline-projects-security-in-afghanistan/2407241 (accessed December 10, 2022).

After its recent takeover and even during the Doha Talks (2018-2020), the Taliban repeatedly gave assurances that its rule would be inclusive, women-friendly, and observant of international human rights.

However, states and international organizations alike are skeptical. Even though they realize that the Taliban is desperate for any form of international recognition, they have little reason to trust the group. The reason for this is that the rigid characteristics of the Taliban need to demonstrate some flexibility before its assurances can be taken seriously.

Twenty years ago, gaining international legitimacy through domestic acts remained low on the Taliban's priority list. Nevertheless, the fact that the Taliban has made pledges since the beginning of the Doha Talks is a sign that the Taliban has evolved somewhat. However, there are three key characteristics of the organization that have endured: emphasis on internal cohesion, high threat perception, and ambiguous messaging.

Emphasis on Internal Cohesion

Perhaps the most enduring characteristic of the Taliban's behavior after August 15, 2021, was its continued prioritization of maintaining the group's internal cohesion and unity. When the Taliban's leadership debates policies or makes strategic decisions, it has a consistent track record of making choices that prioritize the group's integrity or at least its appearance of having integrity.[①]

This particular aspect is a double-edged sword. While it is necessary for the central leadership to be united, especially in a resource-hungry country like Afghanistan, the group will struggle to gain popular favor when confronted with a choice that may benefit the Afghan people at the cost of creating discord among Taliban ranks.

Three weeks after assuming power, the Taliban announced its upper cabinet would consist of its entire senior leadership. The announcement was followed by rumors of a rift between influential leaders.[②] Regardless, the announcement revealed the group's careful balancing act regarding designating governance groups, and that measures were being taken to alleviate internal tensions.

High Threat Perception

Rebels and insurgent groups require strong survival instincts, especially when caught in a protracted conflict. Maintaining a survivalist attitude requires constant vigilance and quick resolution of potential

① Andrew Watkins, "An Assessment of Taliban Rule at Three Months," *CTC Sentinel* 14, no.9 (2021): 1.
② Shabullah Yousafzai, "Mullah Baradar, Haqqani dispel rumours of Taliban rifts," *The Express Tribune*, September 16, 2021, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2320508/mullah-baradar-haqqani-dispel-rumours-of-taliban-rifts (accessed December 10, 2022).

threats. After over two decades of guerilla warfare against a superior enemy, the Taliban, at both the organizational and individual levels, is guided by a threat perception heightened to the point of paranoia.[①]

This feature directly impacts the government's interaction with the population. The Taliban leadership seems shrewdly aware of how decades of struggle and hardship have shaped perceptions, especially on the individual level, towards that of instinctual brutality, which can, in turn, be highly disruptive when transitioning into a governing entity. For example, in late August, a Taliban spokesperson urged women to stay in their homes because its fighters had not yet been trained not to hurt and harass women.[②]

Days after Kabul's fall, former Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh announced armed resistance to the Taliban authority in the Panjshir Valley, a bastion of anti-Taliban forces throughout the years. The announcement was followed by a speedy, large-scale military mobilization by the Taliban to crush the rebellion. By early September, Taliban forces had overwhelmed the valley. The group's swift response to the resistance announcement indicates that the Taliban perceive any varying degree of threat as a danger to its survival.

The Taliban's response to protests also reflects how threat perception guides the organization. Small-scale protests led mainly by women erupted in Jalalabad, Herat, Kabul, and other cities during the first few weeks of its takeover. These protests were met with violence and aggression by Taliban fighters. By mid-September, all kinds of protests and demonstrations were banned unless approved by the organization.[③]

Ambiguous Messaging

The Taliban's ambiguity in messaging, especially regarding their future intentions, is another trait that has endured for years. However, that does not mean that the Taliban is always opaque when communicating. For instance, the Taliban's public messaging was very transparent during the insurgency, putting out clear messages for an armed struggle against the foreign invaders and illegitimate puppet government. When alluding to future intentions, though, the messaging becomes ambiguous. Whether it is about the return of girls to secondary schools, women's rights, or journalism, the Taliban masks its intentions behind the familiar phrase: "in accordance with Islamic laws and values…"[④] Such murky messaging contrasts with its clear rhetoric on ousting the previous administration and makes one fact apparent: the Taliban's messaging

