Graduate students in the Tsinghua-SAIS Dual Degree Program met with Jake Sullivan, former U.S. National Security Adviser to Vice President Joe Biden and former Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State, on December 6th.
智库的作用

2017年12月6日,清华-霍普金斯项目学者与杰克·沙利文先生在清华-卡内基中心进行了深入的交流。

Mr. Sullivan spent time working on various democratic presidential campaigns: in 2008, he served as Deputy Policy Director for Hillary Clinton’s 2008 presidential primary bid, and then as member of Barack Obama’s general election debate preparation team; in 2016, Sullivan was Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to Secretary Clinton’s presidential campaign. Between races, he held the position of Deputy Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Sullivan has also been a senior policy adviser and chief counsel to Senator Amy Klobuchar from his home state of Minnesota, worked as an associate for Faegre & Benson LLP, and taught at the University of St. Thomas Law School. He clerked for Judge Stephen Breyer of the Supreme Court of the United States and Judge Guido Calabresi of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Sullivan holds undergraduate and law degrees from Yale and a master’s degree from Oxford. Sullivan is now a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Geoeconomics and Strategy Program and a Martin R. Flug Visiting lecturer in law at Yale Law School.

Sullivan began the session with some opening thoughts on his think tank experience in the United States. He highlighted the increasingly central role of think tanks in filling the gap between the academic sphere and the practice of actual policy. In this regard, the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, founded in 1910, is very special because it is the first think tank in the United States created specifically for foreign policy purposes.

Sullivan then identified four functions of think tanks for his audience:

  1. Pulling forward new policy ideas, new doctrines and new ways for policy makers. In this sense, think tanks are framing the public debate, pulling forward policy options and have real opportunity to make an impact.
  2. Think tanks are also forums or platforms for public debate and discussion. The biggest challenge is to try to effectively communicate to a larger public.
  3. Serving as an extension of governments in trying to shape diplomatic engagements particularly with difficult countries and issues.
  4. Provide a home to people out of governments.

Finally the goal of all think tanks is to find the most effective way to impact policy makers.

The second part of the meeting was dedicated to a question-and-answer segment. Questions mainly focused on two topics: the Iranian nuclear deal, and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.

Sullivan started by reviewing the negotiation process of the Iranian deal initiated by the Obama administration. The broader objectives of the deal were threefold: first, it aimed to limit the armament of Iran; second, it attempted to create opportunity for greater economic integration for Iran; and third, in case of successful implementation of the deal, it hoped to open up the possibility for discussion on future strategies. However, President Obama and John Kerry worried about the possibility that Iran would walk away from the deal. Sullivan developed his critique of the administration’s approach within the broader perspective of the region. He argued that the fundamental challenge in the Middle East is Iranian overconfidence contrasted by Sunni under confidence. Sullivan suggested that the United States should work to this dynamic by raising the confidence of the U.S.’ Sunni partners. This different mindset on each side is contributing to a toxic atmosphere. He expanded this to say in the Middle East, three main factors contribute to the instability of the region:

  1. Weakening and the collapse of state structures
  2. Rise of jihad ideology
  3. Proxy conflicts between actors: inter-state dimension, rivalry and competitions between Saudi and Iran.

He continued by explaining that the real danger of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons is that Turkey and Egypt will most probably say that they have to get nuclear weapons as well.

Upon request, Sullivan compared and put into perspective the North Korean issue and the Iran issue. He pointed out two essential differences.

First, China’s mindset is fundamentally different. Regarding the Iranian deal, all the great powers, represented by the P5+2 (Germany and the EU), are seated on the same side of the table, both metaphorically and physically. The dynamic with North Korea is, in this aspect, very different. Indeed, China sees itself as seated between the United States and North Korea. China plays the role of balancer by trying to facilitate the dialogue between the two countries, not the role of enforcer of international law. However, Sullivan argued it is time for China to “join the US on the same side of the table,” to say as a responsible great power, “this [behavior] is not acceptable.” It is not enough to ask China to pressure Pyongyang to set up a U.S.-North Korea dialogue. China has to be a central part of negotiations. China, rather than the United States, should be paying for North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear and missile programs.1

The second difference concerns the sanctions. Sullivan argued that sanctions only work if the country is deeply exposed to the international economy and is responsive to its people. Iran is both, and North Korea is neither.

Sullivan concluded by suggesting that the biggest challenge for the Sino-US relations is to design an effective dialogue between the two countries. His experience in government provided a comprehensive view on the Iranian deal and on the North Korea nuclear issue.

