Aid and the China-Africa Relationship with Dan Banik

For the second edition of the TSDM Case Studies in Chinese Political Economy course, students attended a talk by Professor Dan Banik of the University of Oslo Centre for Development and Environment. The presentation and ensuing conversation centered around changing trends in developmental aid, with particular attention given to the China model of assistance and its applications in Africa. At a time when this analysis is particularly topical given trends of criticism towards and reconsideration of Chinese extending influence in the developing world, Professor Banik left us with new information and unanswered questions begging further exploration.

对非援助与中非关系

在中国政治经济案例分析的第二次课上,来自奥斯陆大学环境与发展中心的Dan Banik教授为同学们带来了一次精彩的演讲,主题是发展性援助的变化趋势,其中着重 关注中国对非援助的模式以及该模式在非洲的应用情况。当前,由于西方国家逐渐开 始重视中国在发展中国家影响力的扩大,中国对非援助与中非关系已经成为了一个十分热门的话题, Banik教授的演讲不仅为我们带来了许多新的信息和知识,还为我 们留下了思考问题以帮助我们更好地了解主题。

Banik began his presentation with an examination of traditional aid motivations with roots in the Fukuyaman rhetoric coming out of liberal capitalist democracies as they worked to extend their proclaimed triumphant developmental model across the developing world. China, he argued, has been so welcomed by countries in Africa because it attempts to distance itself from, and in some cases outright reject, altruistic aid that is often made conditional upon ascribing to certain ‘western’ ideologies and values. Rather, China endorses aid in line with economic interests that coincide with national interests as part of a mutually beneficial relationship. For example, in contrast to the clear wall that European and American countries delineate between official development assistance (ODA) and business investment, Chinese operations tend to blur this line. China does not use the ‘savior narrative’ when embarking upon such ‘win-win’ ventures, which according to Banik helps increase buy-in from African leaders by giving at least the appearance of a partnership, rather than simple charity. It also helps that Chinese aid comes with few questions and no requirements of having to implement policies in line with the values of the donor. China regularly asserts that it is the largest developing country in the world, and thus can claim to understand challenges of development while also being able to credibly limit the it commits to projects, in contrast to the often open-ended Western operations seen as interventionism.

Despite the aforementioned positive attributes of this model from the Chinese perspective, and notwithstanding western criticisms stemming from protectionist reflexes, the most telling criticism is that Chinese development aid has itself developed a neocolonialist character. Much of this mutually beneficial exchange network is constructed whereby raw materials go from Africa to China to be processed and resold to African nations as manufactured goods – a cycle more reminiscent of British trade with India than a new-age development strategy. And even though China has traditionally made a habit of focusing aid on turnkey projects that are
to be maintained by the local nations upon completion, more and more recent projects are diverging from this implementation model due to recipient government demands for follow-up materials, assistance with repairs, and other maintenance that only Chinese engineers can provide. As a result, China is now finding itself stuck in the long-term commitments for which it has always criticized the West. In this same vein, the Chinese model’s emphasis on not asking tough questions of the local governments has started to lead to issues as underlying political tensions and questions of project ownership, studiously ignored during project design, cause problems following completion.

The involvement of the Chinese private sector in these activities is the subject of both criticism and heightened interest, as the role companies and corporations play is unique. There is the argument that Chinese development assistance has led to the growth of corporate social responsibility, evidenced by increasing business support for public sector policies. As China has no official aid agency, such as NORAD in Norway or USAID in the USA, many of the companies involved in public projects assume the work traditionally done by governmental organs, even before winning a government contract for continuing their work. While the key role that the private sector plays in Chinese-led development is not well understood, Banik argues that this point could provide an interesting basis for comparison with other international aid models, and thus demands further exploration.

What is clear from Banik’s talk is that both Western and Chinese donors have much learn from each other. The Chinese could learn from the West  how to better conduct feasibility studies and ask hard questions up front, in order to better ensure long-term viability of projects. As the Chinese find themselves in longer-term commitments, they could also learn from the West’s expertise in resource management and organizational capacity building. The West, by contrast, could learn from China’s more business-focused development model. Critiques of China from the West are often exaggerated, particularly on matters of good governance, when in reality the two sides are not in direct competition and many aspects of the Chinese aid model are undertaken by NGOs working in the same space. The Chinese are able to work within systems of corrupt governments, potentially because of different perceptions of right and wrong in terms of what constitutes corruption, which is potentially a source of their greater efficiency in African countries; NGOs tend to just go around the state altogether and give aid to grassroots initiatives. Western organizations could certainly be more efficient if they were better able to work with local governments. Mostly, the West could be more effective by treating aid recipients as partners rather than charity-cases.