① Watkins, "An Assessment of Taliban Rule at Three Months," 4.
② Norimitsu Onishi, "A Taliban Spokesman Urges Women to Stay Home Because Fighters Haven't Been Trained to Respect Them," *The New York Times*, August 25, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/24/world/asia/taliban-women-afghanistan.html (accessed December 10, 2022).
③ Akhtar Mohammad, Peter Beaumont, and Patrick Wintour, "Taliban ban protests and slogans that don't have their approval," *The Guardian*, September 9, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/08/taliban-ban-protests-and-slogans-that-dont-have-their-approval (accessed December 10, 2022).
④ Watkins, "An Assessment of Taliban Rule at Three Months," 8.

is very transparent when it comes to assigning blame, such as when listing the wrongs of the previous government or the social factors that are harmful to Afghan society, but its public messaging becomes quite vague when the question of future constructive ideas and intentions is raised.

There are two possible reasons for such vagueness. One, the Taliban believes that being vague strengthens its hand during negotiations and communication with other actors, domestic or international. Second, the ambiguity results from a lack of concrete consensus among the senior leadership. The Taliban rank and file consists of diverse ethnicities from different tribes and clans and being ambiguous may therefore help maintain cohesion within the group, reinforcing the previous idea that the Taliban prioritizes organizational unity.

The Taliban's Evolution

On February 20, 2020, just days before the Doha agreement signing between the US and the Taliban, the New York Times published a striking opinion piece. The article, titled "What We, the Taliban, Want," was rich with captivating thoughts about peace, stability, and self-determination.① What made the article so remarkable was that it was written by Sirajuddin Haqqani, a wanted Talib with a $10 million bounty on his head. Publishing an op-ed by a wanted individual in one of the US's most reputable newspapers certainly required a shrewd and sophisticated approach to public relations, something that the Taliban did not possess even at the height of its power in 1996-2001. Haqqani's article is just one of many examples of how the Taliban has demonstrated that it is an organization capable of evolving. As the Taliban handles its newfound responsibilities, it is necessary to understand what type of fundamental changes it has undergone, such as its understanding of modern technology, its heightened ethnic tolerance, and its recognition of the importance of good governance. Understanding these changes may add clarity to the future of Afghanistan.

Embracing Modern Communications Technology

Perhaps the most remarkable evolution in the Taliban's policy and inner workings is how it handles media and communications. When it was in power before 2001, the Taliban banned televisions and preferred to communicate with the population through print media and radio. Taliban management also monopolized the use of phones.

① Sirajuddin Haqqani, "Opinion | What We, the Taliban, Want," *The New York Times*, February 20, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/opinion/taliban-afghanistan-war-haqqani.html (accessed December 10, 2022).

As its insurgency progressed, the Taliban eventually started using all available communications facilities, from conventional radios to websites and social media. The Taliban has also grown to be more accepting of the use of television, even actively appearing on local news channels.[①]

Far before its takeover of Kabul, the movement already ran a website accessible in over five languages, and its spokespersons were active on Twitter. Over time, the group mastered the art of hashtags and creating content targeting its supporters. Suhail Shaheen, the Taliban's head of Political Office in Doha, and Zabihullah Mujahid, one of the Emirate's spokespersons, have both steadily amassed a large following on Twitter—nearly half a million each.

The Taliban's attitude toward communications is far more pragmatic than before, despite being shaped by military necessity from the insurgency era. Nevertheless, it can be argued that such a pragmatic shift indicates that the Taliban has accepted the rapid spread of media, technology, and the Internet, and believe that they can no longer control it.[②] Instead, the group has learned to embrace technology.