杰克·沙利文先生曾担任前美国副总统拜登的国家安全顾问兼美国国务院政策规划主任,并多次协助美国民主党的总统候选人参与总统竞选:2008年,担任希拉里·克林顿的政策规划副主任,参与了希拉里党内总统候选人提名竞选,随后加入奥巴马一般性选举辩论的准备团队。2016年,在时任国务卿希拉里的总统竞选团队中担任高级外交政策顾问一职。在这八年中,他还是希拉里的副参谋长。

沙利文先生同时也是明尼苏达州参议员艾米·克罗布歇的高级政策顾问和法律顾问、美国斐格律师事务所的合作伙伴,并在圣托马斯大学法学院任教。他曾担任美国最高法院史蒂芬·布雷耶法官和美国第二巡回上诉法院奎多·卡拉布雷西法官的书记员。沙利文先生在耶鲁大学取得法学学士学位,并在牛津大学获得硕士学位。他现在是卡内基地缘经济与战略项目的高级研究员以及耶鲁大学法学院马丁·弗拉格访问学者。

沙利文先生从他在美国智库的工作经历出发,与项目学者分享了他个人对智库的看法。他强调,智库在消除学术界与政策实践之间的差距中正发挥着越来越重要的作用。从这个角度看,作为基金会因其是美国首个专注于外交政策的智库,建立于1910年的卡内基国际和平尤为特殊。

沙利文先生随后向项目学者阐明了智库的四项职能:

  1. 智库为政策制定者提供新思想、新学说和新路径。
  2. 智库是公开辩论以及讨论的论坛和平台。在这方面,智库最大的挑战是如何有效地和大众沟通。
  3. 作为政府部门的延展,智库需要帮助政府与其他国家一同围绕一些棘手的议题开展外交谈判,处理相应事务。
  4. 智库为政府的离职官员提供后续工作平台。

最后,所有的智库都希望能够找到影响政策制定者的最为有效的方式。

交流的第二部分主要是问答环节。问题主要集中在两个话题:伊朗核协议、朝鲜核武器与导弹问题。

沙利文先生首先回顾了奥巴马政府与伊朗政府开展核协议谈判的过程。伊朗核协议有三个大方向上的目标:首先,该协议旨在限制伊朗的军备力量;其次,该协议试图将伊朗纳入更深层的经济一体化;最后,在协议成功落实的情况下,还希望为未来战略上的讨论提供可能。但是奥巴马总统和约翰·克里担心伊朗可能会会单方面撕毁协定。在此基础上,沙利文先生从更宏观的地区视角提出了他对奥巴马政府用以解决伊朗核问题的方法提出了批判性看法。他认为中东地区最根本的挑战来自伊朗人的过度自信和逊尼派信心不足之间的反差。针对这一地区的事态动荡,他提议:由于双方观念上的差异很可能将把地区争端拖入不利局面,美国应当着力增强其逊尼派同盟的信心。基于此判断,沙利文先生分析了影响中东地区稳定的三个因素:

  1. 国家结构不断削弱、崩溃。
  2. 极端宗教主义抬头。
  3. 代理冲突不断:逊尼派和伊朗之间跨国的敌对与竞争。

他进一步解释了伊朗获得核武器的真正威胁在于土耳其和埃及也有可能要求获得核武器。

对于这一要求,沙利文进行了比较,并代入朝鲜议题和伊朗议题的视角进行分析,指出两点本质上的差别。

第一,中国的观念完全不同。关于伊朗核武器协议,角力的大国(安理会五大常任理事国与德国和欧盟)不管是从精神上还是实际行动上都是站在一边的。在这一方面,朝鲜问题上的局势动态就与之尤为不同。实际上,中国自视处在美国和朝鲜的中间位置,扮演着平衡者的角色,试图推动朝鲜和美国之间的对话,而非担任国际法律的执行者。然而,沙利文也强调,作为一个负责任的大国,中国是时候跟美国站到一边了,就现时而言,居中调停的行为已经无法接受了。美国要求中国对平壤施压,已经开展的朝-美对话远远不够,中国必须成为谈判的中心国家。应当是中国而非美国,为推动朝鲜暂定和撤回核武器以及导弹项目摆出筹码。

第二个不同点在于制裁。沙利文强调,只有在一国与国际经济充分接触,且对民意有回应时,制裁才有作用。伊朗能够如此,朝鲜却截然相反。

由此得出结论,中美关系面临最大的挑战在于建立一套有效的对话机制。针对伊朗协议和朝核问题,沙利文先生以其在政府工作的切身经历为我们提供了一个综合的视角。



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