Of course, questions were raised during the discussion on a variety of issues, including ‘dead
aid,’ the feasibility of incorporating anti-corruption clauses into business agreements, and the tradeoff between full support and local capacity building. What is left for us now, Professor Banik implied in parting, is to attempt to understand the bigger picture formed by all these pieces, and reevaluate aid structures to promote future growth through understanding the differences between the Chinese and Western aid models.

首先,Banik教授审视了弗朗西斯·福山提出的自由资本主义民主国家的传统援助动机——在发展中国家努力扩大它们所认为的已经“胜利”的发展模型。福山认为,中国在一些非洲国家受到特别欢迎的原因是它几乎没有在非洲开展西方所谓的无偿援助,因为这些援助并非真正“无偿”,往往依附于西方的意识形态和价值观。相反,中国支持与中国国家利益相符的经济项目,并试图与非洲国家形成互惠关系。例如,与欧洲和美国在ODA和商业利益划分明晰界限行为相反,中国企业试图模糊界限。当开始与非洲的“双赢”关系时,中国并没有使用“救世主的又吻”;Banik教授认为这种行为使得很多非洲领导人变得非常“买账”,因为即便这只是表面上的“伙伴”关系,也比西方所实施的对非简单慈善关系好。同时,这也使得中国援助在发挥作用的同时,减少实施过程中所遇到的问题。中国自称是世界上最大的发展中国家,与常常被称作是侵略者的西方国家不同,中国可以理解非洲在发展过程中遇到的挑战并做出可以兑现的承诺。

除了前述中国模型的积极贡献,尽管大部分西方批评主要基于自由贸易保护主义的角度,最激烈的批评认为中国的发展性援助本身有着一种新殖民主义的特性。中国所谓的互惠关系的真正运作模式其实是中国从非洲进又原材料进行再生产并卖回给非洲国家——一种更像英国当时在印度的贸易模式而非一种新时代的发展策略。同时,尽管中国有着在援助时提供“一站式”工程的传统——工程完工后由当地政府全权接手,但是越来越多的近期工程在完工后所需的材料、后期维护都只有中国工程师才有能力提供。因此,中国现在似乎陷入了它之前所批评的西方“长期干涉”太多的困境。同时,中国模型强调尊重当地文化,不问当地政府敏感问题的行为方式,似乎已经开始产生问题:政治紧张、项目归属权、项目设计合理性都影响了项目的完成情况。

中国私有企业在非洲的深入发展也成为了外界的聚焦点,因为这些公司在非洲扮演了非常独特的角色。有一种说法是中国的发展援助促进了企业社会责任的增长,并被这些企业对于公共部门不断增长的商业支持所支持。不像挪威的NORAD和美国的USAID,中国没有官方的援助机构或者部门,很多公司在展开项目之前往往无法获得全面的信息。尽管私有部门在中国主导的发展援助中的重要作用并没有被理解,Banik表示这可以为将中国模型与其他国际援助模型进行比较提供有趣的角度,值得更多的探索。

Banik教授的研究十分清晰的表示中国和西方援助者都需要彼此学习。中国可以从西方学习如何提高灵活性并开展援助项目背景调查,使得项目拥有更久的持续性。当中国开始开展越来越多的长期项目的时候,可以从西方专家处学习资源管理和组织性资本建设。西方,相反可以从中国处学习更加以商业为中心的发展模型。西方的对中批评者经常扩大中国模型的缺点,尤其在商品管理方面,尽管双方并没有直接的竞争关系同时中国援助模型已经被许多NGO的其他模型所替代。同时,中国也在和腐败政府合作,潜在原因是对于腐败的认知不同,以及与这些政府合作可以使得中国在非洲国家开展更高效的援助,但是反观NGO则试图调查所有情况后把援助给最基层的组织和机构。事实上,西方可以学习中国模型,通过将被援助方视为伙伴以使得对非援助变得更加高效。

当然,在演讲过程中同学们也提出了一些问题。比如无用援助以及全权自主和本地资本发展的平衡。Banik教授试图从更全面的角度重新审视援助结构以明晰中西方援助模型的差异。