Ethnic Diversity in New Recruits

The Taliban originated from the heart of the Pashtun tribal areas, meaning early recruits were almost exclusively ethnic Pashtuns. Even during the Taliban's initial rule, the northern belt, including the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border, was not controlled by the group. These areas were inhabited by ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmen, who fiercely resisted Taliban rule. When the US invaded Afghanistan, this resistance proved crucial and facilitated the overthrow of the Taliban.

The Taliban's current membership is still predominantly comprised of Pashtuns, but the majority has significantly decreased. This is because the Taliban has effectively projected its mission to the masses, transforming from a Pashtun-based insurgency that gained loyalty through tribal links to a pan-Islamic fighting force confronting foreign invaders. Many experts believe this was the key to the Taliban's complete military success over the Republic's forces.[③]

The group's success in attracting other ethnicities to its cause is credited to not only its ability to tap into religious sentiment but also its growing alienation by the population over corruption, incompetent governance, crooked judicial systems, and unpopular leadership choices. The "shadow government"

① Jim Waterson, "Female presenter interviews Taliban spokesman on Afghanistan television." *The Guardian*, August 18, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/17/female-presenter-interviews-taliban-spokesman-on-afghanistan-television (accessed December 10, 2022).
② Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed?" 6.
③ Frud Bezhan, "Ethnic Minorities Are Fueling the Taliban's Expansion in Afghanistan," *Foreign Policy*, June 15, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/15/ethnic-minorities-are-fueling-the-talibans-expansion-in-afghanistan (accessed December 10, 2022).

operated during the insurgency offered an alternative vision, drawing throngs of rural Afghans into the Taliban's ranks.

As the Taliban surrounded Kabul, it first captured other provincial capitals, prioritizing the northern provinces. It sent its best non-Pashtun commanders to oversee the northern operations, giving them a military edge that they never had before.[①] After the Taliban captured Panjshir, historically known as a stronghold of anti-Taliban forces, it appointed a local Panjshiri to oversee the valley's security.

Ethnic diversity within the Taliban has strengthened the group's standing in many ways, especially militarily. However, it also makes the movement unpredictable. Each ethnicity has its own set of values and beliefs. Since the Taliban has consistently prioritized internal unity and cohesion above all else, having a diverse fighter base will force the Taliban to make concessions or risk internal division.

Increased Pragmatism

In the early days of the insurgency, the Taliban shut down schools (specifically those for girls) in all the districts and areas it captured, citing schools as symbols of the government's influence. Sometime after 2009, the Taliban gradually shifted from attacking to taking control of government schools. This approach was also reflected in a new version of *layha* (lit., "code of conduct"), which removed the education system as a target of the Taliban. In its 2013 Eid-al-Fitr message, the group's leadership proclaimed that "our young generation should arm themselves with religious and modern education because modern education is a fundamental need in every society in the present time."[②]

Up until 2010, there was open hostility toward nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The insurgents described them as "tools of the infidels" and effectively banned them. New versions of *layha*, on the other hand, focused on cooperating with them when practical. In 2011, a Taliban representative said that Mullah Omar had ordered a halt in killing people who worked for organizations building roads as long they did not work with the enemy. NGOs were asked to register with the leadership council and were taxed. There were some exceptions to this shift, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and US military-funded projects.[③]

The above policy shifts throughout the insurgency can be described as pragmatic. In her analysis of the *layhas*, Kate Clark (2011) explains that the fundamental explanation for the policy shifts toward education

① Scott Peterson, "Afghanistan: Taliban strategy to take Kabul ran through northern ethnic recruits." *Christian Science Monitor*, August 20, 2021, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2021/0820/Afghanistan-How-the-Taliban-won-over-northern-ethnic-minorities (accessed December 10, 2022).
② Jackson and Amiri, "Insurgent Bureaucracy."
③ Ruttig, "Have the Taliban Changed?" 9.

and NGOs is a simple acknowledgment of the reality: going against them would eventually anger the local population and alienate the Taliban's shadow government.[①]

The group's increasingly pragmatic actions sometimes collided with its traditional thinking. As Watkins (2021) summarizes, the Taliban grows most pragmatic when the actor with which it is engaging has something it badly needs and does not publicly pressure the group with any potential conditions.[②] There are a couple of reasons for such a pragmatic shift over the past few decades.

First was the death of Mullah Omar and the elevation of Mullah Akhtar Mansour to the top post, which precipitated the leadership's growing openness to engaging with international actors. Even though Omar will always retain a legendary reputation among Taliban supporters, Mansour's experience as his deputy made him recognize the flaws of the group's previous rule. He knew that the Taliban would need international recognition to realize its political ambitions and opened the group to aid agencies and NGOs working in the education and health sectors. When the surge of US troops began to abate, Mansour also restructured the Taliban's hierarchy, introducing Red Units, an elite military unit that came under the direct command of the provincial governor putting it above the standard chain-of-command. In a nutshell, a change in thinking at the top led the Taliban to be more pragmatic.[③]

Second, the long war has instilled a survivalist mentality, which has bolstered a practical way of thinking among the group. Fighting for twenty years against the most powerful military in history forces a group to adapt or face annihilation. The lengthy war also made the Taliban realize that it needed to learn how to govern instead of just fighting for survival.

Overall, the Taliban can be pragmatic when needed, which means that aid agencies, NGOs, and even state actors have increased capacity to influence the group's policymaking. International actors can carefully leverage the Taliban's desire to achieve international recognition to coax the movement into making favorable policies.

Recognizing the Importance of Good Governance

As the Taliban filled out the power void left by the Ghani administration, the group appointed its senior leadership to the same ministries as the previous administration. This implies that the Taliban has silently accepted the scope of a modern Afghan state, created by the previous Western-backed government.[④]

① Kate Clark, "The Layha: Calling the Taleban to Account," *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, July 2011, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/20110704_CKlark_The_Layha.pdf (accessed December 10, 2022).
② Watkins, "An Assessment of Taliban Rule at Three Months," 10.
③ Jackson and Amiri, "Insurgent Bureaucracy."
④ Watkins, "An Assessment of Taliban Rule at Three Months," 6.

Another striking feature of the new government is that the cabinet members appear to favor those who held ministerial ranks back in the 1990s. The cabinet selections contrast with military movements, where military ranks determine the positions of importance. Logically, the selection seems to prefer prior experience in governance. Some ministries have also called former experts and technocrats to return to their former duties.

The Taliban has inherited an economically crippled country. Afghanistan faces an extreme humanitarian crisis with over $9.5 billion frozen by the US. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that Afghanistan's economy will shrink by 30 percent,[①] with as much as 97 percent of the population at risk of falling below the poverty line by mid-2022.[②] In the face of financial catastrophe, the Taliban has determined that good governance is the best way to win local support, which the group recognizes as vital to its hold on power.

Conclusion

After the August 15 takeover, many observers and stakeholders would likely consider the Taliban's track record during its first stint in power to understand its policymaking and political actions. However, such an approach is misguided, erroneous, and myopic. Recent actions and their current policies indicate that the Taliban has, in fact, evolved.

The movement has ideologically solid roots, which are considerably influenced by its geographical origin. Adhering to a strict interpretation of the Deobandi school of Islam and inspired by Pashtun tribal values, the Taliban reigned brutally and harshly over most of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Its severe rule deprived it of international recognition until it was ousted by the US. After transforming into an insurgency, the Taliban steadily underwent fundamental changes over two decades, signaling that it is an organization capable of learning. Finally, after striking a deal with the US, the Taliban marched unopposed into Kabul in August 2021.

When the Taliban announced its interim government cabinet, certain features echoed the past. The cabinet consisted entirely of Taliban senior leadership, indicating the group's aversion to discord within its ranks. Its response to protests and rebellions also mirrored its high degree of threat perception.

① International Monetary Fund, *Regional Economic Outlook, October 2021, Middle East and Central Asia: Trade-Offs Today for Transformation Tomorrow*, (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2021), file:///Users/rafarmer/Downloads/reo-october-2021-english.pdf (accessed December 10, 2022), 16.

② "97 percent of Afghans could plunge into poverty by mid 2022, says UNDP," *United Nations Development Programme*, September 9, 2021, https://www.undp.org/press-releases/97-percent-afghans-could-plunge-poverty-mid-2022-says-undp (accessed December 10, 2022).

Nevertheless, the Taliban's pragmatic decisions regarding media and NGOs reveal that it has evolved since its days as insurgents. One of the fundamental changes within the group is its embrace of the rapid spread of modern communications technology and the Internet to advance its political goals. Other transformations that have changed the group's decision-making processes are ethnic diversity among recruits and recognition of the importance of good governance.

The Taliban is Afghanistan's new reality. International actors should constructively engage with it in the interest of the Afghan people—something that can only be done effectively by first understanding the movement's history and evolution.

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Technology
Tension Between Neutrality and Value Attachment

Tian Lu

Neutrality of Technology

The neutrality of technology has long been highlighted and was referred to by Martin Heidegger as the instrumental definition of technology.[①] Instrumental theory, versus substantive theory, offers the most widely accepted view of technology.[②] It is common sense that technologies are tools ready to serve the needs of their users and are thus deemed neutral. Statements such as "guns don't kill people, people do" or "a knife can be used to cook, kill, or cure" are a good illustration of this viewpoint. The instrumental theory denies inherent the good and evil in technology itself but evaluates the ends for which it was used. When the use of technology has negative consequences, it is not the technology at fault but the person that misused it.[③] In this sense, technology itself is free from the value discussion.

The idea behind instrumental theory is that technologies are subject to the power of mankind. It means that technology is nothing more than a mere means to an end and has no substantive impact on its user—loyally offering services but never overwhelming its master.

The Value Attached to Technology

Technology as a Driving Force Behind Capitalism

Despite its neutrality, technology, especially innovative technology of today is generally considered as good and is recognized as a necessity to be placed great emphasis on by most societies. One reason behind this is deeply embedded in the close relationship between technology and capitalism.

Capital has significantly reshaped life as we know it. In a pre-capitalist era, trade took place when there were concrete needs for exchange, namely Commodities-Money- Commodities.[④] Concrete utility—the end for exchanges and wealth—instead of capital, was accumulated. However, as capital was increasingly popularized and legitimized, process came to take precedence over substance.[⑤] Capital is embodied in commodities that enter the market to accrue more money or to buy or create more commodities and repeat

① William Lovitt, trans., *The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays* (Garland Publishing, 1997).
② Andrew Feenberg, "Critical Theory of Technology," *Tailoring Biotechnologies* 1, no. 1 (2005) 47-64.
③ Arnold Pacey, *Technology in World Civilization: A Thousand-Year History*, (MIT Press, 1991), 2.
④ Xiaoyang Tang, "Co-evolutionary Pragmatism: Re-examine 'China Model' and Its Impact on Developing Countries," *Journal of Contemporary China* 29, no.186 (2020).
⑤ Robert Heilbroner, "Technology and Capitalism," *Social Research* 64, no.3 (1997): 1321–25.

the process indefinitely. The endless pursuit of surplus value, the difference between the amount raised through a sale of a product and the amount it cost, has constructed a dynamic circular that has no counterpart in traditional societies and that enables technology to play a unique role.

Value was attached to technology since it is capable of driving productivity growth, and thus enables the circular dynamic. Technology is the chief source of new areas of profitable accumulation.[①] Without rapidly growing technology, companies lose their market share and states become less competent in global competition as they will be quickly surpassed by late-comers who are equipped with advanced technologies and turned over from previous positions in the division of labor. Technology in turn provides opportunities for potential players to share the cake and is thus irresistible to those who pursue development and prosperity.

Value attachment has become universal due to the global expansion of capitalism. Capitalism has gradually expanded across the world with ever-increasing productivity, forcing countries—capitalist or non-capitalist—to attach value to productivity growth and the technology underpinning it.[②] Capitalism has endowed technology with unprecedented sociopolitical importance and has elevated it to a history-shaping force in the modern era. Recognized as a powerful driver of capitalism and a critical part of modernization around the world, technology has attained universal value attachment.

Technology as Truth

Technology has not only attained sociopolitical importance, but also gradually replaced the supremacy of religion and has elevated itself to new heights during modern times. Before modernization, it was religion that had long been the common denominator in society. Due to the innate tendency of humans to pursue ultimate and fundamental values, traditional societies had shared the common goal of goodness and truth. Religion, which positions God—the supreme good and truth— at its core, stood out by perfectly responding to the general desire of people for goodness and truth. Therefore, religion obtained legitimacy as a criterion for ethics and a standard for value judgment. In line with religion, society and individuals had developed corresponding orders, which enabled them to move toward the highest end.

However, the advancement of technology enabled further scientific discoveries, some of which—especially those since the 17th century—started to challenge the existing political order built upon religion. Despite the Church's best efforts, many were convinced by modern science and began to question whether truth is monopolized by religion. Doubts concerning the connection between truth and religion began to emerge, and modern science took a more prominent role in society. Over the years, modern science and the technologies behind it have become widely regarded as more valid and tangible than faith.

① Heilbroner, "Technology and Capitalism."
② Tang, "Co-evolutionary Pragmatism: Re-examine 'China Model' and Its Impact on Developing Countries."

Heidegger provides another explanation. According to the philosopher, modern technology is a mode of revealing, and *Ge-stell* is the essence of technology and one way of uncovering.[①] According to Heidegger, technology is not about *überwinden*—overcoming—but rather *verwunden*, meaning converting into its concealed truth. And when technology reveals, every being becomes a standing reserve, and this revelation means truth for Heidegger.[②]

Whether we rely on practical historical explanations or philosophical speculations, the undeniable truth is that technology has been a mighty and increasingly powerful force in modern society. Modern individuals are inclined to treat the calculative thinking enabled by technology as the only path to truth and regard it as the only truth, though truth can appear in many ways.[③] In this regard, as it has been firmly associated with truth, technology has since gained universal recognition—what Heidegger calls the "supremacy of technology."

Tension Between Neutrality and Value Attachment: Why Mankind Struggles to Govern Technology

As previously mentioned, the neutrality of technology is widely accepted. Even Heidegger, a staunch opponent of this view, had to admit that it was indeed "correct," just not deep enough. How, then, can neutrality and the value attachment coexist?

Heidegger's is perhaps one of the most impressive contributions to the discussion on the actual role that technology plays in modern societies:

> Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.[④]

The precondition of neutrality, which is that technologies are under the power of man indicates they are mere instruments that serve their masters. But, to a large extent, reality suggests different. Mankind has discovered that technologies are so difficult to govern that mankind itself is eventually governed by technology. Technology has become a sociopolitical force, no longer a lever of material change.[⑤] Though intended to enlighten and inspire, technology finally blocked the truth and prevented humans from encountering the reality of the world. Furthermore, technology has become entangled with capitalism and truth, two topical issues in modern society, and governs humans both materially and spiritually.

① William Lovitt, trans., *The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays* (Garland Publishing, 1977).
② Rauno Huttunen and Leena Kakkori, "Heidegger's Critique of the Technology and The Educational Ecological Imperative," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 54, no.5 (2022).
③ Ibid.
④ Lovitt, trans., *The Question Concerning Technology*.
⑤ Heilbroner, "Technology and Capitalism."

The essence of technology, *Ge-stell* reveals that everything in nature is a standing reserve. But the problem is that technology reveals that humans are also a standing reserve. The moment when humans were conceived as standing reserve, the whole world was reduced to a manageable reserve.[①] As Heidegger claims, the technical restructuring of modern society is rooted in a nihilistic need for power, a degradation of man and Being to the level of mere objects. Technologies have become the world. Because technology rules, we forget who we are and our fundamental freedoms; we no longer recognize the world we have lost. We lose the ability to experience space and time in any other way than through the neutral, ever-more-accurate measurement we do with rulers and clocks.[②] Heidegger highlighted a different form of threat, in that technology might hinder us from experiencing "the call of a more primal truth," whereas many other technology skeptics focus on its evident hazards. Technology not only makes it more difficult for mankind to access the truth, but it also causes mankind to forget it.

To summarize, technology is morally neutral based on the precondition that humans have complete control over it. However, due to a global quest for capitalism and truth, modern society has broadly assigned value to technology. This tension between neutrality and value attachment is deeply rooted in the fact that humans are not fully in control of technology. Instead, technology gradually removes human subjectivity and leads humanity into purposelessness, or even dictates human behavior.

① Huttunen and Kakkori, "Heidegger's Critique of the Technology and The Educational Ecological Imperative."
② Mark Blitz, "Understanding Heidegger on Technology," *The New Atlantis* no.41 (2014): 62-80.

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Ideology in the Era of Modernization and Globalization

Sulochana Wijayasinghe

Introduction

In his book *The Lexus and Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman distinguishes globalization as one of the most defining characters for comprehending post-Cold War world affairs. According to Friedman, globalization is "the system that has now replaced the old Cold War system, and, like that Cold War system, globalization has its own rules and logic that today directly or indirectly influence the politics, environment, geopolitics and economics of virtually every country in the world."① Upon this backdrop, this essay intends to analyze how ideology is understood in this modernized and globalized world and whether traditional orthodoxies of ideologies have faded or changed over time. For this purpose, I will examine ideology in the sense of its structural value (as a political, economic, and social system) as well as its presumed understanding as an intrinsic (abstract) value.

Ideology in the Modernized and Globalized World

During the Cold War (1947–1991), the world was divided into two ideological spheres: liberal political, economic, and social systems versus socialist political, economic, and social systems. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resultant end of the Cold War enabled liberal and capitalist ideological agendas to dominate state affairs in the following decades. Some triumphalist Western observers optimistically predicted that non-liberal capitalist societies would eventually follow and form Western-style political, economic, and social systems. This sentiment was aptly represented by Francis Fukuyama's celebrated article, "The End of History?", in which he wrote,

> What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.②

According to Kishore Mabhubhani, particularly regarding China, the assumption held by many key Western foreign policy elites and scholars was that "continued engagement of China by America would lead to American values seeping into China and that China would gradually open up its political system

① Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*: *Understanding Globalization*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).
② Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 1.

and join the Western liberal mainstream."[①] The effects of hyper-globalization and modernization have been largely seen as drivers that fuel and accelerate such transformations. It is true that some non-Western societies have embraced social and political systems influenced by Western ideologies. However, some others have been able to successfully merge different ideological traditions together in forming their state structures to better equip their societies in coping with the unfamiliar tides of modernization and globalization. China and Vietnam are classic examples of the aforementioned countries. In both countries, socialist political systems co-exist with capitalist market-oriented economies. One could argue that both countries have delivered greater social and political stability and achieved greater economic prosperity [②] than many other comparative societies in the world today.[③]

In his infamous article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," George F. Kennon refers to the Russian population during Cold War as "physically and spiritually tired."[④] In the same article, Kennon emphasizes that spiritual vitality is an integral part of society, as it helps said society to successfully cope with its internal problems. However, what does exactly Kennon mean by the spiritual vitality of society is seemingly a matter of debate. Hegelian philosophical discourse on collective consciousness may offer some insight in this regard. For example, Francis Fukuyama maintained the view that "For Hegel, the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousness."[⑤] This so-called human consciousness primarily reflects on the level of ideas that are largely considered to be unifying world views that could best be understood under the notion of ideology.[⑥] Hegel further views that ideology in this sense is not confined to the secular, such as political doctrines, but can also be included with values significant to the religion and culture of a given society.[⑦] Therefore, even though the concept of ideology in world affairs is often considered in the sense of political and economic systems, as discussed in the paragraph above, it can also be comprehended in its intrinsic ethical value as well.

According to Hegelian conception, the spirit or the collective consciousness of a given society emanates from its historical experience. Therefore, collective consciousness decides and provides the basis for the explanations on historical evolvement and development of a given era. Thus, notions such as nationalism and ideology are all of part of this collective consciousness underpinned by a so-called historical experience.

① Kishore Mahbubani, *Has China Won?: The Chinese Challenge to the American Primacy* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2020): 110.
② "Globalization brings shifts in Vietnam," *China Daily*, January 19, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017wef/2017-01/19/content_27998575.htm (accessed June 1, 2022).
③ "The Winners and Losers of Globalization: Finding a Path to Shared Prosperity," *The World Bank*, October 25, 2013, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/10/25/The-Winners-and-Losers-of-Globalization-Finding-a-Path-to-Shared-Prosperity (accessed June 1, 2022).
④ "X" (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs,* https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct (accessed June 1, 2022).
⑤ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 3.
⑥ Ibid.
⑦ Ibid.

This explains why Deng Xiaoping, in referring to China's party ideology after Chairman Mao Zedong's death, claimed:

> Some had distorted Mao's ideas by taking certain statements made in one context and claiming that they applied to other situations. But Mao had different solutions at different times, and one must have a correct and comprehensive understanding of Mao to apply his prescriptions correctly in each circumstance.①

This understanding was evident when the official ideology of the Chinese Communist Party shifted from the "Two Whatevers"② to "practice is the sole criterion for testing truth." This change demonstrated a clear divergence from Mao's ideology as the "Two Whatevers" were seen as an impediment to China's goals of globalization and modernization. Hu Fuming's commentary "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth" (1978) argues that "we must dare to investigate life in its actuality, real data, and new problems confronted in the course of recent practice. This is the only correct attitude towards Marxism." ③ Thus, fundamental argument this commentary aims to deliver was that Marxism must constantly be reinterpreted as a result of experience, and it should not be regarded as a rigid or an unchanging body of thinking.④

Furthermore, Hegel believed that "[human] consciousness may not be explicit and self-aware, as are modern political doctrines, but may rather take the form of religion or simple cultural or moral habits."⑤In this regard, ideology can be understood as an abstract concept that provides guidance for the utility in the material world. In the case of China, many observers speculate that its socialist ideology may have changed after the reform and opening process. Regardless, China's political elite often define the country's ideology (or at least its guiding principle) as "socialism with Chinese characteristics."⑥ However, due to its abstract nature, it is difficult to clarify in concrete terms what exactly "socialism with Chinese characteristics" means. For this reason, different interpretations have emerged in scholarly debates. Some scholars believe that the concept of "practice is the sole criterion for testing truth" provides theoretical guidance on Chinese socialist ideology. It is obvious that this concept is essentially different to conventional or traditional socialist ideological values. Therefore, in China, the conventional fundamental values of ideology (e.g., class struggle, the "Two Whatevers," etc.) have been subject to reinterpretation and in their current form they appear to be rather ambiguous. Consequently, these values have been contested with diverse interpretations in discourses in different domains.

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① Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011): 171.
② The "Two Whatevers" refers to the statement "We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave," contained in a joint editorial entitled, "Study the Documents Well and Grasp the Key Link" (Feb. 1997) in the *People's Daily*, the *PLA Daily,* and the journal *Red Flag*.
③ "Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth," *Chinese Studies in Philosophy* 25, no.2 (1993): 42.
④ Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*, 176.
⑤ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 3.
⑥ "What does 'path of socialism with Chinese characteristics' mean?," *CGTN*, https://www.cgtn.com/how-china-works/feature/What-does-path-of-socialism-with-Chinese-characteristics-mean.html (accessed March 9, 2022).

Conclusion

In “The End of History?”, Fukuyama contemplates whether the world has reached the end of ideological evolution. The straightforward answer is no. Despite the dynamic trends of globalization and modernization, the world is still ideologically diverse. Some societies have been able to successfully adopt and merge different value systems into one coherent system in which different ideological values coexist. In the sense of ideology as an intrinsic value, traditional ideologies have been transformed and reinterpreted in order to make them applicable to the changing circumstances of globalization and modernization. How China changed its official party ideology from the “Two Whatevers” to “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth” to achieve its development goals serves as a classic example of such transformation and reinterpretation.

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